The cyclical behavior of the Department of Justice's antitrust enforcement activity

International Journal of Industrial Organization

Volumn 19, Issue 1-2, 2001, Pages 27-54

  Ghosal, Vivek ^a   Gallo, Joseph ^b  

^a Economic Analysis Group   (United States)

^b UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI   (United States)

Author keywords

Antitrust enforcement; Economic activity; Interest group theories; K00; L00; L40; Political stance

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035545543     PISSN: 01677187     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-7187(99)00013-2     Document Type: Article

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