On the existence of a cooperative solution for a coalitional game with externalities

International Journal of Game Theory

Volumn 30, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 141-146

  Helm, Carsten ^a  

^a HUMBOLDT UNIVERSITY   (Germany)

Author keywords

core; Balanced games; Coalitional games; Multilateral externalities

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035538785     PISSN: 00207276     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s001820100069     Document Type: Article

References (9)

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