What will become of reformasi? Ethnicity and changing political norms in Malaysia

Contemporary Southeast Asia

Volumn 21, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 424-450

  Weiss, Meredith L ^a  

^a YALE UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 84937325479     PISSN: 0129797X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1355/CS21-3F     Document Type: Article

References (44)

1. Farish A. Noor, “Looking for Reformasi: The Discursive Dynamics of the Reformasi Movement and Its Prospects as a Political Project”, Indonesia and the Malay World 27, no. 77 (March 1977): 6, 13-14.
2. See the pamphlet “Whither Justice?” (distributed by the DAP) or “A Shameful Episode”, Aliran Monthly 18, no. 8 (September 1998): 40.
3. Khalid Jafri, 50 Dalil Mengapa Anwar Tidak Boleh Jadi PM (Ampang, Selangor: Media Pulau Lagenda, 1998).
4. See John Funston, “Malaysia: A Fateful September”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1999 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1999), pp. 165-72, for a more nuanced discussion of the split between Anwar and Mahathir and the events leading to Anwar’s dismissal.
5. See “Anwar’s Case Causes Grave Disquiet: Bar Council”, Business Times (Singapore), 19 April 1999.
6. See Francis Loh, “The Sabah State Elections 1999”, Aliran Monthly 19, no. 3 (April 1999): 33-37, 39-40; or the “Sabah State Elections 1999 Monitor’s Report”, available from Suaram: http://www.suaram.org.
7. See, for instance, the April 1999 issue of Aliran Monthly (19, no. 3), especially Khoo Boo Teik’s “Beyond pigs and lotteries” (pp. 2, 3-6); and Chan Chee Khoon’s “Japanese Encephalitis: A Re-emergent Nightmare?” (pp. 7-8); or David Liebhold, “Hog Hell”, Time Magazine, 5 April 1999.
8. James Wong Wing On, personal communication, 28 May 1999. See also “Aktivis veteran Cina sertai keAdilan”, Berita Harian (Singapore), 31 May 1999.
9. Available at http://bosses.faithweb.com. Though started by an informal group of ethnic Chinese journalists, the on-line “People are the Boss” campaign is intended to be a multi-ethnic citizens’ awareness campaign, and indeed the list of signatories includes not only Chinese names, but also quite a number of Malay and a few Indian names. See also Oon Yeoh, “Divided Malay electorate gives minorities clout”, Nikkei Weekly, 13 September 1999.
10. Available from Suaram: http://www.suaram.org. The demands were drafted as a “wish list” by eleven national-level Chinese guilds and associations and submitted to all political parties. They include such issues as making Malaysia’s affirmative action more needs-based rather than race-based, establishing more Chinese-language schools and increasing freedom of the press. See also ibid.
11. For details on the WAC, see the booklet, “Women’s Agenda for Change”, available from Women’s Development Collective (Kajang, Selangor), or Irene Xavier and Maria Chin Abdullah, “Launching the Women’s Agenda for Change,” Aliran Monthly 19, no. 6 (July 1999): 33-35, 40. Further information on the WCI can be found at http://www.candidate.freeservers.com.
12. Interview with Sivarasa Rasiah, 13 February 1999.
13. All the membership applications have not been keyed in yet, and so the party is not sure of precise membership figures. This number is an estimate based on application forms received. Personal communication with Alison Wee, 19 September 1999.
14. See “4 parti pembangkang M’sia bersetuju untuk bersatu”, Berita Harian (Singapore), 21 June 1999.
15. Brendan Pereira “UMNO battles PAS for Malay hearts,” Straits Times (Singapore), 29 June 1999. In comparison, UMNO has about 2.7 million members. See also Meredith L. Weiss, “New opportunities and strategies for Islamic politics in Malaysia” (Paper delivered at the American Council for the Study of Islamic Societies, Sixteenth Annual Meeting, Villanova University, 30 April-1 May 1999).
16. In fact, the rights of non-Malays are already constrained by the inviolable doctrine of ketuanan Melayu (Malay special rights).
17. It is unclear how deeply this new rhetoric has penetrated; my interviews suggest that it is only part of the top echelon of PAS leaders who have this new understanding of PAS aims or see this rhetoric as nothing more than an opportunistic electoral pact. If PAS does win many seats in coalition with other parties and does not pursue the establishment of an Islamic state, the party could lose substantial mass support.
18. Interview with Mahfuz Omar, 13 April 1999. See also, for instance, Joceline Tan’s article, “Does PAS have what it takes to win the polls?” and interview with Fadzil Mohd Noor (New Straits Times, 11 April 1999), as well as the Joint Media Statement by PAS, DAP and PKN, “Leadership and the Barisan Alternatif” released on 20 September 1999 (available at http://www.keadilan.org)
19. Murray Hiebert cites an UMNO survey finding that 70 per cent of Malays are unhappy with the way Anwar was sacked (“A Single Spark”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 29 October 1998). Several of my informants offered similar or higher statistics, with 80 per cent being the most common figure. One senior UMNO member was more specific, stating that 80 per cent of civil servants and 60 per cent of students do not support Mahathir, while kampung (village) dwellers are about evenly split between support for Anwar and Mahathir.
20. In my interviews with active UMNO and other BN party members, several confessed that they were dissatisfied with Dr Mahathir’s handling of the Anwar affair and felt he should resign. However, they said they would just keep their doubts to themselves and remain loyal to the party, including Mahathir. Regarding the split within UMNO, see also Assif Shameen and Sangwon Suh, “A Test of Strength”, Asiaweek, 20 November 1998.
21. Such as with the establishment in July 1999 of a National Human Rights Commission, high-profile attacks on corruption, or promising to review the ISA.
22. Francis Kok Wah Loh, “Where Has (Ethnic) Politics Gone? The Case of the Barisan Nasional Non-Malay Politicians and Political Parties” (Working paper for Ford Foundation-ISEC-IKMAS research workshop on “Southeast Asian Pluralisms: Social Resources for Civility and Participation in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia”, 5-6 August 1999, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia), pp. 1-4.
23. Khong Kim Hoong, Malaysia’s General Election 1990: Continuity, Change, and Ethnic Politics, Research Notes and Discussions Paper No. 74 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1991), p. 15; and Edmund Terence Gomez, The 1995 Malaysian General Elections: A Report and Commentary, ISEAS Occasional Paper No. 93 (Singapore: ISEAS, 1996), p. 1.
24. On the slant and impact of media coverage of local and federal elections (including the 1990 and 1995 general elections), see Mustafa K. Anuar, “Defining Democratic Discourses: The Mainstream Malaysian Press” (Paper presented at REPUSM-GESEAS Project on “Discourses and Practices of Democracy in Malaysia” Work-in-Progress Meeting, Penang, 18-19 July 1998).
25. Shamsul A.B. “The Redefinition of Politics and the Transformation of Malaysian Pluralism” (Working paper for Ford Foundation-ISEC-IKMAS research workshop on “Southeast Asian Pluralisms: Social Resources for Civility and Participation in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia”, 5-6 August 1999, Petaling Jaya, Malaysia), p. 8.
26. For a thorough discussion of intra-party squabbles and the significance of politics within UMNO, see William Case, “The 1996 UMNO Party Election: ‘Two for the Show’”, Pacific Affairs 70, no. 3 (Fall 1997): 393-411; or R.S. Milne and Diane K. Mauzy, Malaysian Politics under Mahathir (London: Routledge, 1999). On corruption and financial scandals, see Edmund Terence Gomez and Jomo K.S., Malaysia’s Political Economy, Politics, Patronage and Profits (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997); Khoo Boo Teik, “Democracy and Authoritarianism in Malaysia since 1957: Class, Ethnicity and Changing Capitalism”, in Democratization in Southeast and East Asia, edited by Anek Laothamatas (Singapore: ISEAS, 1997), pp. 64-66; or Edmund Terence Gomez, Money Politics in the Barisan Nasional (Kuala Lumpur: Forum, 1990).
27. Khong, op. cit., pp. 8-12.
28. The Sabah state elections had actually been held a few months prior to the federal elections, but the ruling Parti Bersatu Sabah crossed over from BN to the opposition just before the national polls.
29. Shortly before the polls, the BN widely circulated images of Tengku Razaleigh in Kadazan headgear, adorned with what looked like a cross as “proof” of his betrayal.
30. Khong, op. cit., pp. 15-24, 36-45.
31. Gomez, The 1995 Malaysian General Elections, pp. 4-6, 15-17, 22-3, 28-31, 45. See also Khoo Boo Teik, “Politics After Mahathir” (unpublished paper), p. 10.
32. Exact figures on former Semangat ’46 members in PKN are not available. Prior to the formation of PKN, BN-Kelantan estimated that 80 per cent of Semangat ’46 members from Kelantan had re-entered UMNO, with the rest joining PAS (interview with Hj Yusuf Isa, 23 February 1999).
33. See Tangled Web: Dissent, Deterrence and the 27 October 1987 Crackdown in Malaysia (Haymarket, NSW: Committee Against Repression in the Pacific and Asia, 1988).
34. The Malay middle classes are by no means homogeneous, whether in location, extent of reliance on patronage, newness, or political proclivities. For an excellent discussion of some of the subcategories within the Malay middle classes and their sociological and political significance, see A.B. Shamsul, “From Orang Kaya Baru to Melayu Baru: Cultural construction of the Malay ‘new rich’”, in Culture and Privilege in Capitalist Asia, edited by Michael Pinches (London: Routledge, 1999), pp. 86-110; or Khoo Boo Teik, “Democracy and Authoritarianism in Malaysia”, especially pp. 59-61.
35. Asiaweek, 16 April 1999.
36. Interview with James Wong Wing On, 27 March 1999.
37. These activists include, among others, Chandra Muzaffar (International Movement for a Just World/PKN), Irene Fernandez (Tenaganita/PKN), Sivarasa Rasiah (Suaram/ PRM), Tian Chua (Labour Resource Centre/PKN), Zaitun Kasim (All Women’s Action Society/WCI), Mohd. Nasir Hashim (Suara Warga Pertiwi/Parti Sosialis Malaysia, PSM), and Arutchelvan (Suaram/PSM). Some of these individuals are active in other NGOs too.
38. Ostrom thus suggests developing second-generation models of rationality in which reciprocity, reputation, and trust comprise the core of a behavioural theory of collective action, tested empirically both in the laboratory and in the field. Elinor Ostrom, “A Behavioral Approach to the Rational Choice Theory of Collective Action” (Presidential Address, American Political Science Association, 1997), American Political Science Review 92, no.1 (March 1998): 1-22.
39. Rustam A. Sani “Malaysia’s Economic and Political Crisis Since September 1998” (Paper presented at the Second International Malaysian Studies Conference, Kuala Lumpur, 2-4 August 1999), pp. 6-9. The fact that Mahathir is still confidently in control of UMNO and at least a substantial proportion of the electorate implies that perhaps these 1960s-era tactics are not yet entirely obsolete.
40. In fact, Marina Mahathir, the Prime Minister’s daughter, castigated Malaysian protesters for trivializing Indonesia’s dire economic, political and social situation by co-opting the term, “Reformasi”. Marina Mahathir, “The claim for reformation”, The Star (Malaysia), 23 September 1999, p. 7.
41. Malaysia has about 480,000 Internet subscribers among a population of 22 million. The country’s largest Internet service provider, TMNet, reports about 14,000 new subscribers per month since September 1998, compared with about 9,000 per month before. Moreover, Malaysians have more than 900,000 Hotmail accounts, the largest number in Asia, accessed often through cyber-cafes. Several pro-Reformasi websites have recorded more than half a million hits. See Brendan Pereira, “Now for the real news?”, Straits Times (Singapore), 13 June 1999. Responding to this article in a 13 June 1999 post to ADIL-Net (“Re: [ADIL-Net] [gerak-net] [analysis] Now for the real news?”), Annamalai Kaunder adds that 2,836,837 news group postings per day come from domains ending with “.my” (Malaysia) and that 3,471 pro-Reformasi websites experience a total of about 1.7 million transactions per day.
42. For a highly critical perspective, see Anna Har and John Hutnyk, “Languid, tropical, monsoonal time?: net-activism and hype in the context of South East Asian politics”, Saksi, July 1999 (available at: www.saksi.com/jul99/huynyk.htm).
43. Ostrom, op. cit., pp. 6-7.
44. For instance, a Malay-language Internet-based survey by Prof. Rozhan Othman of Universiti Kebangsaan Malaysia in August 1999 found that of 170 respondents, 66.5 per cent were men, 93.5 per cent were from urban areas, and 92.4 per cent were Malay – hardly a representative sample. A full 70 per cent claimed to read the PAS newsletter, Harakah – more than double the percentage of those reading the next-most-popular journal, The Star (30.6 per cent). Among the most common reasons the respondents gave for why people “on the fence” were not ready to support “alternative” parties were doubts in the ability of the opposition parties (62.4 per cent) and that they do not get information from alternative media (51.2 per cent). Results and conclusions from the survey were circulated on ADIL-Net, ISLAH-Net and ALAMIN-Net on 11 August 1999, or can be obtained from the researcher at rozhan@pkrisc.cc.ukm.my.