Measuring voting power in an international institution: The United States and the inter-American development bank

Economics of Governance

Volumn 4, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 19-36

  Strand, Jonathan R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEVADA   (United States)

Author keywords

A priori voting power; Inter American Development Bank; Johnston power index; Weighted voting

Indexed keywords

EID: 1342333000     PISSN: 14356104     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s101010100042     Document Type: Article

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