Job assignment and bandit problems

International Journal of Manpower

Volumn 24, Issue 7, 2003, Pages 844-866+889

  Valsecchi, Irene ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF MILANO BICOCCA   (Italy)

Author keywords

Job mobility; Promotion

Indexed keywords

EID: 0347020920     PISSN: 01437720     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1108/01437720310502168     Document Type: Article

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