Towards evolutionary game models of financial markets

Quantitative Finance

Volumn 1, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 177-185

  Friedman, D ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 85014051870     PISSN: 14697688     EISSN: 14697696     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1080/713665544     Document Type: Article

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