Iron Cage in an Iron Fist: Authoritarian Institutions and the Personalization of Power in Malaysia

Comparative Politics

Volumn 36, Issue 1, 2003, Pages

  Slater, Dan ^a  

^a EMORY UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0242677067     PISSN: 00104159     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/4150161     Document Type: Review

References (74)

1. H. H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology (New York: Oxford University Press, 1946), p. 228.
2. Thomas Fuller, "Malaysia Unrest: 'We Are Prepared to Handle It,'" International Herald Tribune, Sept. 23, 1998.
3. Malaysia has exhibited an atypically "strong, centralized, directive government" since before independence in 1957 and "has experienced politics characterized by extraordinary continuity" ever since. See Richard Stubbs, "The Malayan Emergency and the Development of the Malaysian State," in Paul B. Rich and Richard Stubbs, eds., The Counter-Insurgent State: Guerrilla Warfare and State Building in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 67; Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 32.
4. Malaysia has exhibited an atypically "strong, centralized, directive government" since before independence in 1957 and "has experienced politics characterized by extraordinary continuity" ever since. See Richard Stubbs, "The Malayan Emergency and the Development of the Malaysian State," in Paul B. Rich and Richard Stubbs, eds., The Counter-Insurgent State: Guerrilla Warfare and State Building in the Twentieth Century (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997), p. 67; Harold Crouch, Government and Society in Malaysia (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996), p. 32.
5. I define authoritarian regimes broadly. They include any regime in which "incumbents routinely abuse state resources, deny the opposition adequate media coverage, harass opposition candidates and their supporters, and in some cases manipulate electoral results." See Steven Levitsky and Lucan A. Way, "The Rise of Competitive Authoritarianism," Journal of Democracy, 13 (April 2002), 52, and other articles in this issue on "elections without democracy."
6. Mann defines despotic power in terms of the state's autonomy from civil society. I extend Mann's concept beyond power relationships between state and society to those within the state itself. See Michael Mann, States, War, and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1988), p. 5.
7. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Dictatorial Institutions and the Survival of Dictators," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 2001; Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Gregory Kasza, The Conscription Society: Administered Mass Organizations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
8. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Dictatorial Institutions and the Survival of Dictators," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 2001; Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Gregory Kasza, The Conscription Society: Administered Mass Organizations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
9. Jennifer Gandhi and Adam Przeworski, "Dictatorial Institutions and the Survival of Dictators," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, San Francisco, August 2001; Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999); Gregory Kasza, The Conscription Society: Administered Mass Organizations (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
10. This term is also Mann's. It refers to "the capacity of the state to actually penetrate civil society, and to implement logistically political decisions throughout the realm." Mann, p. 5. Yet a regime can over-come societal resistance only if it has first generated compliance within the state apparatus. I therefore include the organizational coherence of state institutions in my definition of infrastructural power.
11. As Michael Coppedge has suggested, "this phenomenon is not unknown, but it is untheorized." Discussant's comment at the American Political Science Association annual conference, San Francisco, August 30, 2001.
12. A single case can strongly impugn a hypothesis by showing that it fails to hold where it should be most expected to hold. See Harry Eckstein, "Case Study and Theory in Political Science," in Fred Greenstein and Nelson Polsby, eds., Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7 (Reading: Addison-Wesley, 1975).
13. While UMNO rules through a multiethnic coalition, the Barisan Nasional (BN) or National Front, its position within the coalition is so hegemonic that Malaysia is essentially a single party regime. To simplify matters somewhat for nonspecialists, I refer to UMNO rather than to the BN throughout.
14. William Case, "Malaysia's Resilient Pseudodemocracy," Journal of Democracy, 12 (January 2001), 43-57; Levitsky and Way, p. 51.
15. William Case, "Malaysia's Resilient Pseudodemocracy," Journal of Democracy, 12 (January 2001), 43-57; Levitsky and Way, p. 51.
16. See Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia: Quasi-Democracy in a Divided Society," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Upset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries, vol. 3 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); William Case, "Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change," Pacific Affairs, 66 (Summer 1993), 183-205; Crouch, ch. 13; Gordon P. Means, "Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore," Journal of Democracy, 7 (October 1996), 103-17.
17. See Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia: Quasi-Democracy in a Divided Society," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Upset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries, vol. 3 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); William Case, "Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change," Pacific Affairs, 66 (Summer 1993), 183-205; Crouch, ch. 13; Gordon P. Means, "Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore," Journal of Democracy, 7 (October 1996), 103-17.
18. See Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia: Quasi-Democracy in a Divided Society," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Upset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries, vol. 3 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); William Case, "Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change," Pacific Affairs, 66 (Summer 1993), 183-205; Crouch, ch. 13; Gordon P. Means, "Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore," Journal of Democracy, 7 (October 1996), 103-17.
19. See Zakaria Haji Ahmad, "Malaysia: Quasi-Democracy in a Divided Society," in Larry Diamond, Juan J. Linz, and Seymour Martin Upset, eds., Politics in Developing Countries, vol. 3 (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1989); William Case, "Semi-Democracy in Malaysia: Withstanding the Pressures for Regime Change," Pacific Affairs, 66 (Summer 1993), 183-205; Crouch, ch. 13; Gordon P. Means, "Soft Authoritarianism in Malaysia and Singapore," Journal of Democracy, 7 (October 1996), 103-17.
20. Crouch, ch. 5.
21. Stubbs traces the Malaysian state's impressive coercive capacity to the British-led emergency operation against leftists from 1948 to 1960. "By the end of the Emergency the Malayan government had built up a substantial and relatively efficient security apparatus. The police had become a sizeable organisation and the Special Branch had gained a deserved reputation as an intelligence-gathering organisation." See Stubbs, p. 67. This security apparatus continued to play an active role in curbing dissent during the interregnum between British rule and Mahathir's ascendancy to the prime ministry. "Between 1960 and 1981, 3, 102 people were detained at one time or another under the ISA." See Crouch, p. 80.
22. Meredith Weiss, "What Will Become of Reformasi? Ethnicity and Changing Political Norms in Malaysia," Contemporary Southeast Asia, 21 (December 1999), 432, suggests that perhaps 80 percent of ethnic Malays in the civil service did not support Mahathir's handling of the political crisis.
23. Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?," Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1999), 115-44; Barbara Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 1999.
24. Barbara Geddes, "What Do We Know About Democratization after Twenty Years?," Annual Review of Political Science, 2 (1999), 115-44; Barbara Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown: Empirical Test of a Game Theoretic Argument," paper presented at the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Atlanta, September 1999.
25. Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown," p. 16. For a definition of institutionalization in unconsolidated democracies that mirrors this dual emphasis on procedures and organizations, see Scott Mainwaring, "Party Systems in the Third Wave," Journal of Democracy, 9 (July 1998), 70.
26. Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown," p. 16. For a definition of institutionalization in unconsolidated democracies that mirrors this dual emphasis on procedures and organizations, see Scott Mainwaring, "Party Systems in the Third Wave," Journal of Democracy, 9 (July 1998), 70.
27. The same can be said for non-African cases of sultanism and neopatrimonialism, such as the Philippines under Marcos, which have attracted more theoretical attention than highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes such as Malaysia's, See H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Richard Snyder, "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," Comparative Politics, 24 (July 1992), 379-99.
28. The same can be said for non-African cases of sultanism and neopatrimonialism, such as the Philippines under Marcos, which have attracted more theoretical attention than highly institutionalized authoritarian regimes such as Malaysia's, See H. E. Chehabi and Juan J. Linz, eds., Sultanistic Regimes (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998); Richard Snyder, "Explaining Transitions from Neopatrimonial Dictatorships," Comparative Politics, 24 (July 1992), 379-99.
29. Robert H. Jackson and Carl G. Rosberg, Personal Rule in Black Africa: Prince, Autocrat, Prophet, Tyrant (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1982), p. 78.
30. Geddes, "What Do We Know?," pp. 121-22.
31. Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown"; Geddes, "What Do We Know?"; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
32. Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown"; Geddes, "What Do We Know?"; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
33. Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown"; Geddes, "What Do We Know?"; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
34. Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown"; Geddes, "What Do We Know?"; Samuel P. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991); Paul Brooker, Non-Democratic Regimes: Theory, Government and Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2000).
35. Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown," operationalizes the party-personal, party-military, and military-personal divides, which correspond to my machine-bossism, party-military, and junta-strongman divides. My typology mainly differs in arranging her variables along two dimensions rather than one. My typology is more focused but less ambitious than Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan, Problems of Democratic Transition and Consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and Post-Communist Europe (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1996), which encompasses issues of regime ideology and the extent of regime domination, not just that domination's institutional form.
36. Chehabi and Linz, eds., pp. 34-37, recognize the tendency for authoritarian institutions to "decay" as long-serving leaders turn "sultanistic," but they do not discuss how institutions might be actively destroyed rather than passively "decay," as dictators manipulate certain institutions to destroy others.
37. Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H, Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p, 7; Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown," p. 6; and Mainwaring, p. 69.
38. Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H, Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p, 7; Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown," p. 6; and Mainwaring, p. 69.
39. Samuel P. Huntington, "Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Systems," in Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H, Moore, eds., Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of Established One-Party Systems (New York: Basic Books, 1970), p, 7; Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown," p. 6; and Mainwaring, p. 69.
40. Michael Leigh, "Malaysia: 1961 and 2001," paper presented at the annual conference of the Association for Asian Studies, Chicago, March 2001, p. 7.
41. Ho Khai Leong, "Aggrandizement of Prime Minister's Power: The Transformation of the Office of the Prime Minister in Malaysia," Internationales Asienforum, 23 (1992), 243, 236.
42. Both quoted in Simon Martin, "Mahathir Still Firmly in Control on 20th Anniversary," Agence-France Press, July 15, 2001.
43. Edmund Terence Gomez, Political Business: Corporate Involvement of Malaysian Political Parties (Kuala Lumpur: Vinlin Press, 1994), p. 62.
44. Ibid., p. 63.
45. Confidential interview, Kuala Lumpur, 1998.
46. Jim Erickson and Assif Shameen, "Mounting Pressure," Asiaweek, Mar. 27, 1998.
47. William Case, "The 1996 UMNO Party Election: 'Two for the Show,'" Pacific Affairs, 70 (Fall 1997), 393-411; Hari Singh, "Tradition, UMNO and Political Succession in Malaysia," Third World Quarterly, 19 (April 1997), 241-54.
48. William Case, "The 1996 UMNO Party Election: 'Two for the Show,'" Pacific Affairs, 70 (Fall 1997), 393-411; Hari Singh, "Tradition, UMNO and Political Succession in Malaysia," Third World Quarterly, 19 (April 1997), 241-54.
49. Simon Elegant and S. Jayasankaran, "Juggernaut," Far Eastern Economic Review, Nov. 25, 1999.
50. Case, "The 1996 UMNO Party Election," p. 399.
51. Max Weber, in Gerth and Mills, p. 228.
52. Erickson and Shameen.
53. Choong Tet Sieu and Arjuna Ranawana, "Filling Up at Petronas," Asiaweek, Nov. 13, 1998.
54. "The Bailout Business," Asiaweek, Mar. 27, 1998.
55. Assif Shameen and Zoher Abdoolcarim, "Fading from the Picture?," Asiaweek, Aug. 21, 1998.
56. Eddie Toh, "Anwar Not Ruling Out Switching to Opposition Party PAS," Business Times (Singapore), Sept. 5, 1998.
57. S. Jayasankaran and Murray Hiebert, "The Ringmaster," Far Eastern Economic Review, Oct. 15, 1998.
58. "Left Vacant," The Star, Oct. 7, 1998.
59. Charles Chan, "A Case of Swollen Ego, Says Rafidah", The Star, Sept. 16, 1998. This unconditional support came from a minister who has repeatedly lost grass-roots elections for the top women's post in UMNO, only to be resurrected by Mahathir's discretionary offers of seats in the cabinet and supreme council.
60. Choong Tet Sieu and Arjuna Ranawana, "A Case of Order and Disorder," Asiaweek, Oct. 16, 1998.
61. I b i d.
62. "Crackdown," Asiaweek, Oct. 2, 1998.
63. Eddie Toh, "Probe Stopped after PM's Statement," Business Times (Singapore), Nov. 10, 1998.
64. Anthony Spaeth, "He's the Boss," Time International, Sept. 14, 1998.
65. K. Kabilan, "Police Responsible for Rights Abuses: Suhakam," Malaysiakini, Aug. 20, 2001.
66. For a complete transcript of the trial, see The Anwar Ibrahim Judgment (Kuala Lumpur: Malayan Law Journal, 1999).
67. See Meredith Weiss, "The 1999 Malaysian General Elections: Issues, Insults, and Irregularities," paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Association for Asian Studies, San Diego, March 2000.
68. K. Kabilan and Ng Boon Hooi, "Electoral Roll Amendment a Danger to Citizens Rights," Malaysiakini, July 20, 2001.
69. As one Malaysian columnist suggested to me: "The only way this man is leaving office is horizontally." Confidential interview, Kuala Lumpur, July 2001.
70. It is too soon to tell whether Mahathir will make good on his recent promise (delivered in June 2002) to step down in October 2003. More certain is that the decision will be Mahathir's to make.
71. Malaysia has not taken the totalitarian route of mobilizing functional groups into "administered mass organizations." See Kasza, esp. ch. 1. But given the national power and presence of UMNO, the federal police, and state organizations in general, such extreme measures have hardly proven necessary to keep opposition in check.
72. Geddes, "Authoritarian Breakdown," pp. 16-17.
73. As the inspector-general of police put it when the reformasi protests started to swell: "From our experience in the '50s and '60s, we know what we are dealing with...." "Police Outlaw All 'Reformation Meetings,'" The Star, Sept. 23, 1998.
74. Focusing on authoritarian institutions as instruments of cooptation is important, but incomplete. Gandhi and Przeworski, p. 3. Authoritarian regimes need strong institutions to serve as instruments of coercion as well.