Multi-player and multi-round auctions with severely bounded communication

Lecture Notes in Computer Science (including subseries Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence and Lecture Notes in Bioinformatics)

Volumn 2832, Issue , 2003, Pages 102-113

  Blumrosen, Liad ^a   Nisan, Noam ^a   Segal, Ilya ^b  

^a HEBREW UNIVERSITY OF JERUSALEM   (Israel)

^b STANFORD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EFFICIENCY;

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY; EFFICIENCY LOSS; MULTI-ROUND AUCTIONS; UPPER BOUND;

COMMERCE;

EID: 0142152741     PISSN: 03029743     EISSN: 16113349     Source Type: Book Series    
DOI: 10.1007/978-3-540-39658-1_12     Document Type: Article

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