Co-operation and unilateral commitment in the presence of global environmental problems

Environmental and Resource Economics

Volumn 20, Issue 3, 2001, Pages 225-239

  Pereau, Jean Christophe ^a,b   Tazdait, Tarik ^a,c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ GUSTAVE EIFFEL   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ DU LITTORAL CÔTE D OPALE   (France)

^c CNRS   (France)

Author keywords

Coalition; Global environmental problems; Precautionary commitment; Unilateral commitment

Indexed keywords

GLOBAL ENVIRONMENT;

CONTRACTS; PARTICULATE EMISSIONS;

ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT;

EMISSION CONTROL; ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUE; GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE; PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE;

EID: 0035662748     PISSN: 09246460     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1012638802001     Document Type: Article

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