Cross-Strait Economic Relations: China's Leverage and Taiwan's Vulnerability

Issues and Studies

Volumn 39, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 137-175

  Tung, Chen Yuan ^a  

^a NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY   (Taiwan)

Author keywords

Cross Strait economic relations; Economic leverage; Economic sanctions; Vulnerability

Indexed keywords

EID: 0344253844     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Review

References (129)

1. Lin Ming-cheng, "Perng Fai-Nan: Investment in Mainland Reaches US$66.8 Billion," Zhongguo shibao (China Times) (Taipei), January 17, 2003.
2. Kong-Lien Kao, Liang'an jingmao xiankuang yu zhanwang (Cross-Strait economic relations: The current situation and future prospects) (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 1994), 8; and Charng Kao, Dalu jinggai yu liang' an jingmao guanxi (Mainland economic reforms and cross-Strait economic relations) (Taipei: Wunan, 1994), 130-31.
3. Kong-Lien Kao, Liang'an jingmao xiankuang yu zhanwang (Cross-Strait economic relations: The current situation and future prospects) (Taipei: Mainland Affairs Council, 1994), 8; and Charng Kao, Dalu jinggai yu liang' an jingmao guanxi (Mainland economic reforms and cross-Strait economic relations) (Taipei: Wunan, 1994), 130-31.
4. "Economic warfare" seeks to weaken an adversary's aggregate economic potential in order to weaken its military capabilities, either in a peacetime arms race or in an ongoing war. "Economic inducements" involve commercial concessions, technology transfers, and other economic carrots that are extended by a sender in exchange for political compliance on the part of a target. "Economic inducements" are also called "positive sanctions." "Trade wars" are disputes over economic policy and behavior instead of political or security goals.
5. The 1995-1996 tensions were triggered by a combination of President Lee Teng-hui's visit to his alma mater, Cornell University, and the speech Lee made at Cornell University during the trip. In addition, when interviewed by Deutsche Welle Radio on July 9, 1999, President Lee Teng-hui said that since 1991, when the Republic of China Constitution was amended, cross-Strait relations became "state-to-state," or at least "a special state-to-state relationship." These two incidents were taken by Beijing as deliberate attempts to strengthen both domestic and international acceptance of Taiwan as a sovereign nation.
6. It was reported that Beijing would punish Yin Qi (president of the Continental Engineering Corporation), Stan Shih (chairman of the Acer Group), Chang Yung-fa (chairman of the Evergreen Group), and Shi Wen-long (chairman of the Chi Mei Group) because of their support for Chen Shui-bian. See Bin-zhong Song, "China Warns Taiwan Businesspeople Who Support Taiwan Independence," Zhongguo shibao, April 9, 2000.
7. "On the Current Development of Cross-Strait Economic Relations: Questions Answered by the Leader of the CCP Central Office for Taiwan Affairs and the State Council Taiwan Affairs Office," Renmin ribao (People's Daily), April 10, 2000, 1.
8. Gary Gereffi, Miguel Korzeniewicz, and Roberto P. Korzeniewicz, "Introduction: Global Commodity Chains," in Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, ed. Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 1-2; and Gary Gereffi, "Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East Asia," in The Four Asian Tigers: Economic Development and the Global Political Economy, ed. Eun Mee Kim (San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 1998), 98-99.
9. Gary Gereffi, Miguel Korzeniewicz, and Roberto P. Korzeniewicz, "Introduction: Global Commodity Chains," in Commodity Chains and Global Capitalism, ed. Gary Gereffi and Miguel Korzeniewicz (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1994), 1-2; and Gary Gereffi, "Commodity Chains and Regional Divisions of Labor in East Asia," in The Four Asian Tigers: Economic Development and the Global Political Economy, ed. Eun Mee Kim (San Diego, Calif.: Academic Press, 1998), 98-99.
10. Chen-yuan Tung, "China's Economic Leverage and Taiwan's Security Concerns with Respect to Cross-Strait Economic Relations" (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 42-46, 66-67; and Chen-yuan Tung, "Trilateral Economic Relations among Taiwan, China, and the United States," Asian Affairs: An American Review 25, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 229-35.
11. Chen-yuan Tung, "China's Economic Leverage and Taiwan's Security Concerns with Respect to Cross-Strait Economic Relations" (Ph.D. dissertation, Johns Hopkins University, 2002), 42-46, 66-67; and Chen-yuan Tung, "Trilateral Economic Relations among Taiwan, China, and the United States," Asian Affairs: An American Review 25, no. 4 (Winter 1999): 229-35.
12. Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA, Taiwan), Zhizaoye duiwai touzi shikuang diaocha baogao (Survey report on outward investment of the manufacturing industry) (Taipei: MOEA, 1997), 77; and MOEA, Zhizaoye duiwai touzi shikuang diaocha baogao (Survey report on outward investment of the manufacturing industry) (Taipei: MOEA, 2000), 220, 223, 226.
13. Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEA, Taiwan), Zhizaoye duiwai touzi shikuang diaocha baogao (Survey report on outward investment of the manufacturing industry) (Taipei: MOEA, 1997), 77; and MOEA, Zhizaoye duiwai touzi shikuang diaocha baogao (Survey report on outward investment of the manufacturing industry) (Taipei: MOEA, 2000), 220, 223, 226.
14. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 23-27, 40-41.
15. Wen-long Lian et al., Liang'an chuko liandong guanxi zhi yanjiu (A study on the correlations for cross-Strait exports) (Taipei: Chung-Hua Institution for Economic Research, 1999), 122.
16. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 75-83.
17. As argued in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 135-47, based on the following literature: David Leyton-Brown, "Lessons and Policy Considerations about Economic Sanctions," in The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, ed. David Leyton-Brown (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 305-6; William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "The Problems and Promise of Sanctions," in Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peace-building in a Post-Cold War World? ed. David Cortright and George A. Lopez (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 63-64; and William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice, ed. Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 159-81.
18. As argued in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 135-47, based on the following literature: David Leyton-Brown, "Lessons and Policy Considerations about Economic Sanctions," in The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, ed. David Leyton-Brown (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 305-6; William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "The Problems and Promise of Sanctions," in Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peace-building in a Post-Cold War World? ed. David Cortright and George A. Lopez (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 63-64; and William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice, ed. Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 159-81.
19. As argued in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 135-47, based on the following literature: David Leyton-Brown, "Lessons and Policy Considerations about Economic Sanctions," in The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, ed. David Leyton-Brown (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 305-6; William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "The Problems and Promise of Sanctions," in Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peace-building in a Post-Cold War World? ed. David Cortright and George A. Lopez (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 63-64; and William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice, ed. Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 159-81.
20. As argued in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 135-47, based on the following literature: David Leyton-Brown, "Lessons and Policy Considerations about Economic Sanctions," in The Utility of International Economic Sanctions, ed. David Leyton-Brown (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 305-6; William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "The Problems and Promise of Sanctions," in Economic Sanctions: Panacea or Peace-building in a Post-Cold War World? ed. David Cortright and George A. Lopez (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1995), 63-64; and William H. Kaempfer and Anton D. Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," in Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice, ed. Steve Chan and A. Cooper Drury (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000), 159-81.
21. Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data," The China Quarterly, no. 153 (March 1998): 18-20; and J. David Singer, "Statistical Regularities in Chinese and Other Foreign Policy: A Basis for Prediction?" (Paper presented at the conference on "China in the 21st Century," sponsored by the Democratic Progressive Party, National Taiwan University, Taipei, November 6-7, 1999), available online at 〈http://www.future-china.org/csipf/activity/19991106/mt9911_05e.htm〉 (accessed on November 20, 2000).
22. Alastair Iain Johnston, "China's Militarized Interstate Dispute Behavior 1949-1992: A First Cut at the Data," The China Quarterly, no. 153 (March 1998): 18-20; and J. David Singer, "Statistical Regularities in Chinese and Other Foreign Policy: A Basis for Prediction?" (Paper presented at the conference on "China in the 21st Century," sponsored by the Democratic Progressive Party, National Taiwan University, Taipei, November 6-7, 1999), available online at 〈http://www.future-china.org/csipf/activity/19991106/mt9911_05e.htm〉 (accessed on November 20, 2000).
23. These five factors are laid out in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 135-49, based on the following literature: Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," 159-81; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "The Problems and Promise of Sanctions," 63-64; and Richard N. Haass, "Introduction," in Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, ed. Richard N. Haass (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 3.
24. These five factors are laid out in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 135-49, based on the following literature: Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," 159-81; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "The Problems and Promise of Sanctions," 63-64; and Richard N. Haass, "Introduction," in Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, ed. Richard N. Haass (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 3.
25. These five factors are laid out in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 135-49, based on the following literature: Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," 159-81; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "The Problems and Promise of Sanctions," 63-64; and Richard N. Haass, "Introduction," in Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, ed. Richard N. Haass (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 3.
26. These five factors are laid out in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 135-49, based on the following literature: Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," 159-81; Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "The Problems and Promise of Sanctions," 63-64; and Richard N. Haass, "Introduction," in Economic Sanctions and American Diplomacy, ed. Richard N. Haass (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 3.
27. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24; Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 98-106; Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15-17, 120-21; and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or a Lack of Resolve?" in Chan and Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, 187-211.
28. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24; Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 98-106; Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15-17, 120-21; and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or a Lack of Resolve?" in Chan and Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, 187-211.
29. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24; Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 98-106; Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15-17, 120-21; and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or a Lack of Resolve?" in Chan and Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, 187-211.
30. David Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985), 24; Robert A. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," International Security 22, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 98-106; Daniel W. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox: Economic Statecraft and International Relations (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 15-17, 120-21; and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Sanctions as Signals: A Line in the Sand or a Lack of Resolve?" in Chan and Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, 187-211.
31. Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 18-42, 62-64, 102-28, 233-45, 307-9.
32. Richard J. Ellings, Embargoes and World Power: Lessons from American Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 113-55; and A. Cooper Drury, "How and Whom the U.S. President Sanctions: A Time-series Cross-section Analysis of U.S. Sanction Decisions and Characteristics," in Chan and Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, 17-36.
33. Richard J. Ellings, Embargoes and World Power: Lessons from American Foreign Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1985), 113-55; and A. Cooper Drury, "How and Whom the U.S. President Sanctions: A Time-series Cross-section Analysis of U.S. Sanction Decisions and Characteristics," in Chan and Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, 17-36.
34. Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, "Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990s," AEA Papers and Proceedings, May 1999, 403-8; and Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," 158-86.
35. Kimberly Ann Elliott and Gary Clyde Hufbauer, "Same Song, Same Refrain? Economic Sanctions in the 1990s," AEA Papers and Proceedings, May 1999, 403-8; and Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," 158-86.
36. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, "Trade as a Weapon" (Paper for the Fred J. Hansen Institute for World Peace, San Diego State University, World Peace Week, April 12-18, 1999), available online at 〈http://www.iie.com/TESTMONY/gch9.htm〉 (accessed July 25, 2000), 4-5 of 5.
37. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 207-33.
38. Personal interviews with various senior scholars and officials in Shanghai and Xiamen from June to July, 2001.
39. Gary Clyde Hufbauer, Jeffrey J. Schott, and Kimberly Ann Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, second edition (Washington, D.C.: Institute for International Economics, 1990).
40. Finding in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 123-33, based on the following literature: Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 100-3; and Kim Richard Nossal, "Liberal Democratic Regimes, International Sanctions, and Global Governance," in Globalization and Global Governance, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 129.
41. Finding in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 123-33, based on the following literature: Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 100-3; and Kim Richard Nossal, "Liberal Democratic Regimes, International Sanctions, and Global Governance," in Globalization and Global Governance, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 129.
42. Finding in Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 123-33, based on the following literature: Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 100-3; and Kim Richard Nossal, "Liberal Democratic Regimes, International Sanctions, and Global Governance," in Globalization and Global Governance, ed. Raimo Vayrynen (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999), 129.
43. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 49-115; George A. Lopez and David Cortright, "Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations," in Cortright and Lopez, Economic Sanctions, 9; Kimberly Ann Elliot, "Factors Affecting the Success of Sanctions," ibid., 53; and Joseph J. Collins and Gabrielle D. Bowdoin, Beyond Unilateral Economic Sanctions (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), 15-16.
44. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 49-115; George A. Lopez and David Cortright, "Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations," in Cortright and Lopez, Economic Sanctions, 9; Kimberly Ann Elliot, "Factors Affecting the Success of Sanctions," ibid., 53; and Joseph J. Collins and Gabrielle D. Bowdoin, Beyond Unilateral Economic Sanctions (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), 15-16.
45. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 49-115; George A. Lopez and David Cortright, "Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations," in Cortright and Lopez, Economic Sanctions, 9; Kimberly Ann Elliot, "Factors Affecting the Success of Sanctions," ibid., 53; and Joseph J. Collins and Gabrielle D. Bowdoin, Beyond Unilateral Economic Sanctions (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), 15-16.
46. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 49-115; George A. Lopez and David Cortright, "Economic Sanctions in Contemporary Global Relations," in Cortright and Lopez, Economic Sanctions, 9; Kimberly Ann Elliot, "Factors Affecting the Success of Sanctions," ibid., 53; and Joseph J. Collins and Gabrielle D. Bowdoin, Beyond Unilateral Economic Sanctions (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999), 15-16.
47. Kaempfer and Lowenberg, "A Public Choice Analysis of the Political Economy of International Sanctions," 159-61.
48. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 165-68; Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions," World Politics 19 (1967): 388-99; and Zachary Selden, Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 4-5, 20-23.
49. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 165-68; Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions," World Politics 19 (1967): 388-99; and Zachary Selden, Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 4-5, 20-23.
50. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 165-68; Johan Galtung, "On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions," World Politics 19 (1967): 388-99; and Zachary Selden, Economic Sanctions as Instruments of American Foreign Policy (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1999), 4-5, 20-23.
51. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 107; and Paul D. Taylor, "Clausewitz on Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iraq," Strategic Review 23, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 50-56.
52. Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 107; and Paul D. Taylor, "Clausewitz on Economic Sanctions: The Case of Iraq," Strategic Review 23, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 50-56.
53. Jonathan Kirshner, "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions," Security Studies 6, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 32-64; David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 20-22; and Selden, Economic Sanctions, 20-23.
54. Jonathan Kirshner, "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions," Security Studies 6, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 32-64; David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 20-22; and Selden, Economic Sanctions, 20-23.
55. Jonathan Kirshner, "The Microfoundations of Economic Sanctions," Security Studies 6, no. 3 (Spring 1997): 32-64; David Cortright and George A. Lopez, The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 2000), 20-22; and Selden, Economic Sanctions, 20-23.
56. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 97-98; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 114, 122.
57. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 97-98; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 114, 122.
58. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102-11; Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 121-25, 131-47; San Ling Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," Japan and the World Economy 2 (1990): 239-47; and Kimberly Ann Elliott and Peter P. Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions with Application to the Case of Iraq," ibid. 5 (1993): 403-9.
59. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102-11; Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 121-25, 131-47; San Ling Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," Japan and the World Economy 2 (1990): 239-47; and Kimberly Ann Elliott and Peter P. Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions with Application to the Case of Iraq," ibid. 5 (1993): 403-9.
60. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102-11; Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 121-25, 131-47; San Ling Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," Japan and the World Economy 2 (1990): 239-47; and Kimberly Ann Elliott and Peter P. Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions with Application to the Case of Iraq," ibid. 5 (1993): 403-9.
61. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102-11; Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 121-25, 131-47; San Ling Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," Japan and the World Economy 2 (1990): 239-47; and Kimberly Ann Elliott and Peter P. Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions with Application to the Case of Iraq," ibid. 5 (1993): 403-9.
62. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 175-80; Nossal, "Liberal Democratic Regimes," 134-48; and Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 98-106.
63. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 175-80; Nossal, "Liberal Democratic Regimes," 134-48; and Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 98-106.
64. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 175-80; Nossal, "Liberal Democratic Regimes," 134-48; and Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 98-106.
65. Daniel W. Drezner, "The Complex Causation of Sanction Outcomes," in Chan and Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, 215-16; Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 98-106; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 113, 122.
66. Daniel W. Drezner, "The Complex Causation of Sanction Outcomes," in Chan and Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, 215-16; Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 98-106; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 113, 122.
67. Daniel W. Drezner, "The Complex Causation of Sanction Outcomes," in Chan and Drury, Sanctions as Economic Statecraft, 215-16; Pape, "Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work," 98-106; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 113, 122.
68. Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 244-46; T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 38-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-25; and Drezner, "The Complex Causation of Sanction Outcomes," 221-29.
69. Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 244-46; T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 38-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-25; and Drezner, "The Complex Causation of Sanction Outcomes," 221-29.
70. Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 244-46; T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 38-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-25; and Drezner, "The Complex Causation of Sanction Outcomes," 221-29.
71. Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 244-46; T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 38-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-25; and Drezner, "The Complex Causation of Sanction Outcomes," 221-29.
72. Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 244-46; T. Clifton Morgan and Valerie L. Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly: The Use of Economic Sanctions in International Crises," International Studies Quarterly 41 (1997): 38-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-25; and Drezner, "The Complex Causation of Sanction Outcomes," 221-29.
73. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102-3; Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 239-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Morgan and Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly," 43-45; Makio Miyagawa, Do Economic Sanctions Work? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 61-88; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-24, 131-247.
74. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102-3; Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 239-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Morgan and Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly," 43-45; Makio Miyagawa, Do Economic Sanctions Work? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 61-88; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-24, 131-247.
75. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102-3; Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 239-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Morgan and Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly," 43-45; Makio Miyagawa, Do Economic Sanctions Work? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 61-88; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-24, 131-247.
76. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102-3; Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 239-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Morgan and Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly," 43-45; Makio Miyagawa, Do Economic Sanctions Work? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 61-88; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-24, 131-247.
77. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102-3; Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 239-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Morgan and Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly," 43-45; Makio Miyagawa, Do Economic Sanctions Work? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 61-88; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-24, 131-247.
78. Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliot, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, 102-3; Lam, "Economic Sanctions and the Success of Foreign Policy Goals," 239-47; Elliott and Uimonen, "The Effectiveness of Economic Sanctions," 403-9; Morgan and Schwebach, "Fools Suffer Gladly," 43-45; Makio Miyagawa, Do Economic Sanctions Work? (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 61-88; and Drezner, The Sanctions Paradox, 122-24, 131-247.
79. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 234-42.
80. John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997), 104.
81. Allen S. Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan," International Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 123; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," ibid. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 108; and Suisheng Zhao, "Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan," Pacific Affairs 72, no. 4 (1999): 511.
82. Allen S. Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan," International Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 123; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," ibid. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 108; and Suisheng Zhao, "Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan," Pacific Affairs 72, no. 4 (1999): 511.
83. Allen S. Whiting, "China's Use of Force, 1950-96, and Taiwan," International Security 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 123; Robert S. Ross, "The 1995-96 Taiwan Strait Confrontation: Coercion, Credibility, and the Use of Force," ibid. 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 108; and Suisheng Zhao, "Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan," Pacific Affairs 72, no. 4 (1999): 511.
84. You Ji, "Changing Leadership Consensus: The Domestic Context of War Games," in Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan, and the 1995-1996 Crisis, ed. Suisheng Zhao (New York: Routledge, 1999), 90.
85. Personal interview, Shanghai, July 2, 2001.
86. Personal interviews with various senior scholars and officials in Beijing and Shanghai from June to August, 2001.
87. Personal interview, Beijing, August 9, 2001.
88. Personal interviews, Beijing, August 3, 2001 and July 30, 2001.
89. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 115-23.
90. In 1999, the value of gross industrial output for enterprises funded by Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan was RMB 899.4 billion and the value-added provided by these enterprises was RMB 233 billion, rendering the ratio of value-added to output 26 percent.
91. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 247-50.
92. Of the 114 cases in the HSE database, the only case with greater costs to the sender is Canada's sanctions against Japan in 1974. Canada imposed a cost of 0.04 percent of Canada's GNP, but a cost of only 0.01 percent of Japan's GNP.
93. Personal interviews with various senior scholars and officials in Beijing and Shanghai from June to August, 2001.
94. Comments made at a seminar at the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, November 4, 2003.
95. Mark Landler, "These Days 'Made in Taiwan' Often Means 'Made in China'," New York Times, May 29, 2001, A1.
96. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 265-91.
97. Ibid., 294-365.
98. "Comparison - Xinhua Reports on Premier Zhu Rongji News Conference" (in Chinese), Beijing Xinhua Domestic Service, March 15, 2002, in FBIS-CHI-2002-0315.
99. Personal interview, Beijing, July 31, 2001.
100. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 197-206, 294-360.
101. Personal interview, Beijing, July 19, 2001.
102. Personal interviews with various senior scholars in Beijing, Shanghai, and Xiamen from June to July, 2001.
103. Suzanne Ogden, Inklings of Democracy in China (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Asia Center, 2002), 258-317.
104. Localities refer to administrative units at the sub-national level, such as provinces, municipalities, or counties.
105. Kunshan officials told TIEs about Jiang's excerpt. Author's conversation with a TIE manager in Kunshan, July 5, 2001.
106. A former Chinese senior official involved with Taiwan, author's note of a conference in Shanghai, July 17, 2002.
107. Author's interview with Guo-yuan Chen, secretary-general of the Taiwan-Invested Enterprises Association in Beijing, July 18, 2001.
108. Chuo-zhong Wang, "TIEAs Create Opportunities," Zhongguo shibao, August 12, 1996; and Deming Yang, "Comments on the 'Implementation Rules for the PRC Law on Protecting Investment by Taiwan Compatriots'," Xiandai Taiwan yanjiou (Contemporary Taiwan Studies), 2000, no. 2:73.
109. Chuo-zhong Wang, "TIEAs Create Opportunities," Zhongguo shibao, August 12, 1996; and Deming Yang, "Comments on the 'Implementation Rules for the PRC Law on Protecting Investment by Taiwan Compatriots'," Xiandai Taiwan yanjiou (Contemporary Taiwan Studies), 2000, no. 2:73.
110. Personal interviews with: Chi Su, former chairman of Taipei's Mainland Affairs Council, May 21, 2001; with Yun-yuan Liaw, director of the Department of Economic and Trade Service, Straits Exchange Foundation, May 22, 2001; and with Huai-jia Luo, executive director of the Industrial Policy Center, Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers' Association, May 23,2001. See also Tse-Kang Leng, "Dynamics of Taiwan-Mainland China Economic Relations, " Asian Survey 38, no. 5 (May 1998): 504-5.
111. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 374-89.
112. Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, "The 'State of the State', " in The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderic MaoFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 333-60; Hans Hendrischke and Chongyi Feng, The Political Economy of China's Provinces (New York: Routledge, 1999); Linda Chelan Li, Centre and Provincials: China 1978-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Beilei Zhu, "Cong zhongyang yu difang guanxi lun difang jingying zai quanli jiego zhong zhi jiaose fenxi" (On the role of local elites in the power structure from the perspective of central-local relations), Dongya jikan (East Asia Quarterly) (Taipei) 30, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 39-58; Shangli Lin, Guonei zhengfu jian guanxi (Relations among domestic governments) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1998).
113. Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, "The 'State of the State', " in The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderic MaoFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 333-60; Hans Hendrischke and Chongyi Feng, The Political Economy of China's Provinces (New York: Routledge, 1999); Linda Chelan Li, Centre and Provincials: China 1978-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Beilei Zhu, "Cong zhongyang yu difang guanxi lun difang jingying zai quanli jiego zhong zhi jiaose fenxi" (On the role of local elites in the power structure from the perspective of central-local relations), Dongya jikan (East Asia Quarterly) (Taipei) 30, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 39-58; Shangli Lin, Guonei zhengfu jian guanxi (Relations among domestic governments) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1998).
114. Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, "The 'State of the State', " in The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderic MaoFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 333-60; Hans Hendrischke and Chongyi Feng, The Political Economy of China's Provinces (New York: Routledge, 1999); Linda Chelan Li, Centre and Provincials: China 1978-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Beilei Zhu, "Cong zhongyang yu difang guanxi lun difang jingying zai quanli jiego zhong zhi jiaose fenxi" (On the role of local elites in the power structure from the perspective of central-local relations), Dongya jikan (East Asia Quarterly) (Taipei) 30, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 39-58; Shangli Lin, Guonei zhengfu jian guanxi (Relations among domestic governments) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1998).
115. Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, "The 'State of the State', " in The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderic MaoFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 333-60; Hans Hendrischke and Chongyi Feng, The Political Economy of China's Provinces (New York: Routledge, 1999); Linda Chelan Li, Centre and Provincials: China 1978-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Beilei Zhu, "Cong zhongyang yu difang guanxi lun difang jingying zai quanli jiego zhong zhi jiaose fenxi" (On the role of local elites in the power structure from the perspective of central-local relations), Dongya jikan (East Asia Quarterly) (Taipei) 30, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 39-58; Shangli Lin, Guonei zhengfu jian guanxi (Relations among domestic governments) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1998).
116. Richard Baum and Alexei Shevchenko, "The 'State of the State', " in The Paradox of China's Post-Mao Reforms, ed. Merle Goldman and Roderic MaoFarquhar (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 333-60; Hans Hendrischke and Chongyi Feng, The Political Economy of China's Provinces (New York: Routledge, 1999); Linda Chelan Li, Centre and Provincials: China 1978-1993 (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998); Beilei Zhu, "Cong zhongyang yu difang guanxi lun difang jingying zai quanli jiego zhong zhi jiaose fenxi" (On the role of local elites in the power structure from the perspective of central-local relations), Dongya jikan (East Asia Quarterly) (Taipei) 30, no. 1 (Winter 1999): 39-58; Shangli Lin, Guonei zhengfu jian guanxi (Relations among domestic governments) (Hangzhou: Zhejiang renmin chubanshe, 1998).
117. Peter T.Y. Cheung and James T.H. Tang, "The External Relations of China's Provinces," in The Making of Chinese Foreign and Security Policy in the Era of Reform, 1978-2000, ed. David M. Lampton (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2001), 91-121.
118. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 407-12.
119. Ibid., 412-18.
120. The author arrived in China on June 4, 2001, and stayed in Xiamen for one week, Shanghai for one month, Chengdu for four days, and Beijing for one and a half months. He left Beijing on August 15. During this trip, he conducted interviews with Chinese scholars in major research institutes, officials of the Taiwan affairs system, and Taiwan business-people.
121. Personal interview, Shanghai, June 15, 2001.
122. Personal interview, Shanghai, June 26, 2001.
123. Personal interview, Beijing, July 29, 2001.
124. The term "political elite" refers to the leaders of political parties, legislators, ranking governmental officials above the vice-minister level, and presidential candidates.
125. Tung, "China's Economic Leverage," 426-37.
126. Ibid., 437-40.
127. Ibid., 441-48.
128. Personal interviews with: Huai-jia Luo, executive director of the Industrial Policy Center, Taiwan Electrical and Electronic Manufacturers' Association, May 23, 2001; with Horngming Tsai, deputy secretary-general of the Chinese National Federation of Industries, May 28, 2001; and with Vincent C. Siew, former premier and chairman of the MAC, August 23, 2001.
129. Jing-wen Zou, Lee Teng-hui zhizheng gaobai shilu (Confession of Lee Teng-hui's ruling experience) (Taipei: Ink, 2001), 120; as well as personal interviews with Vincent C. Siew, August 23, 2001; with Chang King-yuh, former MAC chairman, August 20, 2001; with Jung-kung Chang, director-general of the Department of Mainland Affairs, KMT Central Committee, May 22, 2001; with Su Chi, May 21, 2001; and with Chong-pin Lin, then MAC vice chairman, June 1, 2001.