The navy's "sophisticated" pursuit of science: Undersea warfare, the limits of internationalism, and the utility of basic research, 1945-1956

ISIS

Volumn 93, Issue 1, 2002, Pages 1-27

  Hamblin, Jacob Darwin ^a  

^a CNRS   (France)

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[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0347692658     PISSN: 00211753     EISSN: 15456994     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1086/343244     Document Type: Article

References (123)

1. John P. Glennon, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, Vol. 2: United Nations and General International Matters (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1992), p. 470.
2. Many scientists after World War II championed international cooperation-especially freedom of publication and open collaboration across national lines-as a means to promote the growth of basic science. See, e.g., a series of articles in the Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 1947, 91, promoting data collection networks, conferences, and societies as methods to collect and disseminate scientific work most efficiently. At the same time, some scientists adhered to an ideology of scientific internationalism out of moral obligation to both society and the scientific community.
3. A useful history of the "scientists's movement" of social responsibility toward the international community immediately following World War II, particularly with regard to atomic weaponry, can be found in Alice Kimball Smith, A Peril and a Hope: The Scientists Movement in America, 1945-1947 (Chicago: Univ. Chicago Press, 1965).
4. More recently, Matt Price has argued that these internationalist attitudes, epitomized by the 1945 Franck report urging an international arms agreement, were less a product of international fraternity than the result of a culture of dissent among scientists caused by the strictures placed on them in the workplace by military supervisors. See Matt Price, "Roots of Dissent: The Chicago Met Lab and the Origins of the Franck Report," Isis, 1995, 86:222-244.
5. For a recent analysis of the pervasive belief in an obligation to international science throughout the 1950s see Joseph Manzione, '"Amusing and Amazing and Practical and Military': The Legacy of Scientific Internationalism in American. Foreign Policy, 1945-1963," Diplomatic History, Winter 2000, 24:21-55.
6. Many scientists shared the defense-oriented view after World War II, especially because they felt that the imposition of communist ideas on scientific practice in the Soviet Union had made internationalism unrealistic. For an analysis of American efforts to gather intelligence on Soviet science during the late 1940s see Ronald E. Doel and Allan A. Needell, "Science, Scientists, and the CIA: Balancing International Ideals, National Needs, and Professional Opportunities," in Eternal Vigilance? Fifty Years of the CIA, ed. Rhodri Jeffreys-Jones and Christopher Andrew (London: Cass, 1997), pp. 59-81.
7. 2: Korea, Science, and the State," in Big Science: The Growth of Large-Scale Research, ed. Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford Univ. Press, 1992), pp. 312-333.
8. Three invaluable accounts of the growth of oceanography at major American research, institutions, including discussion of the Navy's role, are William Wertenbaker, The Floor of the Sea: Maurice Ewing and the Search to Understand the Earth (Boston: Little, Brown, 1974);
9. Susan Schlee, On Almost Any Wind: The Saga of the Oceanographie Research Vessel Atlantis (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell Univ. Press, 1978);
10. and H. W. Menard, The Ocean of Truth: A. Personal History of Global Tectonics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1986).
11. More recently, Ronald Rainger, analyzing the investigations of Bikini Atoll after atomic bomb testing, revealed how oceanographers sought to embed their own research within agendas designed to accomplish the Navy's objectives. See Ronald Rainger, "Science at the Crossroads: The Navy, Bikini Atoll, and American Oceanography in the 1940s," Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences, 2000, 30:349-371.
12. Louis N. Ridenour, "Military Support of American Science, a Danger?" Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Aug. 1947, 3:222.
13. On oceanography and the Navy see Harvey Sapolsky, Science and the Navy: A History of the Office of Naval Research (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1990). It does not follow that the Navy as a whole, in the absence of ONR scientists, would have pursued only technology at the expense of basic research. This essay, which makes use of documents from the Navy's Strategic Plans Division, should make clear how critical scientific research became to the Navy - even, outside of ONR. Chandra Mukerji already has suggested that the Navy and other funding sources came to value scientists not merely for the data they provided but also for the expertise that they honed over many years, providing a knowledge base (or, as Mukerji puts it, an "elite reserve labor force") for various military and policy needs.
14. See Chandra Mukerji, A Fragile Power: Scientists and the State (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1989).
15. For accounts of the largely unsuccessful efforts to put government support for science more firmly into the hands of civilians see Nathan Reingold, "Vannevar Bush's New Deal for Research; or, The Triumph of the Old Order," Hist. Stud. Phys. Biol. Sci., 1987, 17:299-344;
16. and Jessica Wang, "Liberals, the Progressive Left, and the Political Economy of Postwar American Science: The National Science Foundation Debate Revisited," ibid., 1995, 26:139-166.
17. For an overview of these events see J. Merton England, A Patron for Pure Science: The National Science Foundation's Formative Years, 1945-57 (Washington, D.C.: National Science Foundation, 1982).
18. This does not contradict the fact that the U.S. Navy had a long history of support for science, particularly in exploration and survey projects but also in basic science. See, e.g., Marc Rothenberg, '"In. Behalf of the Science of the Country': The Smithsonian and the U.S. Navy in the North Pacific in the 1850s," Pacific Science, 1998, 52:301-307.
19. The Navy's willingness to fund research became especially clear during the interwar period, as described in William. M. McBride, "The 'Greatest Patron of Science"? The Navy-Academia Alliance and U.S. Naval Research, 1896-1923," Journal of Military History, 1992, 50:7-33;
20. David K. van Keuren, "Science, Progressivism, and Military Preparedness: The Case of the Naval Research Laboratory, 1915-1923," Technology and Culture, 1992, 33:710-736;
21. and Naomi Oreskes, "Weighing the Earth from a Submarine: The Gravity Measuring Cruise of the U.S.S. S-2.1," in The Earth, the Heavens, and the Carnegie Institution of Washington, ed. Gregory A. Good (Washington, D.C.: American Geophysical Union, 1994).
22. Wertenbaker, Floor of the Sea (cit. n. 3), pp. 42-44;
23. and Roger Randall Dougan Revelle, "Observations on the Office of Naval Research and International Science, 1945-1960," interviews conducted by Sarah L. Sharp in 1984, Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley (hereafter cited as Revelle oral history interviews), pp. 6, 11.
24. For reflections on Woods Hole's wartime experience with the Navy see also J. Lamar Worzel oral history interview, conducted by Ron Doel in January 1996, Lamont-Doherty Earth Observatory Oral History Project, American Institute of Physics, College Park, Maryland (hereafter cited as Worzel oral history interview), pp. 124-137.
25. This was true not only for oceanography but also for other scientific disciplines in what became known as the era of "Big Science." This term, was initially used by Derek Price to describe the exponential growth of science since the seventeenth century: see Derek J. de Solla Price, Little Science, Big Science (New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1963).
26. However, few can dispute that the definitive factor in the growth of American, science during and after World War II - often termed "Big Science" - was government (largely military) involvement in supporting basic research. See A. Hunter Dupree, "The Great Instauration of 1940: The Organization of Scientific Research for War," in The Twentieth Century Sciences: Studies in the Biography of Ideas, ed. Gerald Holton (New York: Norton, 1972), pp. 443-467;
27. and J. H. Capshew and K. A. Rader, "Big Science: Price to the Present," Osiris, 1992, N.S., 7:3-25.
28. Ridenour, "Military Support of American Science, a Danger?" (cit. n. 4). Ridenour was the assistant director of MIT's Radiation Laboratory during World War II. If Lorraine Daston is correct in writing that moral economies in science "can dignify some objects of study at the expense of a great many others," the Navy used money to work against the grain of Americans scientists' preferred choices of research programs - and usually succeeded. See Lorraine Daston, "The Moral Economy of Science," Osiris, 1995, N.S., 10:3-24, on p. 23.
29. Indeed, the dilemma of choosing between social responsibility and making a living marked the experience of scientists throughout the Cold War. See Alex Roland, "Science and War," ibid., 1985, N.S., 1:247-272.
30. Aldous Huxley, "A Positive Program, of Research for Peace," Bull. Atom. Sci., Aug. 1947, 3:225;
31. Norbert Wiener, "The Armed Services Are Not Fit Almoners for Research," ibid., p. 228;
32. Albert Einstein, "The Military Mentality," ibid., pp. 223-224;
33. and Vannevar Bush, "Dangers to Research, If Recognized, Can Be Avoided," ibid., p. 228.
34. Revelle oral history interviews, p. 51. Ronald Rainger notes that oceanographers such as Revelle were instrumental in convincing the Navy that military patronage could be mutually advantageous but that they recognized the Navy's needs as paramount. According to Rainger, scientists embedded their own research within programs stemming primarily from the Navy's requirements. See Rainger, "Science at the Crossroads" (cit. n. 3).
35. Alan T. Waterman and Robert D. Conrad, "Office of Naval Research Discusses Ridenour's Views," Bull. Atom. Sci., Aug. 1947, 3:230;
36. Revelle oral history interviews, pp. 18, 4;
37. and Ridenour, "Military Support of American Science, a Danger?" (cit. n. 4), p. 222.
38. Harold G. Bowen, Ships, Machinery, and Mossbacks: The Autobiography of a Naval Engineer (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton Univ. Press, 1954), pp. 137, 354 (quotation);
39. Daniel S. Greenberg, The Politics of Pure Science (New York: New American Library, 1967), p. 273 (quoting Wilson);
40. Sapolsky, Science and the Navy (cit. n. 4), p. 60 (Korea-era cuts);
41. and G. Pascal Zachary, Endless Frontier: Vannevar Bush, Engineer of the American Century (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), pp. 340-341 (Navy resentment).
42. E. B. Potter, Admiral Arleigh Burke (New York: Random House, 1990), pp. 320-327.
43. For a treatment of this episode, with particular regard to the role of carrier aircraft, see Jeffrey G. Barlow, Revolt of the Admirals: The Fight for Naval Aviation, 1945-1950 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1995).
44. On the changes wrought by the nuclear age see Clark G. Reynolds, History and the Sea: Essays on Maritime Strategies (Columbia: Univ. South Carolina Press, 1989), p. 186.
45. On the intelligence reports see Director, Naval Intelligence, to Director, Strategic Plans, 19 May 1952, Naval Historical Center, Washington, D.C., Strategic Plans Division Records, OP-30S/OP-60S Subject and Serial Files, Series XVI (hereafter cited as NHC SPD), box 274, folder "A16-8 Antisubmarine Warfare Operations."
46. On the Project Hartwell recommendations see Jack S. Goldstein, A Different Sort of Time: The Life of Jerrold R. Zacharias, Scientist, Engineer, Educator (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1992), pp. 97-103; the quotation is from p. 103.
47. 2" (cit. n. 2), p. 327.
48. Potter, Admiral Arleigh Burke (cit. n. 13), p. 330 (Burke's transfer to research);
49. see also Chs. 22-24.
50. Frank Akers, Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare), "Undersea Warfare Newsletter No. 2-51," 15 Nov. 195.1, NHC SPD, box 264, folder "A16-6 Submarine Warfare Operations"; and Chief of Naval Operations Top Secret memorandum to Chief of Bureau of Ships, Chief of Naval Research, and Hydrographer, 6 June 1952, NHC SPD, box 272, folder "Al Plans, Projects, and Development."
51. Chief of Naval Research memorandum, to various, 9 Mar. 1951, NHC SPD, box 264, folder "A16-6 Submarine Warfare Operations"; and Director of Naval Intelligence Top Secret letter to Director, Strategic Plans, 19 May 1952, NHC SPD, box 274, folder "A16-8 Antisubmarine Warfare Operations."
52. Minutes of Meeting of Anti-Submarine Plans and Policies Group, 5 Feb. 1952, pp. 1-3, 6, NHC SPD, box 27.1, folder "A16-8 Antisubmarine Warfare Operations."
53. For the expectation of action by Soviet submarines in the North Atlantic see David Alan Rosenberg, "American Naval Strategy in the Era of the Third World War: An Inquiry into the Structure and Process of General War at Sea, 1945-90," in Naval Power in the Twentieth Century, ed. N. A. M. Rodger (Annapolis, Md.: Naval Institute Press, 1996), pp. 242-254, on p. 245.
54. On work at Lamont see Worzel oral history interview, p. 294. For a discussion of Ewing's work and the cruises of the Vema see Wertenbaker, Floor of the Sea (cit. n. 3).
55. Cord-Christian Troebst, Conquest of the Sea (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), p. 66;
56. and Worzel oral history interview, p. 128.
57. For a discussion of the development and use of the bathythermograph during this era see Gary E. Weir, Forged in War: The Naval-Industrial Complex and American Submarine Construction, 1940-1961 (Washington, D.C.: Naval Historical Center, 1993).
58. Work on BT slides was a necessary, if time-consuming, task that was probably valued more by the Navy for its operational purposes than by ambitious scientists seeking novel data. Consequently, as Naomi Oreskes has pointed out, such work was accomplished largely by women, who were excluded from, other scientific work. See Naomi Oreskes, "Laissez-tomber: Military Patronage and Women's Work, in Mid-Twentieth-Century Oceanography," Hist. Stud. Phys. Biol. Sci., 2000, 30:373-392.
59. Roger Revelle and Arthur E. Maxwell, "Heat Flow through the Floor of the Eastern North Pacific Ocean," Nature, Aug. 1952, 170:199-200;
60. and Revelle oral history interviews, p. 41 (quotation).
61. For discussions of the impact of heat flow studies on the theory of continental drift see Naomi Oreskes, The Rejection of Continental Drift: Theory and Method in American Earth Science (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1999);
62. H. E. LeGrand, Drifting Continents and Shifting Theories: The Modern Revolution in Geology and Scientific Change. (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1988);
63. and A. Hallam, A. Revolution in the Earth Sciences: From Continental Drift to Plate Tectonics (Oxford: Clarendon, 1973).
64. Revelle oral history interviews, p. 41;
65. and Menard, Ocean of Truth (cit. n. 3), p. 52 (see Ch. 4 for accounts of the expectations and findings of these expeditions).
66. Ronald Kline has shown persuasively that, even prior to World War II, it was characteristic of scientists and engineers to draw rhetorical boundaries around their disciplines, calling one research problem "pure" science and another "applied" science. This concept was perpetuated in Vannevar Bush's authoritative report Science, the Endless Frontier (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1945), which emphasized the need to create "scientific capital" for new technology.
67. Kline argues that this "'assembly-line' blueprint for producing technological change (put science in and get technology out)" was not seriously questioned during the 1940s or 1950s. See Ronald Kline, "Construing 'Technology' as 'Applied Science': Public Rhetoric of Scientists and Engineers in the United States, 1880-1945," Isis, 1995, 86:194-221, on p. 220.
68. Athelstan Spilhaus oral history interview, conducted by Ron Doel in November 1989, American Institute of Physics, p. 96;
69. and G. E. R. Deacon, "Ocean Waves and Swell," Occasional Papers of the Challenger Society, Apr. 1946, 1:1-13,
70. rpt. in Margaret B. Deacon, Oceanography: Concepts and History (Stroudsburg, Pa.: Dowden, Hutchinson & Ross, 1978), pp. 196-197.
71. See also Susan Schlee, The Edge of an Unfamiliar World: A History of Oceanography (New York: Dutton, 1973), pp. 306-311 (Ch. 8: "Oceanography and World War II").
72. Harald Ulrik S verdrup, "New International Aspects of Oceanography," Proc. Amer. Phil. Soc., 1947, 91:15-78, on p. 75.
73. John A. Fleming, "The International Scientific Unions," Proc. Amer. Phil, Soc., 1947, 91:123;
74. Jerome C. Hunsaker, "International Scientific Congresses," ibid., p. 126;
75. and Robert A. Millikan, "The Interchange of Men of Science," ibid., p. 132.
76. Schlee, On Almost Any Wind (cit. n. 3), pp. 196-197 (Operation Cabot), 193-195 (Woods Hole).
77. On Sverdrup see William A. Nierenberg, "Harald Ulrik S verdrup," Biographical, Memoirs of the National Academy of Sciences, 1996, 69:357. Indeed, one of Sverdrup's first acts as director of the Norwegian Polar Institute in Oslo was to organize the 1949-1952 Norwegian-British-Swedish expedition to Antarctica.
78. On the information exchange with Norway see Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Undersea Warfare) to Director of Naval Intelligence, 1 Mar. 1951, NHC SPD, box 261, folder "A 1(2) Navy Research (Agenda Items, Minutes of Meeting)." Regarding Trans-pac see Harold J. Coolidge to Claude ZoBell, 12 Jan. 1953;
79. and C. N. G. Hendrix to ZoBell, 25 Feb. 1953, Scripps Institution of Oceanography Archives, La Jolla, California, Subject Files, AC 6, box 7, folder 29. See this folder for other correspondence regarding the Trans-pac expedition.
80. Vannevar Bush oral history interview, conducted by Eric Hodgins in 1964, Massachusetts Institute of Technology Archives and Special Collections, Cambridge, Massachusetts, MC 143 (hereafter cited as Bush oral history interview), p. 272.
81. Director, Strategic Plans, to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), 24 Apr. 1953, NHC SPD, box 279, folder "Al Plans, Projects, and Development." On the probability that the northern regions would be a battleground see Op-03D3 Top Secret letter to Chief of Naval Operations, 12 May 1953, NHC SPD, box 289, folder "EF-61 Russia." See also Potter, Admiral Arleigh Burke (cit. n. 13), p. 369.
82. Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, 22 July 1953, NHC SPD, box 279, folder "A: Plans, Projects, and Development" ("too obvious," suggestion about a British ship); and Director, Strategic Plans, Top Secret letter to Director, Fleet Operations, 25 Feb. 1954, NHC SPD, box 302, folder "Hydrography" ("insufficient steps," year's worth of observations).
83. Director, Fleet Operations, to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), 16 Mar. 1954, NHC SPD, box 302, folder "Hydrography" (Project Caesar); Op-33 memorandum to Op-03, 13 Apr. 1954, NHC SPD, box 302, folder "Hydrography" (British and Norwegian ships, cooperative venture); Gordon Lill, "Office of Naval Research Laboratory of Oceanography and Hydraulics Laboratory, Woods Hole, Massachusetts," Nature, 29 May 1954, /73:1017-1019 (new oceanographic center);
84. and Potter, Admiral Arleigh Burke (cit. n. 13), p. 377 (Burke sent to sea).
85. Robert S. Dietz Secret letter to Commanding Officer, Office of Naval Research, 11 Aug. 1954, NHC SPD, box 302, folder "Hydrography" (ship availability); and Planning Group, for Employment of a Chartered Research Vessel, to Director, Strategic Plans, 16 Nov. 1954, NHC SPD, box 302, folder "H1 Hydrography" (decision on the Arctic Sealer).
86. Planning Group, for Employment of a Chartered Research Vessel, to Director, Strategic Plans, 16Nov. 1954, Enclosure (1), "Brief of Background Correspondence," NHC SPD, box 302, folder "H1 Hydrography" (data from "Murmansk, run"); and Director, Strategic Plans, to Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Operations), 3 Mar. 1954, NHC SPD, box 302, folder "Hydrography" (data from British).
87. Op-605 Secret memorandum to Op-533, 5 Oct. 1954, NHC SPD, box 302, folder "Hydrography" (information from, "a foreign source"); and Op-533 Secret memorandum, to Op-33, 1 Nov. 1954, NHC SPD, box 302, folder "Hydrography" (British, Norwegian, and German data).
88. Planning Group, for Employment of a Chartered Research Vessel, to Director, Strategic Plans, 16 Nov. 1954, NHC SPD, box 302, folder "H1 Hydrography."
89. Gordon G. Lill Secret memorandum to Commander E. B. Rankin, Op-605D1, 16 Sept. 1954, NHC SPD, box 302, folder "Hydrography."
90. Bruce Hevly, "The Tools of Science: Radio, Rockets, and the Science of Naval Warfare," in National, Military Establishments and the Advancement of Science and Technology, ed. Paul Forman and José M. Sánchez-Ron (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1996), pp. 215-232, on p. 226.
91. Bush oral history interview, p. 279 (quotation);
92. and Goldstein, Different Sort of Time (cit. n. 14), p. 102.
93. On Condon see Jessica Wang, "Science, Security, and the Cold War: The Case of E. U. Condon," Isis, 1992, 83:248-267.
94. The case of Harald Sverdrup is discussed in detail in Naomi Oreskes and Ronald Rainger, "Science and Security before the Atomic Bomb: The Loyalty Case of Harald U. Sverdrup," Studies in the History and Philosophy of Modern Physics, 2000, 31:309-369.
95. For an analysis of the effect of anticommunism on the academic community see Wang, American Science in an Age of Anxiety: Scientists, Anticommunism, and the Cold. War (Chapel Hill: Univ. North Carolina Press, 1999);
96. and Ellen W. Schrecker, No Ivory Tower: McCarthyism and the Universities (New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1986).
97. Bush oral history interview, p. 269 (on the Smyth report);
98. and Louis N. Ridenour, "Secrecy in Science," Bull. Atom. Sci., Mar. 1946, 1:8.
99. On the restrictions on government scientists more generally see Edward A. Shils, The Torment of Secrecy: The Background and Consequences of American Security Policies (Glencoe, Ill: Free Press, 1956), p. 178.
100. J. D. H. Wiseman, to Menard, 5 Nov. 1953, and Menard to Wiseman, 11 Jan. 1954, H. W. Menard Papers, Scripps Institution of Oceanography, box 2, folder 24 "Correspondence 1954"; and Menard, Ocean of Truth (cit. n. 3), p. 111.
101. For an analysis of how classification, and Cold War politics generally, shaped the reception of ideas of plate tectonics see Jacob Darwin Hamblin, "Science in Isolation: American Marine Geophysics Research, 1950-1968," Physics in Perspective, 2000, 2:293-312.
102. Harry Hess to Captain Hobbs, Hydrographic Office, 14 Sept. 1951;
103. and Roger Revelle to Hess, 19 Apr. 1952, Harry Hammond Hess Papers, Firestone Library, Princeton University, Princeton, NJ. (hereafter cited as Hess Papers), box 5, folder unlabeled.
104. Hess to Revelle, 24 Apr. 1952; and Hess to Captain Joseph Cochrane, USN, Hydrographer, 13 July 1953, Hess Papers, box 5, folder unlabeled.
105. Earl Droessler to Revelle, 26 Mar. 1952, Hess Papers, box 5, folder unlabeled;
106. and Lloyd V. Berkner, "Is Secrecy Effective?" Bull. Atom. Sci., Feb. 1955, 11:68.
107. Rear Admiral Felix Johnson, Memorandum of Information, 27 Feb. 1950, NHC SPD, box 255, folder "Intelligence"; and Chief of Naval Research to Chief of Naval Operations, 8 Dec. 1952, NHC SPD, box 269, folder "Al Plans, Projects, and Developments."
108. Director, Strategic Plans, to Director, New Developments and Operational Evaluation, 12 Nov. 1952, NHC SPD, box 269, folder "Al Plans, Projects, and Developments."
109. Hess to Cochrane, USN, Hydrographer, 13 July 1953, Hess Papers, box 5, folder unlabeled (arguing that the Russians could collect the data themselves);
110. Detlev Bronk to Hess, 3 Mar. 1954, and Hess to Bronk, 10 Mar. 1954, Hess Papers, box 22, folder "National Academy of Sciences" (regarding the Woods Hole speech);
111. and Shils, Torment of Secrecy (cit. n. 42), p. 186.
112. Bush oral history interview, p. 329;
113. and Berkner, "Is Secrecy Effective?" (cit. n. 46), p. 68.
114. By focusing on long-term benefits, Bush and Berkner were by no means breaking new ground in scientific rhetoric in the United States. As Marlana Portolano has recently demonstrated with regard to John Quincy Adams and nineteenth-century American astronomy, rhetoric in support of science has many effects, some related to immediate policy decisions and others of a less tangible nature, such as establishing dialogue on issues or simply encouraging the public to value science beyond its immediate uses. See Marlana Portolano, "John Quincy Adams's Rhetorical Crusade for Astronomy," Isis, 2000, 91:480-503.
115. On the upgrading to "Confidential" see Athelstan Spilhaus to Honorable Donald A. Quarles, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Development, 28 Dec. 1953, Hess Papers, box 5, folder unlabeled. For some scientists' perception of Eisenhower's attitude toward classification see Menard, Ocean of Truth (cit. n. 3), pp. 63-64.
116. On Byrd's hopes for the Antarctic expeditions see Paul Siple, 90° South: The Story of the American South Pole Conquest (New York: Putnam, 1959), pp. 126-127.
117. On the Navy's view of its role in national defense strategies see Rosenberg, "American Naval Strategy in the Era of the Third World War" (cit. n. 20), p. 247.
118. Under Defense Secretary Charles E. Wilson many Navy programs were cut back in an effort to implement Eisenhower's New Look strategy, which sought to reduce the cost of defending American interests throughout the world by relying less on conventional weapons and more on the threat of nuclear retaliation. See Bruce E. Geelhoed, Charles E. Wilson and Controversy at the Pentagon, 1953 to 1957 (Detroit: Wayne State Univ. Press, 1979).
119. Hess to Senator Styles Bridges, 10 Feb. 1960, Hess Papers, box 22, folder "NAS-NRC Committee on Oceanography Ocean-Wide Survey Panel, January-June 1962."
120. See Bush, Science, the Endless Frontier (cit. n. 24).
121. See also Kline's analysis of the role of Bush's report in perpetuating the "assembly line" model of basic research turning into technological applications: Kline, "Construing 'Technology' as 'Applied Science'" (cit. n. 24), esp. pp. 218-221.
122. Sapolsky, Science and the Navy (cit. n. 4);
123. and Greenberg, Politics of Pure Science (cit. n. 12).