Multiple principles of political obligation

Political Theory

Volumn 32, Issue 6, 2004, Pages 801-824

  Klosko, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Common good; Fairness; Natural duties; Political obligation

Indexed keywords

EID: 10144237215     PISSN: 00905917     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0090591704265933     Document Type: Review

References (108)

1. Most notable are A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979), chap. 12; M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?" Yale Law Journal 82 (1973). For purposes of discussion here, "political obligations" can be taken to be more or less equivalent to moral requirements to support the state or to obey the law. For basic features of political obligations, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chaps. 1 and 2; G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligations, new ed. (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), chap. 1. I should also note that throughout, discussion is confined to laws that are reasonably just and to liberal, democratic societies that can also be assumed to be reasonably just. In the literature, it is widely believed that liberal political theory is unable to establish political obligations even in such societies. It is this contention that I attempt to refute. Although I believe that the principles I discuss can be extended to other kinds of societies (to different extents), this important subject cannot be discussed in this essay.
2. Most notable are A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979), chap. 12; M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?" Yale Law Journal 82 (1973). For purposes of discussion here, "political obligations" can be taken to be more or less equivalent to moral requirements to support the state or to obey the law. For basic features of political obligations, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chaps. 1 and 2; G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligations, new ed. (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), chap. 1. I should also note that throughout, discussion is confined to laws that are reasonably just and to liberal, democratic societies that can also be assumed to be reasonably just. In the literature, it is widely believed that liberal political theory is unable to establish political obligations even in such societies. It is this contention that I attempt to refute. Although I believe that the principles I discuss can be extended to other kinds of societies (to different extents), this important subject cannot be discussed in this essay.
3. Most notable are A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979), chap. 12; M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?" Yale Law Journal 82 (1973). For purposes of discussion here, "political obligations" can be taken to be more or less equivalent to moral requirements to support the state or to obey the law. For basic features of political obligations, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chaps. 1 and 2; G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligations, new ed. (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), chap. 1. I should also note that throughout, discussion is confined to laws that are reasonably just and to liberal, democratic societies that can also be assumed to be reasonably just. In the literature, it is widely believed that liberal political theory is unable to establish political obligations even in such societies. It is this contention that I attempt to refute. Although I believe that the principles I discuss can be extended to other kinds of societies (to different extents), this important subject cannot be discussed in this essay.
4. Most notable are A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979), chap. 12; M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?" Yale Law Journal 82 (1973). For purposes of discussion here, "political obligations" can be taken to be more or less equivalent to moral requirements to support the state or to obey the law. For basic features of political obligations, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chaps. 1 and 2; G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligations, new ed. (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), chap. 1. I should also note that throughout, discussion is confined to laws that are reasonably just and to liberal, democratic societies that can also be assumed to be reasonably just. In the literature, it is widely believed that liberal political theory is unable to establish political obligations even in such societies. It is this contention that I attempt to refute. Although I believe that the principles I discuss can be extended to other kinds of societies (to different extents), this important subject cannot be discussed in this essay.
5. Most notable are A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979), chap. 12; M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?" Yale Law Journal 82 (1973). For purposes of discussion here, "political obligations" can be taken to be more or less equivalent to moral requirements to support the state or to obey the law. For basic features of political obligations, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chaps. 1 and 2; G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligations, new ed. (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), chap. 1. I should also note that throughout, discussion is confined to laws that are reasonably just and to liberal, democratic societies that can also be assumed to be reasonably just. In the literature, it is widely believed that liberal political theory is unable to establish political obligations even in such societies. It is this contention that I attempt to refute. Although I believe that the principles I discuss can be extended to other kinds of societies (to different extents), this important subject cannot be discussed in this essay.
6. Most notable are A. J. Simmons, Moral Principles and Political Obligations (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1979); L. Green, The Authority of the State (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1988); J. Raz, The Authority of Law (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1979), chap. 12; M. B. E. Smith, "Is There a Prima Facie Obligation to Obey the Law?" Yale Law Journal 82 (1973). For purposes of discussion here, "political obligations" can be taken to be more or less equivalent to moral requirements to support the state or to obey the law. For basic features of political obligations, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chaps. 1 and 2; G. Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligations, new ed. (Savage, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2004), chap. 1. I should also note that throughout, discussion is confined to laws that are reasonably just and to liberal, democratic societies that can also be assumed to be reasonably just. In the literature, it is widely believed that liberal political theory is unable to establish political obligations even in such societies. It is this contention that I attempt to refute. Although I believe that the principles I discuss can be extended to other kinds of societies (to different extents), this important subject cannot be discussed in this essay.
7. For different accounts of the requirements theories of political obligation should satisfy, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chap. 2; Klosko, Principle of Fairness, 2-6; J. Wolff, "Political Obligation: A Pluralistic Approach," in Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity, ed. M. Baghramian and A. Ingram (London: Routledge, 2000), 182-87.
8. For different accounts of the requirements theories of political obligation should satisfy, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chap. 2; Klosko, Principle of Fairness, 2-6; J. Wolff, "Political Obligation: A Pluralistic Approach," in Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity, ed. M. Baghramian and A. Ingram (London: Routledge, 2000), 182-87.
9. For different accounts of the requirements theories of political obligation should satisfy, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chap. 2; Klosko, Principle of Fairness, 2-6; J. Wolff, "Political Obligation: A Pluralistic Approach," in Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity, ed. M. Baghramian and A. Ingram (London: Routledge, 2000), 182-87.
10. Simmons, Moral Principles. Simmons also examines consequentialist and "conceptual" arguments, though he devotes less attention to them. Similar approaches are employed by Smith, "Prima Facie Obligation"; Raz, Authority of Law; and R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), chap. 6.
11. Simmons, Moral Principles. Simmons also examines consequentialist and "conceptual" arguments, though he devotes less attention to them. Similar approaches are employed by Smith, "Prima Facie Obligation"; Raz, Authority of Law; and R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), chap. 6.
12. Simmons, Moral Principles. Simmons also examines consequentialist and "conceptual" arguments, though he devotes less attention to them. Similar approaches are employed by Smith, "Prima Facie Obligation"; Raz, Authority of Law; and R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), chap. 6.
13. Simmons, Moral Principles. Simmons also examines consequentialist and "conceptual" arguments, though he devotes less attention to them. Similar approaches are employed by Smith, "Prima Facie Obligation"; Raz, Authority of Law; and R. Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1986), chap. 6.
14. Simmons explicitly rejects the "universality" requirement that a single principle must account for all political obligations (Moral Principles, 35). The main previous work with a "multiprinciple" approach is Wolff, "Political Obligation," to which I am indebted. The approach is suggested in Klosko, Principle of Fairness, 98-99; see also C. Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), which does not work out the details of the position.
15. Simmons explicitly rejects the "universality" requirement that a single principle must account for all political obligations (Moral Principles, 35). The main previous work with a "multiprinciple" approach is Wolff, "Political Obligation," to which I am indebted. The approach is suggested in Klosko, Principle of Fairness, 98-99; see also C. Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), which does not work out the details of the position.
16. Simmons explicitly rejects the "universality" requirement that a single principle must account for all political obligations (Moral Principles, 35). The main previous work with a "multiprinciple" approach is Wolff, "Political Obligation," to which I am indebted. The approach is suggested in Klosko, Principle of Fairness, 98-99; see also C. Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), which does not work out the details of the position.
17. H. Beran, The Consent Theory of Political Obligation (London: Croom Helm, 1987).
18. C. Wellman, "Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation," Ethics 111 (2001).
19. See note 3. I should note that, after refuting the principles separately, Simmons claims that a combination of them will not satisfy the generality requirement (Moral Principles, 191). I am indebted to an anonymous reader for this point.
20. The term is taken from Simmons, Moral Principles, 55-56. For reasons of space, I cannot discuss additional requirements, although I believe the position developed here could address them.
21. Green, Authority of the State, chap. 3.
22. The best defense of consent theory in the literature is Beran, Consent Theory; his position is criticized in G. Klosko, "Reformist Consent and Political Obligation," Political Studies 39 (1991).
23. The best defense of consent theory in the literature is Beran, Consent Theory; his position is criticized in G. Klosko, "Reformist Consent and Political Obligation," Political Studies 39 (1991).
24. My focus on the comprehensiveness requirement might seem unusual, because we might simply assume that a theory of obligation will explain obligations to obey the law across the board, rather than only some laws, with additional principles required for other laws. The problem, however, is that at the current time no theory is generally viewed as able to do this. Multiple principle (MP) theory, even with its unconventional approach to comprehensiveness, appears to be the only alternative to no satisfactory theory at all.
25. Mutual support and overlap are closely related. But in cases that involve the former, a single principle is not able to generate a given moral requirement without the help of another. With overlap, both principles A and B are able to generate independent moral requirements, which are strengthened by having the same (or closely similar) application.
26. Especially notable is a general duty to obey the law based on the contention that law is a seamless web, and so violation of any given law undermines the legal system as a whole. Although this is potentially an important argument, it raises many questions that cannot be addressed in this essay.
27. An excellent account is Simmons, Moral Principles, chap. 4. For the distinction between express and tacit consent, see J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, sees. 119-22.
28. An excellent account is Simmons, Moral Principles, chap. 4. For the distinction between express and tacit consent, see J. Locke, Second Treatise of Civil Government, sees. 119-22.
29. Locke, Second Treatise, sec. 97.
30. Because of difficulties identifying individuals who have clearly consented to government - aside from naturalized citizens - consent contributes little to MP theory as developed below, though of course, it is an important source of obligations for individuals who have consented.
31. H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 185. For full discussion of political obligations based on the principle of fairness, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness.
32. H. L. A. Hart, "Are There Any Natural Rights?" Philosophical Review 64 (1955): 185. For full discussion of political obligations based on the principle of fairness, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness.
33. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1965), 164; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 112. The underlying moral principle is analyzed by R. Arneson, "The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems," Ethics 92 (1982); see also C. Strang, "What If Everyone Did That?" Durham University Journal 53 (1960).
34. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1965), 164; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 112. The underlying moral principle is analyzed by R. Arneson, "The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems," Ethics 92 (1982); see also C. Strang, "What If Everyone Did That?" Durham University Journal 53 (1960).
35. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1965), 164; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 112. The underlying moral principle is analyzed by R. Arneson, "The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems," Ethics 92 (1982); see also C. Strang, "What If Everyone Did That?" Durham University Journal 53 (1960).
36. D. Lyons, Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1965), 164; J. Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 112. The underlying moral principle is analyzed by R. Arneson, "The Principle of Fairness and Free-Rider Problems," Ethics 92 (1982); see also C. Strang, "What If Everyone Did That?" Durham University Journal 53 (1960).
37. In such cases, we can assume that, if the benefit can be withheld from A, it should be his decision whether he should receive it at the specified price. Within the liberal tradition, liberty is a central value. The decision whether A will have his liberty curtailed by having to contribute to a cooperative scheme should be made by him rather than by the scheme members.
38. The need to accept benefits is noted by Rawls, Theory of Justice, 113-16; similarly, R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 95; Dworkin, Law's Empire, 192-93.
39. The need to accept benefits is noted by Rawls, Theory of Justice, 113-16; similarly, R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 95; Dworkin, Law's Empire, 192-93.
40. The need to accept benefits is noted by Rawls, Theory of Justice, 113-16; similarly, R. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974), 95; Dworkin, Law's Empire, 192-93.
41. For reasons of space, I discuss only (i) and (ii) in this essay. Throughout, I assume that (iii) is met. For discussion of these and other aspects of the principle, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness.
42. Though I will not discuss other possible members of this class, I do not rule them out.
43. Discussion here draws on Klosko, Principle of Fairness, chap. 2, which also considers and counters other possible arguments against obligations in these cases. Important, recent criticisms of the position presented here are presented by A. J. Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 8; and Justification and Legitimacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chap. 2. A response to the former is presented in G. Klosko, "The Natural Basis of Political Obligation," Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001). In regard to the latter, note the example of the well Simmons uses on page 34. This is a poor example, because, as Simmons presents it, the benefit in question is easily supplied through the labor of one person, in contrast to the indispensable public goods discussed throughout this essay.
44. Discussion here draws on Klosko, Principle of Fairness, chap. 2, which also considers and counters other possible arguments against obligations in these cases. Important, recent criticisms of the position presented here are presented by A. J. Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 8; and Justification and Legitimacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chap. 2. A response to the former is presented in G. Klosko, "The Natural Basis of Political Obligation," Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001). In regard to the latter, note the example of the well Simmons uses on page 34. This is a poor example, because, as Simmons presents it, the benefit in question is easily supplied through the labor of one person, in contrast to the indispensable public goods discussed throughout this essay.
45. Discussion here draws on Klosko, Principle of Fairness, chap. 2, which also considers and counters other possible arguments against obligations in these cases. Important, recent criticisms of the position presented here are presented by A. J. Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 8; and Justification and Legitimacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chap. 2. A response to the former is presented in G. Klosko, "The Natural Basis of Political Obligation," Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001). In regard to the latter, note the example of the well Simmons uses on page 34. This is a poor example, because, as Simmons presents it, the benefit in question is easily supplied through the labor of one person, in contrast to the indispensable public goods discussed throughout this essay.
46. Discussion here draws on Klosko, Principle of Fairness, chap. 2, which also considers and counters other possible arguments against obligations in these cases. Important, recent criticisms of the position presented here are presented by A. J. Simmons, On the Edge of Anarchy (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1993), chap. 8; and Justification and Legitimacy (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2001), chap. 2. A response to the former is presented in G. Klosko, "The Natural Basis of Political Obligation," Social Philosophy and Policy 18 (2001). In regard to the latter, note the example of the well Simmons uses on page 34. This is a poor example, because, as Simmons presents it, the benefit in question is easily supplied through the labor of one person, in contrast to the indispensable public goods discussed throughout this essay.
47. See Klosko, Principle of Fairness, chap. 4.
48. J. Rawls, Political Liberalism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 54-58.
49. For discussion, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness, chap. 3. Similar procedures should be used to determine the form in which indispensable public goods are supplied.
50. See Arneson's discussion of the "self-benefit principle" ("Principle of Fairness").
51. The claim in this essay is not that such services must necessarily be provided by the state but only that, if the state does provide them, this must be justified.
52. Rawls, Theory of Justice , sees. 19 and 51; Simmons, Moral Principles, chap. 6; J. Waldron, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993); G. Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1994).
53. Rawls, Theory of Justice , sees. 19 and 51; Simmons, Moral Principles, chap. 6; J. Waldron, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993); G. Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1994).
54. Rawls, Theory of Justice , sees. 19 and 51; Simmons, Moral Principles, chap. 6; J. Waldron, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993); G. Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1994).
55. Rawls, Theory of Justice , sees. 19 and 51; Simmons, Moral Principles, chap. 6; J. Waldron, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy and Public Affairs 22 (1993); G. Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice," Philosophy and Public Affairs 23 (1994).
56. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 114-15.
57. I b i d.
58. Ibid., 337; additional natural duties are discussed in sec. 51.
59. Ibid., 114.
60. Simmons also divorces the natural duties from the context of the original position (Moral Principles, 143-44).
61. Wellman, "Toward a Liberal Theory."
62. For an excellent defense of a duty of mutual aid, see J. Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 126-86. For survey research on attitudes toward the natural duties, see D. Klein and G. Klosko, "Political Obligation: The Empirical Approach" (paper presented at the 2001 meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco). Subjects were University of Virginia undergraduates; although Ns are small and the sample not representative of the American population, the percentages are striking.
63. For an excellent defense of a duty of mutual aid, see J. Feinberg, Harm to Others (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1984), 126-86. For survey research on attitudes toward the natural duties, see D. Klein and G. Klosko, "Political Obligation: The Empirical Approach" (paper presented at the 2001 meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco). Subjects were University of Virginia undergraduates; although Ns are small and the sample not representative of the American population, the percentages are striking.
64. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 334; similarly, 115.
65. Ibid., 114.
66. Ibid., 117; also 115.
67. Ibid., 334, 115. Simmons, for one, appears to attach the cost qualifier to both political duties (Moral Principles, 193; see also 154); Waldron does not discuss the question of costs in "Special Ties."
68. Ibid., 334, 115. Simmons, for one, appears to attach the cost qualifier to both political duties (Moral Principles, 193; see also 154); Waldron does not discuss the question of costs in "Special Ties."
69. Ibid., 334, 115. Simmons, for one, appears to attach the cost qualifier to both political duties (Moral Principles, 193; see also 154); Waldron does not discuss the question of costs in "Special Ties."
70. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 117.
71. For the first of the political duties not to be qualified in regard to cost while all other natural duties are would require explanation. This difference would suggest the likelihood of further, deeper differences and that the duty to comply's derivation would differ from those of the other duties; for discussion, see Klosko, "Natural Duties."
72. Wellman's principle of samaratinism is similarly cost-qualified, "Toward a Liberal Theory," 744, 748, 752 n. 21.
73. For criticisms of Wellman's position in regard to cost, see G. Klosko, "Samaritanism and Political Obligation: A Response to Christopher Wellman's 'Liberal Theory of Political Obligation,'" Ethics 113 (2003).
74. For levels of social spending in different countries, see W. Adema, "What Do Countries Really Spend on Social Policies? A Comparative Note," OECD Economic Studies 28 (1997).
75. Simmons, Moral Principles, 31-35. I assume the legitimacy of requiring that natural duties of justice be fulfilled by supporting state agencies. For discussion, see Daniel McDermott, "Natural Duties and State Legitimacy" (paper presented at the 2001 meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco).
76. Simmons, Moral Principles, 31-35. I assume the legitimacy of requiring that natural duties of justice be fulfilled by supporting state agencies. For discussion, see Daniel McDermott, "Natural Duties and State Legitimacy" (paper presented at the 2001 meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco).
77. For problems with Rawls's view in this regard, see Simmons, Moral Principles, chap. 6.
78. See, for example, R. Goodin, "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" Ethics 98 (1988); C. Wellman, "Relational Facts in Liberal Political Theory: Is There Magic in the Pronoun 'My'?" Ethics 110 (2000). The latter is criticized by C. Coons, "Wellman's 'Reductive' Justifications for Redistributive Policies That Favor Compatriots," Ethics 111 (2001).
79. See, for example, R. Goodin, "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" Ethics 98 (1988); C. Wellman, "Relational Facts in Liberal Political Theory: Is There Magic in the Pronoun 'My'?" Ethics 110 (2000). The latter is criticized by C. Coons, "Wellman's 'Reductive' Justifications for Redistributive Policies That Favor Compatriots," Ethics 111 (2001).
80. See, for example, R. Goodin, "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" Ethics 98 (1988); C. Wellman, "Relational Facts in Liberal Political Theory: Is There Magic in the Pronoun 'My'?" Ethics 110 (2000). The latter is criticized by C. Coons, "Wellman's 'Reductive' Justifications for Redistributive Policies That Favor Compatriots," Ethics 111 (2001).
81. In Philosophical Anarchism, Gans attempts to solve the particularity problem by combining natural duty and "communal" (association) principles (pp. 81-82).
82. Notably, Simmons, Moral Principles; this is also true of public choice theorists, for example, M. Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987). For discussion, see Klosko, "Natural Basis."
83. Notably, Simmons, Moral Principles; this is also true of public choice theorists, for example, M. Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987). For discussion, see Klosko, "Natural Basis."
84. Notably, Simmons, Moral Principles; this is also true of public choice theorists, for example, M. Taylor, The Possibility of Cooperation (Cambridge. UK: Cambridge University Press, 1987). For discussion, see Klosko, "Natural Basis."
85. See Klosko, "Natural Basis."
86. See R. Miller, "Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern," Philosophy and Public Affairs 27 (1998). I should note that this does not justify blackmail by Grey's fellow citizens, that it is legitimate for them not to obey the law unless they are bribed with social welfare programs. As indicated, the primary reason to address their needs is recognition and reciprocation, but these pragmatic considerations are also relevant and should be mentioned. I am grateful to anonymous readers of this journal for discussion on this point.
87. For discussion of this point, I am indebted to David Klein.
88. For convenience, in various contexts below, I will not mention supply of necessary discretionary goods covered by the indirect argument along with goods that are themselves indispensable. Their inclusion can be assumed.
89. D. Hume, A Treatise of Human Nature, ed. E. Mossner (Harmondsworth, UK: Penguin, 1969), III, ii, 8, p. 590. Although the examples that Hume provides are public goods, "common provisions" under CG will also include excludable goods, if these satisfy the conditions discussed below.
90. I am grateful to an anonymous reader for discussion of this point.
91. Cf. note above.
92. Dworkin, Law's Empire, 196-216; J. Horton, Political Obligation (London: Macmillan, 1992), chap. 6; also, M. Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993).
93. Dworkin, Law's Empire, 196-216; J. Horton, Political Obligation (London: Macmillan, 1992), chap. 6; also, M. Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993).
94. Dworkin, Law's Empire, 196-216; J. Horton, Political Obligation (London: Macmillan, 1992), chap. 6; also, M. Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993).
95. See A. J. Simmons, "Associative Political Obligations," Ethics 106 (1996); but see the response of J. Horton, "Political Obligation, Identity, and Political Community" (paper presented at the 2001 meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco).
96. See A. J. Simmons, "Associative Political Obligations," Ethics 106 (1996); but see the response of J. Horton, "Political Obligation, Identity, and Political Community" (paper presented at the 2001 meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco).
97. J. Kalt, "Public Goods and the Theory of Government," Cato Journal 1 (1981): 580.
98. A possible problem with the common good principle (CG) is that common provisions are frequently not public goods but excludable. This implies that, ordinarily, they should be funded through user fees, although considerations of social justice could require that economically disadvantaged members of society have access. Exploration of these issues is beyond the scope of this essay.
99. On determinations of fair benefits and burdens, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness, chap. 3.
100. On these requirements, see ibid.
101. Empirical evidence suggests that there is greater agreements on fair procedures than on fair distribution; for discussion, see G. Klosko, Democratic Procedures and Liberal Consensus (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2000), chap. 8.
102. Simmons, Moral Principles, 65-68. As is clear in the philosophy of Rousseau, rights to participate by themselves do not provide adequate safeguards.
103. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 93-95. For discussion of the example, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness, chap. 2.
104. Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 93-95. For discussion of the example, see Klosko, Principle of Fairness, chap. 2.
105. A. J. Simmons, "The Anarchist Position: A Reply to Klosko and Senor," Philosophy and Public Affairs 16 (1987): 274 (his emphasis).
106. CG also works reciprocally to establish obligations in regard to indispensable public goods, though I of course view this as a strength rather than a weakness of MP theory.
107. It is worth noting that an additional advantage of increasing the number of principles involved in MP theory is that, if one principle is refuted, the theory could still ground comprehensive general political obligations through operation of the remaining principles.
108. Previous versions of this essay were presented at the College of William and Mary and to the University of Virginia Political Theory Colloquium. I am grateful to both audiences and to many colleagues and friends for helpful comments. These include Lawrie Balfour, Colin Bird, Richard Dagger, Joshua Dienstag, David Klein, Don Moon, Peter Rinderle, Stephen White, Jonathan Wolff, and my anonymous readers.