Relational facts in liberal political theory: Is there magic in the pronoun 'my'?

Ethics

Volumn 110, Issue 3, 2000, Pages 537-562

  Wellman, Christopher Heath ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0034164763     PISSN: 00141704     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/233323     Document Type: Article

References (78)

1. See Michael Sandel, "Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory 12 (1984): 81-95, and Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); as well as Alasdair MacIntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" in The Lindley Lecture series (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1984).
2. See Michael Sandel, "Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory 12 (1984): 81-95, and Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); as well as Alasdair MacIntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" in The Lindley Lecture series (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1984).
3. See Michael Sandel, "Procedural Republic and the Unencumbered Self," Political Theory 12 (1984): 81-95, and Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1982); as well as Alasdair MacIntyre, "Is Patriotism a Virtue?" in The Lindley Lecture series (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1984).
4. I borrow the term "relational facts" from David Miller, On Nationality (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995). As will become apparent below, this expression is not unproblematic; among other things, it is unclear what the relevant class of relational facts is and how it is to be demarcated. (Presumably, Miller means to pick out socially salient relations, but, as we will see, things are not so simple.) Despite these difficulties, I adopt Miller's expression because it is useful to motivating this general (and growing) dissatisfaction with traditional liberalism.
5. A related criticism is that the citizens of a genuinely liberal state will be, as a matter of fact, unwilling to make the political sacrifices necessary for the state to survive. I discuss this version in my essay, "Divided We Stand; United We Fall? An Essay on Size, Citizenship, and Secession," Good Society 6 (1996): 21-23.
6. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
7. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
8. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
9. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
10. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
11. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
12. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
13. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
14. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
15. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
16. As I understand their work - Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1986); Margaret Gilbert, "Group Membership and Political Obligation," Monist 76 (1993): 119-31; Michael Hardimon, "Role Obligations," Journal of Philosophy 41 (1994): 333-63; Diane Jeske, "Associative Obligations, Voluntarism, and Equality," Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 77 (1996): 289-309; Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: Notre Dame University Press, 1984); David Miller, On Nationality, Andrew Oldenquist, "Loyalties," Journal of Philosophy 79 (1982): 173-93; Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice; Samuel Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," Philosophy & Public Affairs 26 (1997): 189-209; Yael Tamir, Liberal Nationalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1993); and Bernard Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," reprinted in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), pp. 1-19 - these authors are some of the more prominent theorists who have expressed sympathy for associativism. (I deliberately stop short of labeling these authors as associativists. This caution is necessary in part because some are explicitly ambivalent about associativism but also because the literature in this area is especially murky - it is not always clear whether a given author is criticizing universalism, impartiality, or reductionism, for instance.)
17. MacIntyre, After Virtue, p. 220.
18. David Miller, p. 50. I should note that Miller uses the terms 'universalism' and 'particularism' for what I label, respectively, 'reductionism' and 'associativism'. Even though Miller's writing on this topic is especially instructive, I break from his terminology to avoid the confusion that might result from the fact that others (like Peter Winch and Margaret Urban Walker) understand the distinction between "universalism" and "particularism" to be something quite different from that which is the focus of this article.
19. This expression originated with William Godwin, Enquiry concerning Political Justice, , 3d ed. (1798), vol. 1, p. 127, quoted in D. H. Monroe, Godwins Political Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 9.
20. This expression originated with William Godwin, Enquiry concerning Political Justice, , 3d ed. (1798), vol. 1, p. 127, quoted in D. H. Monroe, Godwins Political Philosophy (London: Oxford University Press, 1953), p. 9.
21. Dworkin, p. 196. To my knowledge, this is where Dworkin first coined the term "associative obligation."
22. Scheffler, "Relationships and Responsibilities," p. 190.
23. This example illustrates that the term "relational facts" is somewhat unfortunate because the facts cited by reductionists (i.e., long-standing emotional intimacy and interdependence) can also be considered, in a perfectly straightforward sense, relational. I presume, however, that David Miller and others use the term in a more restricted sense. As I mention in n. 2 above, I follow their usage of this term despite the potential for confusion both because it is prominent in the literature and because I lack a clearly superior alternative.
24. Samuel Scheffler, "Families, Nations, and Strangers," The Lindley Lecture (Lawrence: University of Kansas, 1994), p. 11. Scheffler considers the compatibility of associative obligations and "commonsense moral thought" rather than liberalism per se.
25. Let me be clear here: I do not deny that liberalism leaves room for individuals permissibly to favor those with whom they have special ties, nor do I deny that some citizens may have special rights (because they are victims of past injustices, for instance). Rather, I suggest only that liberals are opposed to according special rights (whether they be against the state or not) to individuals without sufficient justification for this privileged status.
26. Again, it is important to clarify my position. Given the liberal premium upon liberty (some prefer to conceive of it in terms cf "autonomy"), liberals view each of us as free from moral duty unless there exist compelling moral reasons to limit our behavior (e.g., if we have made a promise or our conduct would be wrongly harmful to others). Absent such a consideration, the liberal presumption in favor of liberty prevails. As I will indicate presently, then (quite apart from what duties one might have to the state or considerations about which duties a state may enforce) liberals shun associativism simply because, in positing duties without sufficient cause, it demonstrates an insufficient appreciation for moral liberty.
27. Scheffler, "Families, Nations, and Strangers," p. 7.
28. Jeske, p. 292. Like Scheffler, Jeske is concerned with ordinary moral thought rather than liberal political theory.
29. Dworkin, pp. 190-216.
30. Ibid., p. 195.
31. Ibid., p. 196.
32. Tamir, pp. 117-39.
33. Ibid., p. 139.
34. I focus upon this question in part because I have addressed the other questions elsewhere but mostly because associativists (like David Miller and Tamir) view this topic as an especially vulnerable point for reductionists. Indeed, even the reductionist Richard Miller acknowledges: "The particularist challenge has begun to seem so powerful that it forces a choice between abandoning universalism and abandoning the patriotic bias in tax-financed aid that is a deep commitment of the vast majority of reflective people who are otherwise strongly attracted to universalism" (Richard W. Miller, "Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern," Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 [1998]: 202-24, p. 204). Other prominent discussions of related issues include Henry Shue's article, "Mediating Duties," Ethics 98 (1988): 687-704; and Jeremy Waldron's essay, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993): 3-30.
35. I focus upon this question in part because I have addressed the other questions elsewhere but mostly because associativists (like David Miller and Tamir) view this topic as an especially vulnerable point for reductionists. Indeed, even the reductionist Richard Miller acknowledges: "The particularist challenge has begun to seem so powerful that it forces a choice between abandoning universalism and abandoning the patriotic bias in tax-financed aid that is a deep commitment of the vast majority of reflective people who are otherwise strongly attracted to universalism" (Richard W. Miller, "Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern," Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 [1998]: 202-24, p. 204). Other prominent discussions of related issues include Henry Shue's article, "Mediating Duties," Ethics 98 (1988): 687-704; and Jeremy Waldron's essay, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993): 3-30.
36. I focus upon this question in part because I have addressed the other questions elsewhere but mostly because associativists (like David Miller and Tamir) view this topic as an especially vulnerable point for reductionists. Indeed, even the reductionist Richard Miller acknowledges: "The particularist challenge has begun to seem so powerful that it forces a choice between abandoning universalism and abandoning the patriotic bias in tax-financed aid that is a deep commitment of the vast majority of reflective people who are otherwise strongly attracted to universalism" (Richard W. Miller, "Cosmopolitan Respect and Patriotic Concern," Philosophy & Public Affairs 27 [1998]: 202-24, p. 204). Other prominent discussions of related issues include Henry Shue's article, "Mediating Duties," Ethics 98 (1988): 687-704; and Jeremy Waldron's essay, "Special Ties and Natural Duties," Philosophy & Public Affairs 22 (1993): 3-30.
37. See Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality," Philosophy & Public Affairs I (1972): 229-43; and Louis Pascal, "Judgement Day," reprinted in Applied Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) pp. 105-23.
38. See Peter Singer, "Famine, Affluence and Morality," Philosophy & Public Affairs I (1972): 229-43; and Louis Pascal, "Judgement Day," reprinted in Applied Ethics, ed. Peter Singer (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986) pp. 105-23.
39. See Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State, and Utopia (New York: Basic Books, 1974).
40. I call this position "patriotist" rather than "nationalist" to single out the members of territorial, political units rather than cultural groups. For an interesting collection of essays on the limits of patriotism, see Martha C. Nussbaum et al., For Love of Country (Boston: Beacon Press, 1996).
41. Robert Goodin, "What Is So Special about Our Fellow Countrymen?" Ethics 98 (1988): 663-86, p. 685.
42. I do not mean for this quick review to be conclusive; I merely hope to show why so many have been dissatisfied with the standarc reductionist accounts.
43. I owe this example to Allen Buchanan.
44. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1971), p. 60.
45. Of course, the inequalities between A-land and B-land can influence their relative power in international law, but I presume that this will have a much less dramatic effect upon the welfare of the citizens of the poorer state.
46. Those who subscribe to this relational theory of equality might view the preceding point about the effectiveness of rights merely as an implication of this understanding of equality. I offer these two as separate arguments, however, because I expect that my views on equality will be much more controversial than my claim about the effectiveness of rights. Separating them, then, allows me to supply reasons to those who reject the relational theory of equality and yet still appreciate (on some other grounds) the importance of the effectiveness of rights.
47. Elizabeth Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337. Jean Hampton is another theorist to advocate a relational theory of equality. In developing what she considers an Aristotelian approach, she writes: "We want, [Aristotle] says, a society in which people treat each other as equals (no one should be allowed to be master of another or the slave of another) and in which these equals treat each other as partners - or 'civic friends.' The way to get that is to pursue not exact equality of resources but sufficient equality to ensure that no one is able to use his wealth to gain political advantage over others in a way that damages their partnership" (Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy [Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997], p. 158).
48. Elizabeth Anderson, "What Is the Point of Equality?" Ethics 109 (1999): 287-337. Jean Hampton is another theorist to advocate a relational theory of equality. In developing what she considers an Aristotelian approach, she writes: "We want, [Aristotle] says, a society in which people treat each other as equals (no one should be allowed to be master of another or the slave of another) and in which these equals treat each other as partners -or 'civic friends.' The way to get that is to pursue not exact equality of resources but sufficient equality to ensure that no one is able to use his wealth to gain political advantage over others in a way that damages their partnership" (Jean Hampton, Political Philosophy [Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1997], p. 158).
49. Anderson, p. 314.
50. Ibid., p. 316.
51. Jean-Jacques Rousseau, A Discourse on the Origins of Inequality and The Social Contract, reprinted in The Social Contract and Discourses (London: J. M. Dent & Sons, 1973).
52. Fred Hirsch, Social Limits to Growth (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 3-5.
53. As the editors have pointed out, there are two important limitations to this consideration: first, with the media, business, and other cultural influences becoming increasingly international, we should expect people around the world to be comparing themselves to foreigners more and more. Second, even if it is in fact true that compatriots consider themselves through the eyes of their compatriots, this is only one of many factors to consider when designing redistributive policies.
54. For instance, a reviewer from this journal suggested that, unless there are other strong reasons for governmental distribution of benefits and burdens to other Americans, one might work to abolish this favoritism rather than cite it as the reason Americans compare themselves principally to other Americans. Thus, if one believes that the world ought not to be divided into political states, one might worry about the extent to which my arguments take this arrangement as a given.
55. This objection is similar to what Andrew Mason labels the "phenomenological objection: we have more confidence in the existence of special obligations (even when we disagree about their content) than we do in any complex story about how they are entailed by generic principles, and hence no such story could provide the real justification for them" (Andrew Mason, "Special Obligations to Compatriots," Ethics 107 [1997]: 427-47, pp. 429-30).
56. Williams, "Persons, Character, and Morality," p. 18.
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid. For an excellent discussion of the Williams example and a sustained treatment of the whole issue of motivation in ethics, see Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).
59. Ibid. For an excellent discussion of the Williams example and a sustained treatment of the whole issue of motivation in ethics, see Marcia Baron, Kantian Ethics Almost without Apology (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1995).
60. W. D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1930), p. 24.
61. Ibid., p. 23. I am not alleging that Ross is an associativist; instead, I suggest only that the associativist's critique of reductionism is analogous to Ross's objection to utilitarianism.
62. David Miller, p. 50 (emphasis in original).
63. I am grateful to David Miller for impressing upon me the importance of this objection. I should add that, more than anything else, it was Miller's probing written work and our subsequent conversations which drew me to examine these issues.
64. I do not assert that one has an "all-things-considered" duty to do as one has promised; I claim only that one at least always has moral reasons to fulfill one's promises.
65. I owe this point to Bernard Boxill.
66. As David Miller writes (in a manner reminiscent of Ross): "We are tied in to many different relationships - families, work groups, voluntary associations, religious and other such communities, nations - each of which makes demands on us, and there is no single overarching perspective from which we can order or rank these demands. In case of conflict - say, where I have to decide whether to use my resources to help my brother or my colleague at work - I simply have to weigh their respective claims, reflecting both on the nature of my relationship to the two individuals and on the benefits that each would get from the help I can give" (p. 53).
67. One may protest that, insofar as liberalism is a family of political theories, it is not concerned with doctrines about the moral duties individuals have to one another generally. Thus, liberalism simply does not speak to whether siblings have moral duties to each other in virtue of their being offspring of the same parents. Although it is true that liberalism is a family of political theories, this discussion about siblings is relevant, because it is crucial that liberals be capable of explaining the special obligations among compatriots without resorting to implausible accounts of how these obligations are generated. Thus, liberals are right to be wary of associativism if it turns out that its derivation of special obligations is suspect.
68. Concerned that framing the debate in terms of identity imports irrelevant metaphysical and psychological issues, one reviewer recommended that I avoid all talk of personal identity. Although I have some sympathy for this view, I think it is important to be faithful to the terms of the debate as I have inherited it. Thus, my strategy is first to explain why associativists suspect that identity is paramount and then to argue that their suspicion is ill founded.
69. David Miller, pp. 57-58.
70. Michael Walzer, Just and Unjust Wars (New York: Basic Books, 1977), p. 158.
71. MacIntyre, Is Patriotism a Virtue? p. 12.
72. Perhaps an associativist could argue for a less direct and more plausible connection between duty and motivation, but she would have to say more than any associativist has (to my knowledge) yet to say.
73. I do not mean to suggest that no moral conclusions can reasonably be drawn about such a different environment; I assert only that there are not fewer duties. For instance, it may be that we would blame slave owners in the Antebellum South less, but it does not follow from this that they were justified in acting as they did.
74. J. J. C. Smart provides a notorious case of such bullet biting in his essay, "An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics," in Utilitarianism: For and Against, and Bernard Williams (Cambridge: University Press, 1963), pp. 71-73.
75. Some might worry that I am being unfair to associativists in suggesting that their view involves such an unorthodox interpretation of "ought implies can." Indeed, MacIntyre can be read as simply making the twin empirical claims about human psychology that (1) agents cannot be motivated by reason alone and must rely upon sentiment and (2) agents cannot be motivated by impartial motives alone and must rely upon partial motives. In order to harness these empirical claims against reductionist models of ethics, however, one must add something else, and this is where something like a motivationally sensitive construal of "ought implies can" must enter the picture. Without this, the empirical claims are impotent.
76. Jeske, p. 292.
77. Godwin, p. 127.
78. I deliberately avoid the issue of nationalism or ethnic identity in this article. In particular, there is considerable disagreement as to whether nationalism is akin to patriotism or more like racism. My own view is that liberals should be ambivalent about nationalism, but this is not the place for me to defend these views. On this topic, see my essay, "On Liberalism's Regarding Nationalism" (in Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict, ed. Nanad Miscevic [Chicago: Open Court, 2000]).