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Social Choice and Welfare
Volumn 19, Issue 2, 2002, Pages 313-324
On asymptotic strategy-proofness of the plurality and the run-off rules
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[No Author keywords available]
Indexed keywords

EID: 0036525808     PISSN: 01761714     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s003550100113     Document Type: Article
Times cited : (13)
References (15)
  • 1
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    • (1999) Current Trends in Economics , pp. 13-27
    • Aleskerov, F.1    Kurbanov, E.2
  • 2
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    • Investigation into the relative manipulability of four voting systems
    • Chamberlin J (1985) Investigation into the relative manipulability of four voting systems. Behav Sci 30: 195-203
    • (1985) Behav Sci , vol.30 , pp. 195-203
    • Chamberlin, J.1
  • 3
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    • Positionalist voting functions
    • Gärdenfors P (1973) Positionalist voting functions. Theory Decision 4: 1-24
    • (1973) Theory Decision , vol.4 , pp. 1-24
    • Gärdenfors, P.1
  • 4
    • 0001195563 scopus 로고
    • Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result
    • Gibbard A (1973) Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result. Econometrica 41: 587-601
    • (1973) Econometrica , vol.41 , pp. 587-601
    • Gibbard, A.1
  • 5
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    • A note on asymptotical strategy proofness
    • Fristrup P, Keiding H (1989) A note on asymptotical strategy proofness. Econ Lett 31: 307-312
    • (1989) Econ Lett , vol.31 , pp. 307-312
    • Fristrup, P.1    Keiding, H.2
  • 6
    • 0038832454 scopus 로고
    • Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but few aren't
    • Kelly J (1993) Almost all social choice rules are highly manipulable, but few aren't. Soc Choice Welfare 10: 161-175
    • (1993) Soc Choice Welfare , vol.10 , pp. 161-175
    • Kelly, J.1
  • 7
    • 21344452754 scopus 로고    scopus 로고
    • Statistical manipulability of social choice functions
    • Kim KH, Roush FW (1996) Statistical manipulability of social choice functions. Group Decision Negotiation 5: 263-282
    • (1996) Group Decision Negotiation , vol.5 , pp. 263-282
    • Kim, K.H.1    Roush, F.W.2
  • 9
    • 0003277329 scopus 로고
    • Axioms of cooperative decision making
    • Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
    • Moulin H (1988) Axioms of cooperative decision making. (Econometric Society monographs, 14) Cambridge University Press, Cambridge
    • (1988) Econometric Society Monographs , vol.14
    • Moulin, H.1
  • 10
    • 0001518465 scopus 로고
    • The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation
    • Nitzan S (1985) The vulnerability of point-voting schemes to preference variation and strategic manipulation. Publ Choice 47: 349-370
    • (1985) Publ Choice , vol.47 , pp. 349-370
    • Nitzan, S.1
  • 11
    • 84916029437 scopus 로고
    • Strategic voting without collusion under binary and democratic group decision rules
    • Pattanaik PK (1975) Strategic voting without collusion under binary and democratic group decision rules. Rev Econ Stud 42: 93-103
    • (1975) Rev Econ Stud , vol.42 , pp. 93-103
    • Pattanaik, P.K.1
  • 12
    • 0000100146 scopus 로고
    • A note on manipulability of large voting schemes
    • Peleg B (1979) A note on manipulability of large voting schemes. Theory Decision 11: 401-412
    • (1979) Theory Decision , vol.11 , pp. 401-412
    • Peleg, B.1
  • 13
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    • Susceptibility to manipulation
    • Saari D (1990) Susceptibility to manipulation. Publ Choice 64: 21-41
    • (1990) Publ Choice , vol.64 , pp. 21-41
    • Saari, D.1
  • 14
    • 49549141769 scopus 로고
    • Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions
    • Satterthwaite MA (1975) Strategy-proofness and Arrow's Conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions. J Econ Theory 10: 187-217
    • (1975) J Econ Theory , vol.10 , pp. 187-217
    • Satterthwaite, M.A.1

* 이 정보는 Elsevier사의 SCOPUS DB에서 KISTI가 분석하여 추출한 것입니다.