Incentives for boundedly rational agents

Topics in Theoretical Economics

Volumn 3, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 11-26

  Basov, Suren ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MELBOURNE   (Australia)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Incentives; Principal agent model

Indexed keywords

EID: 13444272211     PISSN: 1534598X     EISSN: 1534598X     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2202/1534-598X.1093     Document Type: Article

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