Optimal Agendas for Multi-Issue Negotiation

Proceedings of the International Conference on Autonomous Agents

Volumn 2, Issue , 2003, Pages 129-136

  Fatima, Shaheen ^a   Wooldridge, Michael ^a   Jennings, Nicholas R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF LIVERPOOL   (United Kingdom)

^b UNIVERSITY OF SOUTHAMPTON   (United Kingdom)

Author keywords

Agendas; Game theory; Multi issue negotiation

Indexed keywords

ALGORITHMS; COMPUTATIONAL COMPLEXITY; GAME THEORY; MULTI AGENT SYSTEMS; NETWORK PROTOCOLS; OPTIMIZATION; PROBABILITY; QUALITY OF SERVICE; SET THEORY; SOFTWARE AGENTS; SOFTWARE ENGINEERING;

AGENDAS; MULTI-ISSUE NEGOTIATION;

COMPUTER SCIENCE;

EID: 1142280933     PISSN: None     EISSN: None     Source Type: Conference Proceeding    
DOI: 10.1145/860575.860597     Document Type: Conference Paper

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