An economic analysis of leniency programs in antitrust law

Economist

Volumn 151, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 415-432

  Hinloopen, Jeroen ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

Cartel stability; Leniency program; Time dependent detection probabilities

Indexed keywords

ECONOMIC ANALYSIS;

EID: 0346276940     PISSN: 0013063X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/B:ECOT.0000006592.62377.60     Document Type: Article

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