Incentive compatible bidding mechanism in power generation markets

Dianli Xitong Zidonghua/Automation of Electric Power Systems

Volumn 27, Issue 7, 2003, Pages 27-31+69

  Zhang, Shaohua ^a   Fang, Yong ^a   Li, Yuzeng ^a  

^a SHANGHAI UNIVERSITY   (China)

Author keywords

Bidding mechanism; Fixed cost recovery; Incentive compatibility; Monte Carlo simulation; Power generation market

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION; COST BENEFIT ANALYSIS; ELECTRIC LOAD DISPATCHING; MANAGEMENT; MONTE CARLO METHODS;

BIDDING MECHANISM; ELECTRICITY MARKET; FIXED COST RECOVERY; INCENTIVE COMPATIBILITY;

ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEMS;

EID: 0037928763     PISSN: 10001026     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (29)

1. McAfee R P, McMillan J. Auctions and Bidding. Journal of Economic Literature, 1987, 25 (2): 699-738
2. David A K, Wen F. Market Power in Electricity Supply. IEEE Trans on Energy Conversion, 2001, 16 (4): 352-360
3. Vickrey W. Counterspeculation, Auctions, and Competitive Sealed Tenders. Journal of Finance, 1961, 16 (1): 8-37
4. Hao S. A Study of Basic Bidding Strategy in Clearing Pricing Auctions. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 2000, 15 (3): 975-980
5. Guan X, Ho Y C, Pepyne D L. Gaming and Price Spikes in Electricity Power Markets. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 2001, 16 (3): 402-408
6. Graves F C, Read E G, Hanser P Q, et al. One-part Markets for Electric Power: Ensuring the Benefits of Competition. In: Illic M, Galiana F, Fink L, eds. Power Systems Restructuring: Engineering and Economics. Norwell, MA: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1998, 243-280
7. Mielczarski W, Michalik G. Open Electricity Markets in Australia: Contract and Spot Prices. IEEE Power Engineering Review, 1999, 19 (2): 49-51
8. Vazquez C, Rivier M, Perez-Arriaga I J. If Pay-as-bid Auctions Are Not a Solution for California, Then Why Not a Reliability Market? The Electricity Journal, 2001, 14 (4): 41-48
9. Kahn A E, Cramton P C, Porter R H, et al. Uniform Pricing or Pay-as-bid Pricing: A Dilemma for California and Beyond. The Electricity Journal, 2001, 14 (6): 70-79
10. Fabra N, von der Fehr N, Harbord D. Modeling Electricity Auctions. The Electricity Journal, 2002, 15 (7): 72-81
11. Bower J, Bunn D. Experimental Analysis of the Efficiency of Uniform-price Versus Discriminatory Auctions in the England and Wales Electricity Market. Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, 2001, 25 (3): 561-592
12. Rothopf M H. Control of Market Power in Electricity Auctions. The Electricity Journal, 2002, 15 (8): 15-24
13. Duan Gang, Wang Xinfeng, Bai Wei, et al. Suppress Price Spikes by Hybridizing System-marginal-price Auction and Pay-as-bid Auction. Automation of Electric Power Systems, 2002, 26 (9): 30-35
14. Geng Jian, Wang Xifan, Chen Haoyoung, et al. Iterative Competitive Bidding Mechanism in Generation Market. Automation of Electric Power Systems, 2002, 26 (9): 1-6
15. Rothkopf M H. Daily Repetition: A Neglected Factor in the Analysis of Electricity Auction. The Electricity Journal, 1999, 12 (3): 60-70
16. Brunekreeft G. A Multiple-unit, Multiple-period Auction in the British Electricity Spot Market. Energy Economics, 2001, 23 (1): 99-118
17. Wang Xifan. Block Bidding Model Based Power Market. Proceedings of the CSEE, 2001, 21 (12): 1-6
18. Vazquez C, Rivier M, Perez-Arriaga I J. A Market Approach to Long-term Security of Supply. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 2002, 17 (2): 349-357
19. Zhang Weiying. Game Theory and Information Economics. Shanghai: Shanghai People's Publisher, 1996
20. Bushnell J, Oren S S. Bidder Cost Revelation in Electric Power Auction. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 1994, 6 (1): 1-22
21. Hobbs B F, Rothkopf M H, Hyde L C, et al. Evaluation of a Truthful Revelation Auction in the Context of Energy Markets with Nonconcave Benefits. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2000, 18 (1): 5-32
22. Chao H P, Wilson R. Multi-dimensional Procurement Auctions for Power Reserve: Robust Incentive-compatible Scoring and Settlement Rules. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2002, 22 (2): 161-183
23. Kamat R, Oren S S. Rational Buyer Meets Rational Seller: Reserves Market Equilibria Under Alternative Auction Designs. Journal of Regulatory Economics, 2002, 21 (3): 247-288
24. Fahrioglu M, Alvarado F L. Designing Incentive Compatible Contracts for Effective Demand Management. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 2000, 15 (4): 1255-1260
25. Silva C, Wollenberg B F, Zheng C Z. Application of Mechanism Design to Electric Power Markets. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 2001, 16 (4): 862-869
26. Mirrlees J. An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation. Review of Economic Studies, 1971, 38 (3): 334-368
27. Caramanis M C. Investment Decisions and Long-term Planning Under Electricity Spot Pricing. IEEE Trans on Power Apparatus and Systems, 1982, 101 (12): 4640-4648
28. Perez-Arriaga I J, Meseguer C. Wholesale Marginal Prices in Competitive Generation Markets. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 1997, 12 (2): 710-717
29. The IEEE Reliability Test System-1996. A Report Prepared by the Reliability Test System Task Force of the Application of Probability Methods Subcommittes. IEEE Trans on Power Systems, 1999, 14 (3): 1010-1020