Risk, return, and moral hazard

Journal of Accounting Research

Volumn 37, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 27-55

  Demski, Joel S ^a   Dye, Ronald A ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033410498     PISSN: 00218456     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2491395     Document Type: Article

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