Intergovernmental transfers and fiscal behavior insurance versus aggregate discipline

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 62, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 149-170

  Sanguinetti, Pablo ^a   Tommasi, Mariano ^b  

^a UNIVERSIDAD TORCUATO DI TELLA   (Argentina)

^b UNIVERSIDAD DE SAN ANDRÉS   (Argentina)

Author keywords

Common pool; Fiscal federalism; Insurance; Intergovernmental transfers; Risk sharing

Indexed keywords

INSURANCE SYSTEM; INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS; RISK FACTOR; THEORETICAL STUDY;

NORTH AMERICA; UNITED STATES;

EID: 0345768781     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(03)00045-X     Document Type: Article

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