Interregional Redistribution Through Tax Surcharge

International Tax and Public Finance

Volumn 3, Issue 2, 1996, Pages 157-173

  Cremer, Helmuth ^a   Marchand, Maurice ^b   Pestieau, Pierre ^c  

^a UNIVERSITÉ DE TOULOUSE   (France)

^b UNIVERSITÉ CATHOLIQUE DE LOUVAIN   (Belgium)

^c UNIVERSITY OF LIÈGE   (Belgium)

Author keywords

Fiscal federalism; Optimal taxation; Public goods

Indexed keywords

EID: 0000447333     PISSN: 09275940     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/BF00399908     Document Type: Article

References (10)

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10. Tirole, J. (1991). "Collusion and the Theory of Organization." In J.-J. Laffont (ed.), Advances in Economic Theory (pp. 151-206). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.