Economic growth, liquidity, and bank runs

Journal of Economic Theory

Volumn 109, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 220-245

  Ennis, Huberto M ^a   Keister, Todd ^b  

^a FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF RICHMOND   (United States)

^b INSTITUTO TECNOLÓGICO AUTÓNOMO DE MÉXICO   (Mexico)

Author keywords

Banking panics; Capital formation; Deposit contracts; Endogenous growth; Equilibrium; Equilibrium selection; Sunspot

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038323840     PISSN: 00220531     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-0531(03)00014-0     Document Type: Article

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