Social exclusion of Muslim youth in Flemish-and French-speaking Belgian schools

Comparative Education Review

Volumn 49, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 1-22

  Merry, Michael S ^a  

^a NONE

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EID: 15744403445     PISSN: 00104086     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/426158     Document Type: Article

References (129)

1. "Quelle est, en effet, la priorité pour ces jeunes? Renouer avec l'histoire de leurs parents ou travailler leur assimilation économique?" Altay Manço, "Strategies d'orientation scolaire et insertion sociale: Contexte general et cas des jeunes Marocains en Belgique francophone," Revue internationale de l'education 40, no. 2 (1994): 110.
2. For example, there are Sufis, Shi'ite, Sunnis, and Turkish Azeri. Except where ethnic differences arise, the minorities discussed in this study will be referred to strictly in religious terms. Kathleen Peleman notes also that both Turks and Moroccans in Belgium must stress the religious aspect of their identities if they are to be accepted within their own groups (Kathleen Peleman, personal communication, July 29, 2003). Compare Meryem Kanmaz, "'Onze nationaliteit is onze godsdienst': Islam als 'identity marker' bij jonge Marokkaanse moslims in Gent," in Migratie, zijn uw kinderen? Identiteitsbeleving bij allochtone jongeren, ed. M. C. Foblets and E. Cornelis (Leuven: Acco, 2002), 115-33. Nationality is increasingly unreliable as an indicator of ethnicity with the increases in naturalizations since ius soli laws were ratified in 1985 and expanded again under the law of June 13, 1991. Nationality is also unreliable as there has been a sharp rise in the number of converts to Islam in Belgium as elsewhere in Europe; see Monique Renaerts, "Processes of Homogenization in the Muslim Educational World in Brussels," International Review of Educational Research 31 (1999): 284. Enrollment figures of religion classes in state schools is also unreliable in part because a large number of Muslims attend Catholic schools and because a significant percentage do not request Islamic instruction but prefer the optional classes in nonconfessional ethics.
3. For example, there are Sufis, Shi'ite, Sunnis, and Turkish Azeri. Except where ethnic differences arise, the minorities discussed in this study will be referred to strictly in religious terms. Kathleen Peleman notes also that both Turks and Moroccans in Belgium must stress the religious aspect of their identities if they are to be accepted within their own groups (Kathleen Peleman, personal communication, July 29, 2003). Compare Meryem Kanmaz, "'Onze nationaliteit is onze godsdienst': Islam als 'identity marker' bij jonge Marokkaanse moslims in Gent," in Migratie, zijn uw kinderen? Identiteitsbeleving bij allochtone jongeren, ed. M. C. Foblets and E. Cornelis (Leuven: Acco, 2002), 115-33. Nationality is increasingly unreliable as an indicator of ethnicity with the increases in naturalizations since ius soli laws were ratified in 1985 and expanded again under the law of June 13, 1991. Nationality is also unreliable as there has been a sharp rise in the number of converts to Islam in Belgium as elsewhere in Europe; see Monique Renaerts, "Processes of Homogenization in the Muslim Educational World in Brussels," International Review of Educational Research 31 (1999): 284. Enrollment figures of religion classes in state schools is also unreliable in part because a large number of Muslims attend Catholic schools and because a significant percentage do not request Islamic instruction but prefer the optional classes in nonconfessional ethics.
4. For example, there are Sufis, Shi'ite, Sunnis, and Turkish Azeri. Except where ethnic differences arise, the minorities discussed in this study will be referred to strictly in religious terms. Kathleen Peleman notes also that both Turks and Moroccans in Belgium must stress the religious aspect of their identities if they are to be accepted within their own groups (Kathleen Peleman, personal communication, July 29, 2003). Compare Meryem Kanmaz, "'Onze nationaliteit is onze godsdienst': Islam als 'identity marker' bij jonge Marokkaanse moslims in Gent," in Migratie, zijn uw kinderen? Identiteitsbeleving bij allochtone jongeren, ed. M. C. Foblets and E. Cornelis (Leuven: Acco, 2002), 115-33. Nationality is increasingly unreliable as an indicator of ethnicity with the increases in naturalizations since ius soli laws were ratified in 1985 and expanded again under the law of June 13, 1991. Nationality is also unreliable as there has been a sharp rise in the number of converts to Islam in Belgium as elsewhere in Europe; see Monique Renaerts, "Processes of Homogenization in the Muslim Educational World in Brussels," International Review of Educational Research 31 (1999): 284. Enrollment figures of religion classes in state schools is also unreliable in part because a large number of Muslims attend Catholic schools and because a significant percentage do not request Islamic instruction but prefer the optional classes in nonconfessional ethics.
5. Karen Phalet and Marc Swyngedouw, "National Identities and Representations of Citizenship: A Comparison of Turks, Moroccans and Working Class Belgians in Brussels," Ethnicities 2, no. 1 (2002): 12.
6. Such is the agenda of the controversial Lebanese immigrant in Belgian politics, D. Abou Jahjah; see his Resist! Veel Meer dan een Cultuurshok (Berchem: Epo, 2003).
7. An incendiary debate was touched off by the following authors concerning the discriminatory - even racist - nature of migrant policy toward Muslims that I will not canvass here. See Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, "The Belgian Migrant Debate," New Community 20, no. 2 (January 1994): 227-51. This is a condensed English version of Het Belgische Migrantendebat (Antwerp: International Pragmatics Association, 1992). Blommaert later wrote, "the 'integration' concept has become one of the main tools for constructing well-sounding discriminatory rhetoric" (Jan Blommaert and Marco Martiniello, "Ethnic Mobilization, Multiculturalism and the Political Process in Two Belgian Cities: Antwerp and Liège," Innovation 9, no. 1 [1996]: 58). The ius soli laws of 1985 were an effective way to avoid the debate on voting rights ( Dirk Jacobs, personal communication, July 30, 2003). Voting rights to immigrants in local elections became a major political issue in late 2003 and, thanks mainly to the socialists and the francophone parties, the vote was ratified on February 19, 2004. Immigrants must be able to prove a 5-year residency in Belgium, they must register to vote, and they must pledge to respect the Belgian Constitution and other laws that apply to citizens (see Thérèse de Raedt, "Muslims in Belgium: A Case Study of Emerging Identities," Journal of Muslim Affairs 24, no. 1 [2004]: 27, n. 41). Throughout I will use "autochthonous" to refer to the ethnic Belgian majority, Flemish or Walloon. I will use "allochthonous" to refer to the ethnic minorities who, for the purposes of this study, are Muslim and have resided in Belgium for no more than three generations.
8. An incendiary debate was touched off by the following authors concerning the discriminatory - even racist - nature of migrant policy toward Muslims that I will not canvass here. See Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, "The Belgian Migrant Debate," New Community 20, no. 2 (January 1994): 227-51. This is a condensed English version of Het Belgische Migrantendebat (Antwerp: International Pragmatics Association, 1992). Blommaert later wrote, "the 'integration' concept has become one of the main tools for constructing well-sounding discriminatory rhetoric" (Jan Blommaert and Marco Martiniello, "Ethnic Mobilization, Multiculturalism and the Political Process in Two Belgian Cities: Antwerp and Liège," Innovation 9, no. 1 [1996]: 58). The ius soli laws of 1985 were an effective way to avoid the debate on voting rights ( Dirk Jacobs, personal communication, July 30, 2003). Voting rights to immigrants in local elections became a major political issue in late 2003 and, thanks mainly to the socialists and the francophone parties, the vote was ratified on February 19, 2004. Immigrants must be able to prove a 5-year residency in Belgium, they must register to vote, and they must pledge to respect the Belgian Constitution and other laws that apply to citizens (see Thérèse de Raedt, "Muslims in Belgium: A Case Study of Emerging Identities," Journal of Muslim Affairs 24, no. 1 [2004]: 27, n. 41). Throughout I will use "autochthonous" to refer to the ethnic Belgian majority, Flemish or Walloon. I will use "allochthonous" to refer to the ethnic minorities who, for the purposes of this study, are Muslim and have resided in Belgium for no more than three generations.
9. An incendiary debate was touched off by the following authors concerning the discriminatory - even racist - nature of migrant policy toward Muslims that I will not canvass here. See Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, "The Belgian Migrant Debate," New Community 20, no. 2 (January 1994): 227-51. This is a condensed English version of Het Belgische Migrantendebat (Antwerp: International Pragmatics Association, 1992). Blommaert later wrote, "the 'integration' concept has become one of the main tools for constructing well-sounding discriminatory rhetoric" (Jan Blommaert and Marco Martiniello, "Ethnic Mobilization, Multiculturalism and the Political Process in Two Belgian Cities: Antwerp and Liège," Innovation 9, no. 1 [1996]: 58). The ius soli laws of 1985 were an effective way to avoid the debate on voting rights ( Dirk Jacobs, personal communication, July 30, 2003). Voting rights to immigrants in local elections became a major political issue in late 2003 and, thanks mainly to the socialists and the francophone parties, the vote was ratified on February 19, 2004. Immigrants must be able to prove a 5-year residency in Belgium, they must register to vote, and they must pledge to respect the Belgian Constitution and other laws that apply to citizens (see Thérèse de Raedt, "Muslims in Belgium: A Case Study of Emerging Identities," Journal of Muslim Affairs 24, no. 1 [2004]: 27, n. 41). Throughout I will use "autochthonous" to refer to the ethnic Belgian majority, Flemish or Walloon. I will use "allochthonous" to refer to the ethnic minorities who, for the purposes of this study, are Muslim and have resided in Belgium for no more than three generations.
10. An incendiary debate was touched off by the following authors concerning the discriminatory - even racist - nature of migrant policy toward Muslims that I will not canvass here. See Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, "The Belgian Migrant Debate," New Community 20, no. 2 (January 1994): 227-51. This is a condensed English version of Het Belgische Migrantendebat (Antwerp: International Pragmatics Association, 1992). Blommaert later wrote, "the 'integration' concept has become one of the main tools for constructing well-sounding discriminatory rhetoric" (Jan Blommaert and Marco Martiniello, "Ethnic Mobilization, Multiculturalism and the Political Process in Two Belgian Cities: Antwerp and Liège," Innovation 9, no. 1 [1996]: 58). The ius soli laws of 1985 were an effective way to avoid the debate on voting rights ( Dirk Jacobs, personal communication, July 30, 2003). Voting rights to immigrants in local elections became a major political issue in late 2003 and, thanks mainly to the socialists and the francophone parties, the vote was ratified on February 19, 2004. Immigrants must be able to prove a 5-year residency in Belgium, they must register to vote, and they must pledge to respect the Belgian Constitution and other laws that apply to citizens (see Thérèse de Raedt, "Muslims in Belgium: A Case Study of Emerging Identities," Journal of Muslim Affairs 24, no. 1 [2004]: 27, n. 41). Throughout I will use "autochthonous" to refer to the ethnic Belgian majority, Flemish or Walloon. I will use "allochthonous" to refer to the ethnic minorities who, for the purposes of this study, are Muslim and have resided in Belgium for no more than three generations.
11. An incendiary debate was touched off by the following authors concerning the discriminatory - even racist - nature of migrant policy toward Muslims that I will not canvass here. See Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, "The Belgian Migrant Debate," New Community 20, no. 2 (January 1994): 227-51. This is a condensed English version of Het Belgische Migrantendebat (Antwerp: International Pragmatics Association, 1992). Blommaert later wrote, "the 'integration' concept has become one of the main tools for constructing well-sounding discriminatory rhetoric" (Jan Blommaert and Marco Martiniello, "Ethnic Mobilization, Multiculturalism and the Political Process in Two Belgian Cities: Antwerp and Liège," Innovation 9, no. 1 [1996]: 58). The ius soli laws of 1985 were an effective way to avoid the debate on voting rights ( Dirk Jacobs, personal communication, July 30, 2003). Voting rights to immigrants in local elections became a major political issue in late 2003 and, thanks mainly to the socialists and the francophone parties, the vote was ratified on February 19, 2004. Immigrants must be able to prove a 5-year residency in Belgium, they must register to vote, and they must pledge to respect the Belgian Constitution and other laws that apply to citizens (see Thérèse de Raedt, "Muslims in Belgium: A Case Study of Emerging Identities," Journal of Muslim Affairs 24, no. 1 [2004]: 27, n. 41). Throughout I will use "autochthonous" to refer to the ethnic Belgian majority, Flemish or Walloon. I will use "allochthonous" to refer to the ethnic minorities who, for the purposes of this study, are Muslim and have resided in Belgium for no more than three generations.
12. Jane Percy-Smith, ed., Policy Responses to Social Exclusion: Towards Inclusion? (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000); Annette Hayton, ed., Tackling Disaffection and Social Exclusion: Educational Perspectives and Policies (London: Kogan Page, 1999).
13. Jane Percy-Smith, ed., Policy Responses to Social Exclusion: Towards Inclusion? (Philadelphia: Open University Press, 2000); Annette Hayton, ed., Tackling Disaffection and Social Exclusion: Educational Perspectives and Policies (London: Kogan Page, 1999).
14. Torsten Husén, "Schooling in Modern Europe: Exploring Major Issues and Their Ramifications," International Review of Education 39, no. 6 (1993): 499-509; Joanna McPake and Ghazala Bhatti, "Education and Poverty in Western Europe," Prospects 29, no. 4 (1999): 551-59.
15. Torsten Husén, "Schooling in Modern Europe: Exploring Major Issues and Their Ramifications," International Review of Education 39, no. 6 (1993): 499-509; Joanna McPake and Ghazala Bhatti, "Education and Poverty in Western Europe," Prospects 29, no. 4 (1999): 551-59.
16. Ian Andriessen and Karen Phalet, "Acculturation and School Success: A Study among Minority Youth in the Netherlands," Intercultural Education 13, no. 1 (2002): 21-36; Leslie Limage, "Education and Muslim Identity: The Case of France," Comparative Education 36, no. 1 (2000): 73-94; Pnina Werbner, "Divided Loyalties, Empowered Citizenship? Muslims in Britain," Citizenship Studies 4, no. 3 (2000): 307-23.
17. Ian Andriessen and Karen Phalet, "Acculturation and School Success: A Study among Minority Youth in the Netherlands," Intercultural Education 13, no. 1 (2002): 21-36; Leslie Limage, "Education and Muslim Identity: The Case of France," Comparative Education 36, no. 1 (2000): 73-94; Pnina Werbner, "Divided Loyalties, Empowered Citizenship? Muslims in Britain," Citizenship Studies 4, no. 3 (2000): 307-23.
18. Ian Andriessen and Karen Phalet, "Acculturation and School Success: A Study among Minority Youth in the Netherlands," Intercultural Education 13, no. 1 (2002): 21-36; Leslie Limage, "Education and Muslim Identity: The Case of France," Comparative Education 36, no. 1 (2000): 73-94; Pnina Werbner, "Divided Loyalties, Empowered Citizenship? Muslims in Britain," Citizenship Studies 4, no. 3 (2000): 307-23.
19. Annette Lareau, Unequal Childhood: Class, Race, and Family Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), and "Class, Race and Contemporary American Childrearing in Black Families and White Families," American Sociological Review 67, no. 5 (2002): 747-76.
20. Annette Lareau, Unequal Childhood: Class, Race, and Family Life (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), and "Class, Race and Contemporary American Childrearing in Black Families and White Families," American Sociological Review 67, no. 5 (2002): 747-76.
21. Pierre Bourdieu, Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, 2nd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1990); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, 1976).
22. Pierre Bourdieu, Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture, 2nd ed. (London: Sage Publications, 1990); Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis, Schooling in Capitalist America (New York: Basic Books, 1976).
23. Samuel Lucas, Tracking Inequality (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999); Jeannie Oakes, Keeping Track: How Schools Structure Inequality (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985).
24. Samuel Lucas, Tracking Inequality (New York: Teachers College Press, 1999); Jeannie Oakes, Keeping Track: How Schools Structure Inequality (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1985).
25. Henry Giroux, Theory and Resistance in Education (London: Bergin & Garvey, 1983); Michael Apple and Lois Weiss, eds., Ideology and Practice in Schooling (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983).
26. Henry Giroux, Theory and Resistance in Education (London: Bergin & Garvey, 1983); Michael Apple and Lois Weiss, eds., Ideology and Practice in Schooling (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1983).
27. J ohn Ogbu, "Immigrant and Involuntary Minorities in Comparative Perspective," in Minority Status and Schooling: A Comparative Study of Immigrant and Involuntary Minorities, ed. M. A. Gibson and J. Ogbu (New York: Garland, 1991), 3-33; J. Ogbu and H. Simons, "Voluntary and Involuntary Minorities: A Cultural-Ecological Theory of School Performance with Some Implications for Education," Anthropology and Educational Quarterly 29 (1998): 155-88.
28. J ohn Ogbu, "Immigrant and Involuntary Minorities in Comparative Perspective," in Minority Status and Schooling: A Comparative Study of Immigrant and Involuntary Minorities, ed. M. A. Gibson and J. Ogbu (New York: Garland, 1991), 3-33; J. Ogbu and H. Simons, "Voluntary and Involuntary Minorities: A Cultural-Ecological Theory of School Performance with Some Implications for Education," Anthropology and Educational Quarterly 29 (1998): 155-88.
29. Frederick Erickson, "Transformation and School Success: The Politics and Culture of Educational Achievement," Anthropology and Education Quarterly 18 (1987): 335-56.
30. Dutroux was sentenced to life imprisonment in June 2004. Following the death of Benaïsa, the burial needs of Muslim residents in Belgium became, for the first time, a topic of public interest. While some limited provisions have been made, it remains an issue that has failed to be adequately addressed in Belgian public decision making (Dirk Jacobs, personal communication, July 31, 2003).
31. Vlaams Blok is different from most right-wing political parties in Europe chiefly because its roots were established in a cultural (Flemish) preservation movement. The literature on the Blok is large, but a nice overview can be found in Dirk Jacobs and Stef Rummens, "'Wij zeggen wat ú Denkt' Extreem-Rechts in Vlaanderen en Nieuw Radicaal-Rechts in Europa," Krisis 2 (2003): 41-59; also see Patrick Hossay, "'Our People First': Understanding the Resonance of the Vlaams Blok's Xenophobic Programe," Social Identities 2, no. 3 (1996): 343-55. The high court in Belgium has recently made it impossible for Vlaams Blok to continue as a legitimate party owing to its overtly racist/xenophobic character. In response, the Blok has already begun to reorganize, renaming itself Vlaams Belang (Flemish Concern/Interest), and plans to tame its message.
32. Vlaams Blok is different from most right-wing political parties in Europe chiefly because its roots were established in a cultural (Flemish) preservation movement. The literature on the Blok is large, but a nice overview can be found in Dirk Jacobs and Stef Rummens, "'Wij zeggen wat ú Denkt' Extreem-Rechts in Vlaanderen en Nieuw Radicaal-Rechts in Europa," Krisis 2 (2003): 41-59; also see Patrick Hossay, "'Our People First': Understanding the Resonance of the Vlaams Blok's Xenophobic Programe," Social Identities 2, no. 3 (1996): 343-55. The high court in Belgium has recently made it impossible for Vlaams Blok to continue as a legitimate party owing to its overtly racist/xenophobic character. In response, the Blok has already begun to reorganize, renaming itself Vlaams Belang (Flemish Concern/Interest), and plans to tame its message.
33. See John Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium: A Unique Federalism (London: Hurst, 1996); W. D. Halls, "Belgium: A Case Study in Educational Regionalism," Comparative Education 19, no. 2 (1983): 169-77.
34. See John Fitzmaurice, The Politics of Belgium: A Unique Federalism (London: Hurst, 1996); W. D. Halls, "Belgium: A Case Study in Educational Regionalism," Comparative Education 19, no. 2 (1983): 169-77.
35. Blommaert and Martiniello, "Ethnic Mobilization," 51.
36. Bart Maddens, personal communication.
37. Dirk Jacobs, "The Debate over Enfranchisement of Foreign Residents in Belgium," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25, no. 4 (1999): 649-63. See also Hassan Bousetta and Marc Swyngedouw, "La Citoyenneté de l'Union Européenne et l'Enjeu de Bruxelles: Le droit supranational européen confronté aux réalités d'une société multiethnique et multinationale divisée, " Courrier Hebdomadaire 1636 (1999).
38. Dirk Jacobs, "The Debate over Enfranchisement of Foreign Residents in Belgium," Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 25, no. 4 (1999): 649-63. See also Hassan Bousetta and Marc Swyngedouw, "La Citoyenneté de l'Union Européenne et l'Enjeu de Bruxelles: Le droit supranational européen confronté aux réalités d'une société multiethnique et multinationale divisée, " Courrier Hebdomadaire 1636 (1999).
39. Jaak Billiet, personal communication.
40. For an explanation of this recognition as expediency in the face of the mid-1970s oil crisis, see Albert Bastenier, "Islam in Belgium: Contradictions and Perspectives," in The New Islamic Presence in Western Europe, ed. T. Gerholm and Y. G. Lithman (London: Mansell, 1988), 140.
41. Both Belgium and Germany actively recruited cheap labor from abroad during the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s; the sizable Muslim population in both countries is therefore not due to prior colonial exploitation, as is the case with the United Kingdom, France, and the Netherlands. While "guest worker" is a label that was used for 3 decades throughout Europe, it has a particularly negative ascription in Germany, where its stigma has lingered. See Sandra Schmidt, "Immigration Policy and New Ethnic Minorities in Contemporary Germany," in Ethnicity and Democratisation in the New Europe, ed. Karl Cordell (London: Routledge, 1999), 91-105.
42. See Dana L. Simel, "Exclusionary Christian Civil Religion for Jewish and Islamic Students in Bavarian Schools," Comparative Education Review 40 (February 1996): 28-46.
43. This estimate is provided by Herman de Ley, Centrum voor Islam in Europa, Ghent, 2002, at http://www.flwi.ugent.be/cie/.
44. While Islam has a long history in Europe - at least on its periphery, e.g., Albania, Bosnia, southern Spain, and Bulgaria, there remains a deeply embedded sense of a "Christian" Europe.
45. Marcelo Suárez-Orozco, "Anxious Neighbors: Belgium and Its Immigrant Minorities," in Controlling Immigration: A Global Perspective, ed. Wayne A. Cornelius, Philip L. Martin, and James F. Hollifeld (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1994), 257.
46. Jan Blommaert, "Integration Policies and the Politics of Integration in Belgium," in Multicultural Policies and the State: A Comparison of Two European Societies, ed. M. Martiniello (Utrecht: European Research Centre, 1998), 80-85, at 81. While she called for assimilation to Belgian laws and principles of equality, D'Hondt was attacked from the extreme left (as intolerant) and the extreme right (as undervaluing "Belgian" culture). See Eugene Roosens, "Multicultural Society: The Case of Flemish Brussels," in Martiniello, Multicultural Policies, 49.
47. Jan Blommaert, "Integration Policies and the Politics of Integration in Belgium," in Multicultural Policies and the State: A Comparison of Two European Societies, ed. M. Martiniello (Utrecht: European Research Centre, 1998), 80-85, at 81. While she called for assimilation to Belgian laws and principles of equality, D'Hondt was attacked from the extreme left (as intolerant) and the extreme right (as undervaluing "Belgian" culture). See Eugene Roosens, "Multicultural Society: The Case of Flemish Brussels," in Martiniello, Multicultural Policies, 49.
48. Philip Hermans, Opgroeien als Marokkaan in Brussel (Brussels: Cultuur en Migratie, 1994), 187-97.
49. Eugene Roosens, "Cultural Ecology and Achievement Motivation: Ethnic Minority Youngsters in the Belgian System," in Different Cultures, Same School, ed. Lotty Eldering and Jo Kloprogge (Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger, 1989), 145.
50. Monique Renaerts and Ural Manço, "Lente institutionalisation de l'Islam et persistence d'inégalités face aux autres cultes reconnus," in Voix et voies musulmanes de Belgique (Brussels: 2000), 83-106; Ural Manço and Meryem Kanmaz, "De la pathologie au traitement: La gestion municipale de l'Islam et des musulmanes de Belgique," Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée 33 (2002): 57-89.
51. Monique Renaerts and Ural Manço, "Lente institutionalisation de l'Islam et persistence d'inégalités face aux autres cultes reconnus," in Voix et voies musulmanes de Belgique (Brussels: 2000), 83-106; Ural Manço and Meryem Kanmaz, "De la pathologie au traitement: La gestion municipale de l'Islam et des musulmanes de Belgique," Cahiers d'études sur la Méditerranée 33 (2002): 57-89.
52. Hybridism suggests that one identifies oneself by more than one identifier, e.g., European, "from Brussels," Moroccan, etc. Eugene Roosens prefers to speak of many immigrant youth as psychologically "fragmented," with diverging vestiges of split identities, forcing many to "create a viable synthesis that is usable for everyday life" ("Cultural Ecology and Achievement Motivation," 90). This identity with the country of origin was confirmed by nearly every ethnographer I interviewed. For a contradictory finding, see Karen Phalet and Willem Claeys, "A Comparative Study of Turkish and Belgian Youth," Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology 24, no. 3 (September 1993): 319-43.
53. Roosens, "Multicultural Society," 73.
54. This is true in spite of strong ethnic ties to one's home country. See Eugene Roosens, "The Multicultural Nature of Contemporary Belgian Society: The Immigrant Community," in Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium, ed. A. Lijphart (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1981), 74-75. The same strong ethnic identity has also been found among many Greek immigrants. See Roosens, "Multicultural Society," 52-53.
55. This is true in spite of strong ethnic ties to one's home country. See Eugene Roosens, "The Multicultural Nature of Contemporary Belgian Society: The Immigrant Community," in Conflict and Coexistence in Belgium, ed. A. Lijphart (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, 1981), 74-75. The same strong ethnic identity has also been found among many Greek immigrants. See Roosens, "Multicultural Society," 52-53.
56. Johan Leman, "The Education of Immigrant Children in Belgium," Anthropology and Educational Quarterly 22, no. 2 (1991): 140.
57. Ibid., 142.
58. Renaerts, "Processes of Homogenization," 293.
59. These teachers are contracted out by the embassies of the respective governments and then appointed by the Islamic Cultural Centre (ICC) in Brussels. There may be ethnic tensions, e.g., Turkish parents not wanting their children to be instructed by an "Arab" and vice versa (Monique Renaerts and Christianne Timmerman, personal communication). A law passed in 1974 made provisions for financial aid in infrastructure (e.g., mosques) and personnel (imams) in the way of salary and pension. To date, however, no money has been made available for buildings or imam salaries, unlike in the Netherlands. What has changed is that since 1998 certain mosques (its number growing each year) are officially recognized by the provincial government and, on certain conditions (e.g., must be of a certain size, must not be dependent on a foreign government) receive subsidies. A significant reason for the shortage has to do with the rigorous language requirements for religious instructors, and the problem is most acute among Turkish instructors in Flanders (Monique Renaerts, personal communication, August 2, 2003).
60. Monique Renaerts and Dirk Jacobs, personal communication.
61. It is no longer the case that Moroccan youth in Flanders speak French as their parents did (Meryem Kanmaz, personal communication, August 10, 2003).
62. Johan Leman, "Cultural Hybridism and Self-Categorization: Trilingually and Biculturally Scholarized Adolescents in Brussels," International Journal of Educational Research 31 (1999): 320.
63. Roosens, "Cultural Equality and Achievement Motivation," 59.
64. Johan Leman, "School as a Structuring Force in Interethnic Hybridism," International Journal of Educational Research 31 (1999): 343.
65. I b i d.
66. Eugene Roosens, "How Multicultural Is the School in 'Multicultural Society'? A Belgian Case Study," International Journal of Educational Research 23, no. 1 (1995): 18.
67. See M. Danesi, "Enkele twee- en drietalige onderwijsprogramma's bij immigrantenkinderen in Canada en België met het oog op de gewenste plaatsen de 'moedertaal' in het onderwijs," in Taal- en Cultuurgevoeligonderwijs vow Migrantenkinderen, ed. J. Leman (Brussels: Cultuur en Migratie), 27-50.
68. Philip Hermans, personal communication.
69. It is important to point out that concentration schools result from a variety of factors, and educational segregation may not reflect the geographical distribution of the various ethnic groups. For more details on how concentration schools may be determined, see Lieven de Rycke and Marc Swyngedouw, "The Value of Concentration Schools as Appreciated by Moroccans, Turks, and Unskilled Belgians in Brussels," International Journal of Educational Research 31 (1999): 268.
70. Ibid., 275.
71. Ibid., 270. A ccording to this study, two-thirds were strongly opposed. This has even resulted in Flemish parents being denied access to schools within their own neighborhoods because no room was left. It has also meant that Flemish schools in Brussels are experiencing many of the fiscal pressures that the francophone Brussels schools do. With new legislation in Flanders, Dutch language schools face a special dilemma. While Dutch speakers are a minority in the Brussels region, the new decrees extending the provisions for freedom of choice make it impossible for these schools to prefer Dutch-speaking families (Bart Maddens, personal communication, August 13, 2003).
72. Ibid., 270. A ccording to this study, two-thirds were strongly opposed. This has even resulted in Flemish parents being denied access to schools within their own neighborhoods because no room was left. It has also meant that Flemish schools in Brussels are experiencing many of the fiscal pressures that the francophone Brussels schools do. With new legislation in Flanders, Dutch language schools face a special dilemma. While Dutch speakers are a minority in the Brussels region, the new decrees extending the provisions for freedom of choice make it impossible for these schools to prefer Dutch-speaking families (Bart Maddens, personal communication, August 13, 2003).
73. De Rycke and Swyngedouw, 270.
74. Ibid., 268.
75. Ibid., 276. Many Kurds do come to Belgium for political reasons.
76. Ibid., 277.
77. Philip Hermans, "Moroccan Immigrants and School Success," International Journal of Educational Research 23, no. 1 (1995): 35.
78. Leman, "The Education of Immigrant Children in Belgium," 142. Roelands and Druine specify that educational priority is given to immigrant students in the hopes of (a) reducing retention rates and (b) diminishing the number of immigrant youth dependent on special education (J. Roelands and N. Druine, "Belgium," in Education in a Single Europe, 2nd ed., ed. Colin Brock and Witold Tulasiewicz [London: Routledge, 2000], 79).
79. Leman, "The Education of Immigrant Children in Belgium," 142. Roelands and Druine specify that educational priority is given to immigrant students in the hopes of (a) reducing retention rates and (b) diminishing the number of immigrant youth dependent on special education (J. Roelands and N. Druine, "Belgium," in Education in a Single Europe, 2nd ed., ed. Colin Brock and Witold Tulasiewicz [London: Routledge, 2000], 79).
80. Leman, "The Education of Immigrant Children in Belgium," 144.
81. Hermans, "Moroccan Immigrants and School Success," 36. Se e also Herman's rich discussion of Moroccan parents in "Opvoeden in een 'Multiculturele' Samenleving: Opvattingen, Idealen, Praktijken en Problemen van Marokkaanse Ouders," in Allochtone Jongeren in het Onderwijs: Een Multidisciplinair Perspectief, ed. C. Timmerman, P. Hermans, and J. Hoornaert (Leuven: Garant, 2002), 95-148.
82. Hermans, "Moroccan Immigrants and School Success," 36. See also Herman's rich discussion of Moroccan parents in "Opvoeden in een 'Multiculturele' Samenleving: Opvattingen, Idealen, Praktijken en Problemen van Marokkaanse Ouders," in Allochtone Jongeren in het Onderwijs: Een Multidisciplinair Perspectief, ed. C. Timmerman, P. Hermans, and J. Hoornaert (Leuven: Garant, 2002), 95-148.
83. Roosens, "How Multicultural Is the School in 'Multicultural Society'?" 17.
84. This includes keeping children home from school in order to do translating for the parents.
85. Roosens, "Multicultural Society," 56.
86. According to a recent study by Phalet and Swyngedouw ("National Identities and Representations of Citizenship," 27, n. 9), 80 percent of Turkish and 72 percent of Moroccan participants were low educated with either primary education in their country of origin or vocational training in Belgium as cutoff points. Even so, Turkish girls are twice as likely to be at least functionally literate compared to Moroccan girls. This difference can be traced to the reforms of Atatürk in 1929 and the possibility of finding acceptance in one's community through the Kemalist educated person ideal. Moroccan women, on the other hand, owing to their considerable exposure to the French language in Morocco and the increasing inability to read the Arabic script, are much more likely than Turkish women to linguistically integrate. Turkish television in Belgium also plays a role (Ron Lesthaeghe and Johan Surkyn, "Heterogeneity in Social Change: Turkish and Moroccan Women in Belgium," European Journal of Population 11 [1995]: 24; see also Christiane Timmerman, "The Revival of Tradition, Consequence of Modernity: The Case of Young Turkish Women in Belgium," Folk 42 [2000]: 83-100, "Secular and Religious Nationalism among Young Turkish Women in Belgium: Education May Make the Difference," Anthropology and Education Quarterly 31, no. 3 [2000]: 333-54, and cf. her dissertation, "Onderwijs maakt het vershil: Socio-culturele praxis en etniciteitsbeleving bij turkse jonge vrouwen," Universiteit Katholieke Leuven, Leuven, 1999).
87. According to a recent study by Phalet and Swyngedouw ("National Identities and Representations of Citizenship," 27, n. 9), 80 percent of Turkish and 72 percent of Moroccan participants were low educated with either primary education in their country of origin or vocational training in Belgium as cutoff points. Even so, Turkish girls are twice as likely to be at least functionally literate compared to Moroccan girls. This difference can be traced to the reforms of Atatürk in 1929 and the possibility of finding acceptance in one's community through the Kemalist educated person ideal. Moroccan women, on the other hand, owing to their considerable exposure to the French language in Morocco and the increasing inability to read the Arabic script, are much more likely than Turkish women to linguistically integrate. Turkish television in Belgium also plays a role (Ron Lesthaeghe and Johan Surkyn, "Heterogeneity in Social Change: Turkish and Moroccan Women in Belgium," European Journal of Population 11 [1995]: 24; see also Christiane Timmerman, "The Revival of Tradition, Consequence of Modernity: The Case of Young Turkish Women in Belgium," Folk 42 [2000]: 83-100, "Secular and Religious Nationalism among Young Turkish Women in Belgium: Education May Make the Difference," Anthropology and Education Quarterly 31, no. 3 [2000]: 333-54, and cf. her dissertation, "Onderwijs maakt het vershil: Socio-culturele praxis en etniciteitsbeleving bij turkse jonge vrouwen," Universiteit Katholieke Leuven, Leuven, 1999).
88. According to a recent study by Phalet and Swyngedouw ("National Identities and Representations of Citizenship," 27, n. 9), 80 percent of Turkish and 72 percent of Moroccan participants were low educated with either primary education in their country of origin or vocational training in Belgium as cutoff points. Even so, Turkish girls are twice as likely to be at least functionally literate compared to Moroccan girls. This difference can be traced to the reforms of Atatürk in 1929 and the possibility of finding acceptance in one's community through the Kemalist educated person ideal. Moroccan women, on the other hand, owing to their considerable exposure to the French language in Morocco and the increasing inability to read the Arabic script, are much more likely than Turkish women to linguistically integrate. Turkish television in Belgium also plays a role (Ron Lesthaeghe and Johan Surkyn, "Heterogeneity in Social Change: Turkish and Moroccan Women in Belgium," European Journal of Population 11 [1995]: 24; see also Christiane Timmerman, "The Revival of Tradition, Consequence of Modernity: The Case of Young Turkish Women in Belgium," Folk 42 [2000]: 83-100, "Secular and Religious Nationalism among Young Turkish Women in Belgium: Education May Make the Difference," Anthropology and Education Quarterly 31, no. 3 [2000]: 333-54, and cf. her dissertation, "Onderwijs maakt het vershil: Socio-culturele praxis en etniciteitsbeleving bij turkse jonge vrouwen," Universiteit Katholieke Leuven, Leuven, 1999).
89. According to a recent study by Phalet and Swyngedouw ("National Identities and Representations of Citizenship," 27, n. 9), 80 percent of Turkish and 72 percent of Moroccan participants were low educated with either primary education in their country of origin or vocational training in Belgium as cutoff points. Even so, Turkish girls are twice as likely to be at least functionally literate compared to Moroccan girls. This difference can be traced to the reforms of Atatürk in 1929 and the possibility of finding acceptance in one's community through the Kemalist educated person ideal. Moroccan women, on the other hand, owing to their considerable exposure to the French language in Morocco and the increasing inability to read the Arabic script, are much more likely than Turkish women to linguistically integrate. Turkish television in Belgium also plays a role (Ron Lesthaeghe and Johan Surkyn, "Heterogeneity in Social Change: Turkish and Moroccan Women in Belgium," European Journal of Population 11 [1995]: 24; see also Christiane Timmerman, "The Revival of Tradition, Consequence of Modernity: The Case of Young Turkish Women in Belgium," Folk 42 [2000]: 83-100, "Secular and Religious Nationalism among Young Turkish Women in Belgium: Education May Make the Difference," Anthropology and Education Quarterly 31, no. 3 [2000]: 333-54, and cf. her dissertation, "Onderwijs maakt het vershil: Socio-culturele praxis en etniciteitsbeleving bij turkse jonge vrouwen," Universiteit Katholieke Leuven, Leuven, 1999).
90. Philip Hermans and Eugene Roosens, personal communication.
91. Kathleen Peleman, "The Impact of Residential Segregation on Participation in Associations: The Case of Moroccan Women in Belgium," Urban Studies 39, no. 4 (2002): 740. Peleman stresses that "most Moroccan families live in the suburbs by coincidence rather than by rational choice."
92. These centers consist of a board of locally represented people and operate on the regional, provincial, and local levels. They provide assistance in education, language, and even legal advice (Philip Hermans, personal communication).
93. See the discussion in Hermans, Opgroeien als Marokkaan in Brussel, 223-69, and "Moroccan Immigrants and School Success," 37 and 39.
94. See the discussion in Hermans, Opgroeien als Marokkaan in Brussel, 223-69, and "Moroccan Immigrants and School Success," 37 and 39.
95. Hermans, "Moroccan Immigrants and School Success," 39.
96. See Marcelo Suarez-Orozco and Carola Suarez-Orozco, "Some Conceptual Considerations in the Interdisciplinary Study of Immigrant Children," in Immigrant Voices: In Search of Educational Equity, ed. Enrique Trueba and Lilia Bartolomé (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 24.
97. Tove Skutnabb-Kangas and Robert Phillipson, "Minority Workers or Minority Human Beings? A European Dilemma," International Review of Education 42, no. 4 (1996): 301.
98. Philip Hermans, personal communication, July 30, 2003.
99. De Rycke and Swyngedouw, 271. Johan Leman also reports that roughly 90 percent of children of Turkish immigrants attend lower-quality vocational education programs (Leman, "The Education of Immigrant Children in Belgium," 146).
100. See Philip Hermans, "The Expression of Guilt by Moroccan Adolescents: Ethnocentric Interpretations by Western Teachers and Social Workers," International Journal of Educational Research 31 (1999): 303-16.
101. Hermans, "Moroccan Immigrants and School Success," 41.
102. Many students in Philip Hermans's field research offered reasons ranging from not enjoying homework to having too much freedom. Very few pointed to a Belgian society that offers them few opportunities (ibid., 35).
103. "Les Turcs et le Marocains sont . . . sur-représentes parmi les sujets pour qui l'échec découle d'un manque de connaissance en français (dès le début de l'enseignement obligatoire) et du 'désinérêt des parents pour la scolarité. Les autres nationalités, enfin, sont unanimes dans leur explication de l'échec scolaire qui dans leur cas est d'ailleurs largement marginal. Ces derniers pensent que 'des problèmes familiaux ou financiers,' 'des problèmes de santé' et 'le mauvais choix de la section d'étude sont à la base de leur retard pédagogique" (Manço, "Strategies d'orientation," 103).
104. For many lurid accounts of such harassment, see Philip Hermans, "The Experience of Racism by Moroccan Adolescents in Brussels," Migration 15 (1992): 55-82.
105. Roosens, "Cultural Ecology and Achievement Motivation," 102.
106. Hassan Bousetta, personal communication, August 19, 2003. To this day, there is great unease in French-speaking Belgium to discuss " ethnicity" and "race" as topics in academic or political discussion.
107. Leman, "School as a Structuring Force in Interethnic Hybridism," 344. In an earlier article ("The Education of Immigrant Children in Belgium," 151), Leman argued that the French community was making a considerable effort, where possible, to expand the supply of official language offerings in secondary education with a third or fourth language, including Arabic and Turkish. On the recruitment of personnel, see Leman, "The Education of Immigrant Children in Belgium," 150.
108. Leman, "School as a Structuring Force in Interethnic Hybridism," 344. In an earlier article ("The Education of Immigrant Children in Belgium," 151), Leman argued that the French community was making a considerable effort, where possible, to expand the supply of official language offerings in secondary education with a third or fourth language, including Arabic and Turkish. On the recruitment of personnel, see Leman, "The Education of Immigrant Children in Belgium," 150.
109. Marco Martiniello and Altay Manço, "Intercultural Education in French-Speaking Belgium: An Overview of Ideology, Legislation and Practice," European Journal of Intercultural Studies 4, no. 2 (1995): 19-27.
110. Torsten Husén, and W. D. Halls, eds., "The Education of Linguistic, Cultural and Immigrant Minorities in Europe," in Schooling in Modern European Society: A Report of the Academia Europaea (New York: Pergamon, 1992), 196-97.
111. Leman, "School as a Structuring Force in Interethnic Hybridism," 345. Regarding the two reasons listed, much of the good will that has accompanied the European Commission's policies and statements on intercultural education (including Maastricht and Amsterdam) has failed to find its way into practice, and many of the intercultural educational "experiments" have been limited to pilot projects within individual countries.
112. Of the famed European schools (Schola Europaea), there are four in Belgium. In these schools, there is great respect shown to both the culture and language of origin of each of the pupils. Eugene Roosens writes, "the objectifiable culture of origin, as found in the families, is integrated in the school situation" ("Multicultural Society," 50-51). These schools tend to cater to European functionaries' children, and its teachers are carefully selected, very well paid, and, most important, given the administrative support necessary to facilitate an academic atmosphere of mutual respect. See A. McGrath, A. Ramler, and S. Ramler, "The European Schools: Models of Multicultural Learning," Independent School (Summer 2002): 4, 61, 88-94. For a more critical reaction, see Stephen Bates, "Learning to Live Together, EU Style," Times Educational Supplement, November 10, 2000, 16.
113. Of the famed European schools (Schola Europaea), there are four in Belgium. In these schools, there is great respect shown to both the culture and language of origin of each of the pupils. Eugene Roosens writes, "the objectifiable culture of origin, as found in the families, is integrated in the school situation" ("Multicultural Society," 50-51). These schools tend to cater to European functionaries' children, and its teachers are carefully selected, very well paid, and, most important, given the administrative support necessary to facilitate an academic atmosphere of mutual respect. See A. McGrath, A. Ramler, and S. Ramler, "The European Schools: Models of Multicultural Learning," Independent School (Summer 2002): 4, 61, 88-94. For a more critical reaction, see Stephen Bates, "Learning to Live Together, EU Style," Times Educational Supplement, November 10, 2000, 16.
114. Eugene Roosens, personal communication, August 8, 2003. Roosens told me that at last count only 12 Flemish schools displayed any interest.
115. Roosens, "Multicultural Society," 58.
116. Monique Renaerts, personal communication, August 2, 2003. Quotation from Roelands and Druine, "Belgium," 77.
117. Monique Renaerts, personal communication, August 2, 2003. Quotation from Roelands and Druine, "Belgium," 77.
118. Roosens, "Cultural Ecology and Achievement Motivation," 98.
119. Several studies have chronicled this shift, but none better than Marc Swyngedouw, "The Threatening Immigrant' in Flanders, 1930-1980: Redrawing the Social Space," New Community 21, no. 3 (1995): 325-40.
120. See Marco Martiniello, "The Existence of an Urban Underclass in Belgium," New Community 22, no. 4 (1996): 655-69.
121. Geert Driessen, "The Effect of Religious Groups' Dominance in Classrooms on Cognitive and Noncognitive Educational Outcomes," Journal of Education and Religion 3, no. 1 (2002): 49.
122. John Ogbu, "Adaptation to Minority Status and Impact on School Success," Theory into Practice 31, no. 4 (1992): 290-91.
123. Eugene Roosens, Creating Ethnicity: The Process of Ethnogenesis (London: Sage, 1989), 133-34.
124. In their studies carried out in the Netherlands, Geert Driessen and Frans van der Slik ("Religion, Denomination, and Education in the Netherlands: Cognitive and Non-cognitive Outcomes after an Era of Secularization," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40, no. 4 [2001]: 561-72) found that, even when controlling for socioeconomic background, Muslim students, most of whom are either Moroccan or Turkish and attend concentration schools, routinely score considerably lower than other pupils in math and language achievement. See also A. Dijkstra and J. Peschar, "Religious Determinants of Academic Attainment in the Netherlands," Comparative Education Review 40, no. 1 (1996): 47-65. This is true even though the Dutch government provides nearly twice as much (1.9) funding per child of immigrant parentage with a "disadvantaged" background (Geert Driessen, personal communication).
125. In their studies carried out in the Netherlands, Geert Driessen and Frans van der Slik ("Religion, Denomination, and Education in the Netherlands: Cognitive and Non-cognitive Outcomes after an Era of Secularization," Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 40, no. 4 [2001]: 561-72) found that, even when controlling for socioeconomic background, Muslim students, most of whom are either Moroccan or Turkish and attend concentration schools, routinely score considerably lower than other pupils in math and language achievement. See also A. Dijkstra and J. Peschar, "Religious Determinants of Academic Attainment in the Netherlands," Comparative Education Review 40, no. 1 (1996): 47-65. This is true even though the Dutch government provides nearly twice as much (1.9) funding per child of immigrant parentage with a "disadvantaged" background (Geert Driessen, personal communication).
126. Spokespersons for Vlaams Blok have denied accusations suggesting that they are opposed to the rights of minorities to dress and behave as they choose. They only insist that such cultural differences be expressed in their own cultures, i.e., not on Belgian soil. On poverty and access to employment, see N. Ouali and A. Rea, "Young Migrants in the Belgian Labour Market: Integration, Discrimination and Exclusion," in Migrants, Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market: Integration and Exclusion in Europe, ed. J. Wrench, Andrea Rea, and Nouria Ouali (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 21-34. On housing, see Christian Kesteloot and Henk Meert, "Segregation and Economic Integration of Immigrants in Brussels," in Minorities in European Cities: The Dynamics of Social Integration and Social Exclusion at the Neighborhood Level, ed. S. Body-Gendrot and M. Martiniello (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 54-72. On discrimination by police, see Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, "The Rhetoric of Tolerance; or, What Police Officers Are Taught about Migrants," Journal of Intercultural Studies 14, no. 1 (1993): 49-63.
127. Spokespersons for Vlaams Blok have denied accusations suggesting that they are opposed to the rights of minorities to dress and behave as they choose. They only insist that such cultural differences be expressed in their own cultures, i.e., not on Belgian soil. On poverty and access to employment, see N. Ouali and A. Rea, "Young Migrants in the Belgian Labour Market: Integration, Discrimination and Exclusion," in Migrants, Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market: Integration and Exclusion in Europe, ed. J. Wrench, Andrea Rea, and Nouria Ouali (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 21-34. On housing, see Christian Kesteloot and Henk Meert, "Segregation and Economic Integration of Immigrants in Brussels," in Minorities in European Cities: The Dynamics of Social Integration and Social Exclusion at the Neighborhood Level, ed. S. Body-Gendrot and M. Martiniello (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 54-72. On discrimination by police, see Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, "The Rhetoric of Tolerance; or, What Police Officers Are Taught about Migrants," Journal of Intercultural Studies 14, no. 1 (1993): 49-63.
128. Spokespersons for Vlaams Blok have denied accusations suggesting that they are opposed to the rights of minorities to dress and behave as they choose. They only insist that such cultural differences be expressed in their own cultures, i.e., not on Belgian soil. On poverty and access to employment, see N. Ouali and A. Rea, "Young Migrants in the Belgian Labour Market: Integration, Discrimination and Exclusion," in Migrants, Ethnic Minorities and the Labour Market: Integration and Exclusion in Europe, ed. J. Wrench, Andrea Rea, and Nouria Ouali (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1999), 21-34. On housing, see Christian Kesteloot and Henk Meert, "Segregation and Economic Integration of Immigrants in Brussels," in Minorities in European Cities: The Dynamics of Social Integration and Social Exclusion at the Neighborhood Level, ed. S. Body-Gendrot and M. Martiniello (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000), 54-72. On discrimination by police, see Jan Blommaert and Jef Verschueren, "The Rhetoric of Tolerance; or, What Police Officers Are Taught about Migrants," Journal of Intercultural Studies 14, no. 1 (1993): 49-63.
129. This is particularly true for female Muslims, but space limitations prevent me from elaborating here. See Unni Wikan, Generous Betrayal: Politics of Culture in the New Europe (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002), for an incisive treatment of the abuses of "culture" and identity politics.