The U.S. and Japan in the Bretton Woods institutions: Sharing or contesting leadership?

International Journal

Volumn 52, Issue 2, 1997, Pages 264-295

  Rapkin, David P ^a   Strand, Jonathan R ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA LINCOLN   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039466474     PISSN: 00207020     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/40203200     Document Type: Article

References (82)

1. C. Fred Bergsten and Marcus Noland, Reconcilable Differences? United Stales-Japan Economic Conflict (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics 1993), 233.
2. Donald R. Sherk, U.S. policy toward the multilateral development banks,' Washington Quarterly 16(summer 1993), 79.
3. David P. Rapkin 'The contested concept of hegemonic leadership,' in Rapkin, ed, World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 1990). On the idea that different countries provide different types of leadership, see Oran R. Young, 'Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international society,' International Organization 45(summer 1991), 281-308.
4. David P. Rapkin 'The contested concept of hegemonic leadership,' in Rapkin, ed, World Leadership and Hegemony (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 1990). On the idea that different countries provide different types of leadership, see Oran R. Young, 'Political leadership and regime formation: on the development of institutions in international society,' International Organization 45(summer 1991), 281-308.
5. Hideo Sato, 'Global leadership sharing: a framework of analysis,' paper for the Global Leadership Sharing Project, University of Tsukuba, October 1996.
6. Charles Morrison, 'Models of U.S.-Japanese leadership sharing in Asia,' ibid.
7. Charles Kindleberger, World In Depression, 1929-39 (rev. ed. 1986; Berkeley; University of California Press 1973).
8. Bergsten and Noland, Reconcilable Differences, 235.
9. David P. Rapkin, 'Japan and world leadership?' in Rapkin, ed, World Leadership and Hegemony.
10. On weighted voting, see Stephen Zamora, 'Voting in international economic organizations,' American Journal of International Law 74 (July 1980), 588-99; Elizabeth McIntyre, 'Weighted voting in international organizations,' International Organization 8(summer 1954), 484-97; Hanna Newcombe, James Wert, and Alan Newrombe, 'Comparison of weighted voting formulas for the United Nations,' World Politics 23(April 1971), 452-92; William J. Dixon, 'The evaluation of weighted voting schemes for the United Nations General Assembly,' International Studies Quarterly 27(September 1983), 295-314.
11. On weighted voting, see Stephen Zamora, 'Voting in international economic organizations,' American Journal of International Law 74 (July 1980), 588-99; Elizabeth McIntyre, 'Weighted voting in international organizations,' International Organization 8(summer 1954), 484-97; Hanna Newcombe, James Wert, and Alan Newrombe, 'Comparison of weighted voting formulas for the United Nations,' World Politics 23(April 1971), 452-92; William J. Dixon, 'The evaluation of weighted voting schemes for the United Nations General Assembly,' International Studies Quarterly 27(September 1983), 295-314.
12. On weighted voting, see Stephen Zamora, 'Voting in international economic organizations,' American Journal of International Law 74 (July 1980), 588-99; Elizabeth McIntyre, 'Weighted voting in international organizations,' International Organization 8(summer 1954), 484-97; Hanna Newcombe, James Wert, and Alan Newrombe, 'Comparison of weighted voting formulas for the United Nations,' World Politics 23(April 1971), 452-92; William J. Dixon, 'The evaluation of weighted voting schemes for the United Nations General Assembly,' International Studies Quarterly 27(September 1983), 295-314.
13. On weighted voting, see Stephen Zamora, 'Voting in international economic organizations,' American Journal of International Law 74 (July 1980), 588-99; Elizabeth McIntyre, 'Weighted voting in international organizations,' International Organization 8(summer 1954), 484-97; Hanna Newcombe, James Wert, and Alan Newrombe, 'Comparison of weighted voting formulas for the United Nations,' World Politics 23(April 1971), 452-92; William J. Dixon, 'The evaluation of weighted voting schemes for the United Nations General Assembly,' International Studies Quarterly 27(September 1983), 295-314.
14. Frederick K. Lister, Decision-Making Strategies for International Organizations: The IMF Model, Monograph Series in World Affairs, vol 40, book 4, Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, 1984, 11.
15. Ibid, 37.
16. On basic votes, see Joseph Gold, Voting and Decision in the International Monetary Fund (Washington DC: IMF 1972), 18-19.
17. IMF, Treasury Department, 'Financial organization and operations of the IMF,' Pamphlet Series, No. 45, IMF, 1990, 19.
18. Ibid, 16. There is no rule linking quotas and staff, but over time an informal convention evolved that ensured that staff representation matched quota share. Miles Kahler 'The United States and the International Monetary Fund: declining influence or declining interest?' in Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, eds, The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence. (London: Routledge 1990), 97.
19. Ibid, 16. There is no rule linking quotas and staff, but over time an informal convention evolved that ensured that staff representation matched quota share. Miles Kahler 'The United States and the International Monetary Fund: declining influence or declining interest?' in Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, eds, The United States and Multilateral Institutions: Patterns of Changing Instrumentality and Influence. (London: Routledge 1990), 97.
20. Lister, Decision-Making Strategies, 76.
21. Sadako Ogata, 'Shifting power relations in multilateral development banks,' Journal of International Studies (Tokyo) 22(January 1989), 12, 18.
22. World Bank, 'Criteria for the allocation of the shares of bank capital,' Resource Mobilization Department, Replenishment Policy Division, March 1995, 2.
23. Lister, Decision-Making Strategies, 113: the Fund tends to impose special-majority requirements on decisions 'which are of a novel or controversial character, which are likely to have far-reaching repercussions or which involve the power to vary, amplify, modify or otherwise adapt one of the organizations' basic rules.'
24. Zamora, 'Voting in international economic organizations,' 589.
25. McIntyre, 'Weighted voting in international organizations,' 491.
26. Lister, Decision-Making Strategies, 39.
27. Ibid, 108. However, 'there is at least one aspect of the Fund in which the influence of voting power is critical even though decisions in the ordinary sense are not involved. The biennial elections of executive directors are governed by rules under which a minimum proportion of the votes allotted to members eligible to participate in an election must be received by a candidate.' Gold, Voting and Decisions, 28.
28. Ibid, 108. However, 'there is at least one aspect of the Fund in which the influence of voting power is critical even though decisions in the ordinary sense are not involved. The biennial elections of executive directors are governed by rules under which a minimum proportion of the votes allotted to members eligible to participate in an election must be received by a candidate.' Gold, Voting and Decisions, 28.
29. Gold, Voting and Decisions, 29.
30. Frank A. Southard, The Evolution of the International Monetary Fund, Essays in International Finance, no. 135, Department of Economics, Princeton University, 1979, 5-6.
31. From 1947 to 1995 membership in the Bank increased from 45 to 178, while the number of Executive Board groupings only doubled (from 12 to 24), effectively diluting the voice of members without individual representation on the Executive Board.
32. Bereket Habte Selassie, 'The World Bank: power and responsibility in historical perspective,' African Studies Review 27(December 1984), 35-46; C. Roe Goddard and Melissa H. Birch, 'The International Monetary Fund,' in Goddard, John T. Passé-Smith, and John G. Conklin, eds, International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in the Changing Global Order (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 1996), 215-35.
33. Bereket Habte Selassie, 'The World Bank: power and responsibility in historical perspective,' African Studies Review 27(December 1984), 35-46; C. Roe Goddard and Melissa H. Birch, 'The International Monetary Fund,' in Goddard, John T. Passé-Smith, and John G. Conklin, eds, International Political Economy: State-Market Relations in the Changing Global Order (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner 1996), 215-35.
34. Kahler, 'The United States and the International Monetary Fund.'
35. This section draws on David P. Rapkin, Joseph U. Elston, and Jonathan R. Strand, 'Institutional adjustments to changed power distributions: the United States and Japan in the IMF,' Global Governance, forthcoming.
36. Ogata 'Shifting power relations,' 18.
37. ODA is a factor in Bank determination of quotas but not in the IMF determination of quotas/voting shares. We include it here because of its obvious relevance as an indicator of importance in the world economy.
38. Falling from 4.23 to 4.18 per cent. Harold James reports that Japan's and West Germany's shares in the IMF were suppressed in the late 1970s as a kind of penalty (presumably imposed by the United States) for inadequate efforts to reduce their balance-of-payments surpluses. International Monetary Cooperation Since Bretton Woods (Washington DC: International Monetary Fund 1996), 601.
39. Dennis T. Yasutomo, The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy (New York: St Martin's 1995), chap 3; Sherk, 'U.S. policy,' 80.
40. Dennis T. Yasutomo, The New Multilateralism in Japan's Foreign Policy (New York: St Martin's 1995), chap 3; Sherk, 'U.S. policy,' 80.
41. Ryokichi Hirono, 'Japan's leadership role in the multilateral development institutions,' in Shafiqul Islam, ed, Yen for Development: Japanese Foreign Aid and the Politics of Burden-Sharing (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press 1991), 176.
42. Kahler, 'The United States and the International Monetary Fund,' 92.
43. Ogata, 'Shifting power relations,' 15. See also the Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 April 1984, 186-7.
44. Ogata, 'Shifting power relations,' 15. See also the Far Eastern Economic Review, 26 April 1984, 186-7.
45. It is important to note that contributions to the IDA do not figure into the calculation of World Bank voting rights.
46. Ogata,'Shifting power relations,' 15-16.
47. The United States quota share was 20.91 (down from 21.78) per cent; Japan's rose to 5.19 from 4.94 per cent, barely exceeding Germany's 5.17 per cent.
48. Economist, 19 April 1986, 82-3.
49. Shafiqul Islam, 'Beyond burden-sharing: economics and politics of Japanese foreign aid,' in Islam, ed, Yen for Development, 221.
50. United States officials dismissed the Miyazawa plan without serious consideration, ostensibly on the grounds that it would shift private risk onto the public, that is, that IMF monies would be used to bail out commercial banks. See New York Times 28 September 1988, A 1.
51. Far Eastern Economic Review, 13 October 1988, 98. Indeed, according to the Japan Times, Japan's objective at the Berlin meeting was to raise its quota from 4.7 to 8 per cent.
52. Tadashi Saito, 'Japan's role in multilateral financial organizations,' JEI Report No 7A (22 February 1991), 4-5.
53. Hobart Rowen 'Japanese intensifying push for higher IMF ranking,' Washington Post, 26 September 1991, C 1.
54. Wall Street Journal, 9 February 1989.
55. Hobart Rowen, 'Britain in the IMF: Sunset Boulevard,' Washington Post, 22 February 1990; also Economist, 'The IMF: sabres at dawn,' 12 May 1990, 76.
56. Hobart Rowen, 'Britain in the IMF: Sunset Boulevard,' Washington Post, 22 February 1990; also Economist, 'The IMF: sabres at dawn,' 12 May 1990, 76.
57. Clyde H. Farnsworth, 'IMF part on Fund rise and voting,' New York Times, 7 May 1990, D1, D7.
58. Japan Times, 9 May 1990.
59. Kahler, 'The United States and the International Monetary Fund,' 105.
60. Sherk, 'U.S. policy,' 83-4; Catherine Gwin, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, 1945-1992 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1994), 64-76.
61. Sherk, 'U.S. policy,' 83-4; Catherine Gwin, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, 1945-1992 (Washington DC: Brookings Institution 1994), 64-76.
62. Gwin, U.S. Relations with the World Bank, 71-2.
63. Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 77.
64. John Williamson, 'Democracy and the "Washington Consensus,"' World Development 21(1983), 1329-36.
65. Susumu Awanohara, 'The U.S. and Japan at the World Bank,' in Peter Gourevitch, Takashi Inoguchi, and Courtney Purrington, eds, United States-Japan Relations and International Institutions After the Cold War (La Jolla CA: Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1995), 168. Similarly, Edith Terry refers to the Bank's structural adjustment policies as 'a reflection of the free-market ideological excesses of three Republican Administrations in the U.S.' 'How Asia got rich: World Bank vs. Japanese industrial policy,' Japan Policy Research Institute, Working Paper no 10, 1995, 3,
66. Susumu Awanohara, 'The U.S. and Japan at the World Bank,' in Peter Gourevitch, Takashi Inoguchi, and Courtney Purrington, eds, United States-Japan Relations and International Institutions After the Cold War (La Jolla CA: Graduate School of International Relations and Pacific Studies, University of California, San Diego, 1995), 168. Similarly, Edith Terry refers to the Bank's structural adjustment policies as 'a reflection of the free-market ideological excesses of three Republican Administrations in the U.S.' 'How Asia got rich: World Bank vs. Japanese industrial policy,' Japan Policy Research Institute, Working Paper no 10, 1995, 3,
67. Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund, 'Issues related to the World Bank's approach to structural adjustment: proposal from a major partner,' Occasional Paper no 1, 1991.
68. World Bank, The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Public Policy (New York: Oxford University Press 1993).
69. See Awanohara, 'The U.S. and Japan at the World Bank': Terry, 'How Asia got rich'; and Robert Wade, ed, Miracle or Design: Lessons from the East Asian Experience (Washington DC: Overseas Development Council 1994).
70. See Awanohara, 'The U.S. and Japan at the World Bank': Terry, 'How Asia got rich'; and Robert Wade, ed, Miracle or Design: Lessons from the East Asian Experience (Washington DC: Overseas Development Council 1994).
71. Dani Rodrik, 'King Kong meets Godzilla: the World Bank and the east Asian miracle,' in Wade, ed, Miracle or Design, 14.
72. Kahler, 'The United States and the International Monetary Fund,' 91. According to Kahler, United States interest in the IMF began to wane in the early 19705.
73. Robert Wade, 'Japan, the World Bank, and the art of paradigm maintenance: The East Asian Miracle in political perspective,' New Left Review (May/June 1996), 36.
74. Awanohara, 'The U.S. and Japan at the World Bank.'
75. Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 123-33.
76. Awanohara, 'The U.S. and Japan at the World Bank,' 180.
77. Ogata, 'Shifting power relations.' For another useful perspective on the same problem, see Sherk 'U.S. policy,' 82-5.
78. Ogata, 'Shifting power relations.' For another useful perspective on the same problem, see Sherk 'U.S. policy,' 82-5.
79. Yasumoto cites a United States Treasury Department official's view that the two countries agreed on policies in the World Bank 80 to 90 per cent of the time. Yasutomo, New Multilateralism, 70, 80-1.
80. Ibid, 135.
81. American officials refrained from making the episode a bilateral confrontation. If Japan's increasing assertiveness in the IMF and World Bank has challenged any of the G-5 countries in recent years it has been the European members (which it surpassed to gain the number two position in both institutions) more so than the United States.
82. Wade, 'Japan, the World Bank, and the art of paradigm maintenance,' 14.