Compensation and recruiting: Private universities versus private corporations

Journal of Corporate Finance

Volumn 10, Issue 1, 2004, Pages 37-52

  Cornell, Bradford ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA   (United States)

Author keywords

Agent; Corporate finance; Executive compensation; Principal

Indexed keywords

EID: 0345059005     PISSN: 09291199     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0929-1199(02)00025-1     Document Type: Article

References (23)

1. Abowd J.M. Does performance-based managerial compensation affect corporate performance? Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 4 1990 S52-S73
2. Abowd J.M. Bognanno M. International differences in executive and managerial compensation In: Freeman R. Katz L. (Eds.), Differences and Changes in Wage Structures 1995 67-103 The University of Chicago Press Chicago
3. Bertrand M. Mullainathan S. Agents with and without principals American Economic Review 90 2000 203-208
4. Bertrand M. Mullainathan S. Are CEOs rewarded for luck? The ones without principals are Quarterly Journal of Economics 116 3 2001 903-932
5. Business Week Executive Pay 2002 80 100 April 15
6. Cosh A. Hughes A. Executive remuneration, executive dismissal, and institutional shareholdings International Journal of Industrial Organization 15 4 1997 469-492
7. Crystal G. In Search of Excess: The Overcompensation of American Executives 1991 W.W. Norton New York, NY
8. Finkelstein, S., 1996. Understanding pay dispersion with top management teams: a social comparison perspective, unpublished working paper, Dartmouth College.
9. Grossman S. Hart O. An analysis of the principal-agent problem Econometrica 51 1983 7-45
10. Hambrick, D., Siegel, P., 1998. Pay dispersion with top management groups: evidence of its harmful effects on performance of high-technology firms, unpublished working paper, Columbia University.
11. Holmstrom B. Moral hazard and observability Bell Journal of Economics 10 1979 74-91
12. Holmstrom B. Contracts and the market for executives: comment In: Wein L. Wijkander H. (Eds.), Contract Economics 1992 101-121 Blackwell New York
13. Kahn L.M. Sherer P.D. Contingent pay and management performance Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 1990 107S-120S (February)
14. Kaplan S.N. Corporate governance in Germany, Japan, and the United States: a comparison Research in International Business and Finance 12 1 1995 253-260
15. Lazear E. Rosen S. Rank-order tournaments as optimum labor contracts Journal of Political Economy 89 5 1981 841-864
16. Leonard J.S. Executive pay and firm performance Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43 1990 13S-29S (February)
17. Martin J. Golf tournaments and CEO pay-unraveling the mysteries of executive compensation Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 13 3 2001 8-20
18. Mirrlees J. The optimal structure of incentives and authority within an organization Bell Journal of Economics 7 1976 105-131
19. Murphy K.J. Executive compensation In: Ashenfelter O. Card D. (Eds.), Handbook of Labor Economics 1999 2485-2563 North-Holland Amsterdam
20. O'Reilly C.A. Pfeffer J. Hidden Value 2000 Harvard Business School Press Boston, MA
21. O'Reilly, C.A., Wade, J., Pollock, T., 1998. Overpaid CEOs and underpaid managers: equity and executive compensation, unpublished working paper, Stanford University.
22. Roe M.J. The political roots of American corporate finance Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 9 4 1997 8-22
23. Zhou X. CEO pay, firm size, and corporate performance: evidence from Canada Canadian Journal of Economics 33 1 2000 213-251