Samaritanism and Political Obligation: A Response to Christopher Wellman's "Liberal Theory of Political Obligation"

Ethics

Volumn 113, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 835-840+929

  Klosko, George ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0142219332     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/373956     Document Type: Article

References (17)

1. Christopher Heath Wellman, "Toward a Liberal Theory of Political Obligation," Ethics 111 (2001): 735-59. Unaccompanied page references are to this article. For purposes of discussion here, "political obligations" can be taken to be more or less equivalent to moral requirements to support the state or to obey the law.
2. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), secs. 19, 51. Politics at the University of Virginia
3. See George Klosko, The Principle of Fairness and Political Obligations (Savage, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1992).
4. Consequentialist theories do not generally recognize cost qualifiers on natural duties - which is often viewed as a serious flaw of such theories; see Shelly Kagan, The Limits of Morality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).
5. Rawls, p. 114.
6. Ibid., p. 117.
7. Ibid., pp. 115, 334. It is interesting that in both passages in which it is presented, this duty is explicitly qualified in regard to cost, while the duty to comply with existing institutions is not. However, for the latter duty not to be cost qualified while all other natural duties are would require explanation and would suggest deeper differences between this and the other natural duties; for discussion, see George Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice," Philosophy & Public Affairs 23 (1994): 251-70. A. John Simmons, for one, appears to attach the cost qualifier to both of Rawls's political duties (Moral Principles and Political Obligations [Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1979], p. 193; see also p. 154).
8. Ibid., pp. 115, 334. It is interesting that in both passages in which it is presented, this duty is explicitly qualified in regard to cost, while the duty to comply with existing institutions is not. However, for the latter duty not to be cost qualified while all other natural duties are would require explanation and would suggest deeper differences between this and the other natural duties; for discussion, see George Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice," Philosophy & Public Affairs 23 (1994): 251-70. A. John Simmons, for one, appears to attach the cost qualifier to both of Rawls's political duties (Moral Principles and Political Obligations [Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1979], p. 193; see also p. 154).
9. Ibid., pp. 115, 334. It is interesting that in both passages in which it is presented, this duty is explicitly qualified in regard to cost, while the duty to comply with existing institutions is not. However, for the latter duty not to be cost qualified while all other natural duties are would require explanation and would suggest deeper differences between this and the other natural duties; for discussion, see George Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties of Justice," Philosophy & Public Affairs 23 (1994): 251-70. A. John Simmons, for one, appears to attach the cost qualifier to both of Rawls's political duties (Moral Principles and Political Obligations [Princeton, NJ.: Princeton University Press, 1979], p. 193; see also p. 154).
10. See Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties," which criticizes Rawls's view on these grounds. Important discussions of natural duties of justice and political obligations do not explore this problem (Simmons, chap. 6; Jeremy Waldron, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 [1993]: 3-30).
11. See Klosko, "Political Obligation and the Natural Duties," which criticizes Rawls's view on these grounds. Important discussions of natural duties of justice and political obligations do not explore this problem (Simmons, chap. 6; Jeremy Waldron, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 [1993]: 3-30).
12. Lawrence Becker, Reciprocity (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1986), p. 3.
13. Wellman combines fairness and samaritanism in a different way (p. 749).
14. For recent discussions of "multiple-principle" approaches to political obligation, see Jonathan Wolff, "Political Obligation: A Pluralistic Approach," in Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity, ed. Maria Baghramian and Attracta Ingram (London; Routledge, 2000); C. Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). The approach is suggested in Klosko, Principle of Fairness, pp. 91, 98-99.
15. For recent discussions of "multiple-principle" approaches to political obligation, see Jonathan Wolff, "Political Obligation: A Pluralistic Approach," in Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity, ed. Maria Baghramian and Attracta Ingram (London; Routledge, 2000); C. Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). The approach is suggested in Klosko, Principle of Fairness, pp. 91, 98-99.
16. For recent discussions of "multiple-principle" approaches to political obligation, see Jonathan Wolff, "Political Obligation: A Pluralistic Approach," in Pluralism: The Philosophy and Politics of Diversity, ed. Maria Baghramian and Attracta Ingram (London; Routledge, 2000); C. Gans, Philosophical Anarchism and Political Disobedience (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1992). The approach is suggested in Klosko, Principle of Fairness, pp. 91, 98-99.
17. For discussion of some of these difficulties, see Wellman, pp. 754 ff. I should note that a theory of political obligation along the lines indicated here will still be incomplete. Though it will cover both central state benefits and services to the needy, many other state services will be beyond its ambit. Important among these are benefits provided to individuals themselves that concern excludable rather than public goods and so are not (or not easily) covered by the principle of fairness. Members of this class include many educational and cultural facilities, e.g., museums, and public parks and recreation facilities.