Scoring run-off paradoxes for variable electorates

Economic Theory

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 53-80

  Lepelley, Dominique ^a   Merlin, Vincent ^a  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE CAEN   (France)

Author keywords

Abstention; Manipulation; Paradox; Voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035529078     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/PL00004103     Document Type: Article

References (24)

1. Berg S., Lepelley D.: On probability models in voting theory. Statistica Neerlandica 48, 133-146 (1994)
2. Fishburn P.C., Brams S.: Paradoxes of preferential voting. Mathematics Magazine 56, 207-214 (1983)
3. Gehrlein W.V.: Condorcet's paradox, the Condorcet efficiency of the voting rules. Mathematica Japonica 45, 173-199 (1997)
4. Kim K.H., Roush F.W.: Statistical manipulability of social choice functions. Group Decision and Negociation 5, 263-282 (1997)
5. Lepelley D.: Contribution à l'analyse des procédures de décision collectives. Ph-D dissertation, Université de Caen (1989)
6. Lepelley D.: Vote majoritaire à deux tours et manipulation stratégique. Revue d'Économie Politique 105, 279-292 (1995)
7. Lepelley D., Chantreuil F., Berg S.: The likelihood of monotonicity paradoxes in run-off elections. Mathematical Social Sciences 31, 133-146 (1996)
8. Lepelley D., Mbih B.: The vulnerability of four social choice functions to coalitional manipulation of preferences. Social Choice and Welfare 11, 253-265 (1994)
9. Lepelley D., Valognes F.: On the Kim and Roush voting procedure. Group Decision and Negociation 8, 109-123 (1999)
10. Merlin V.R.: L'agrégation des préférences individuelles: les règles positionnelles itératives et la méthode de Copeland. Ph-D dissertation, Université de Caen (1996)
11. Merlin V., Saari D.: The Copeland method II: Manipulation, monotonicity and paradoxes. Journal of Economic Theory 72, 148-172 (1998)
12. Merlin V., Tataru M., Valognes F.: The probability that all the voting rules select the same outcome. Journal of Mathematical Economics 33, 183-207 (2000)
13. Moulin H.: Condorcet's principle implies the no show paradox. Journal of Economic Theory 45, 45-53 (1988)
14. Myerson R.: Axiomatic derivation of scoring rules without the ordering assumption. Social Choice and Welfare 12, 59-74 (1995)
15. Ray D.: On the possibility of a "no show paradox" Under the single transferable vote. Mathematical Social Sciences 11, 183-189 (1986)
16. Saari D.G.: Consistency of decision processes. Annals of Operations Research 23, 103-137 (1990)
17. Saari D.G.: Geometry of voting. Berlin Heidelberg New York: Springer 1994
18. Saari D.G., Merlin V.R.: Changes that cause changes. Social Choice and Welfare (to appear) (2000)
19. Saari D.G., Tataru M.: The likelihood of dubious election outcomes. Economic Theory 13, 345-363 (1999)
20. Schläfli L.: Theorie der Vielfachen Kontinuität. Gesammelte Mathematische Abhandlungen 1. Basel: Birkhäuser 1950
21. Smith J.H.: Aggregation of preferences with variable electorate. Econometrica 41, 1027-1041 (1973)
22. Tataru M., Merlin V.R.: On the relationship of the condorcet winner and positional voting rule. Mathematical Social Sciences 34, 81-90 (1997)
23. Young H.P.: Social choice scoring functions. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 28, 824-838 (1975)
24. Young H.P., Levenglick A.: A consistent extension of Condorcet's election principle. SIAM Journal of Applied Mathematics 35, 285-300 (1978)