Learning dynatnics, lock-in, and equilibrium selection in experimental coordination games

The Evolution of Economic Diversity

Volumn , Issue , 2013, Pages 133-163

  Crawford, Vincent ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

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EID: 85071776128     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Book    
DOI: None     Document Type: Chapter

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