Common internal properties among power indices by

Control and Cybernetics

Volumn 26, Issue 4, 1997, Pages

  Freixas, Josep ^a   Gambarelli, Gianfranco ^b  

^a UNIVERSITAT POLITÈCNICA DE CATALUNYA   (Spain)

^b UNIVERSITY OF BERGAMO   (Italy)

Author keywords

Monotonicity; Power indices; Simple games; Solution concepts

Indexed keywords

EID: 17544403737     PISSN: 03248569     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (21)

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