Direct and ultimate ownership structures in the UK: An intertemporal perspective over the last decade

Corporate Governance: An International Review

Volumn 13, Issue 1, 2005, Pages 26-45

  Marchica, Maria Teresa ^b   Mura, Roberto ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF YORK   (United Kingdom)

^b NONE

Author keywords

Board of directors; Direct ownership; UK companies; Ultimate ownership

Indexed keywords

EID: 12844266952     PISSN: 09648410     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-8683.2005.00401.x     Document Type: Review

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