Political manipulations and market reforms failures

World Politics

Volumn 55, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 315-360

  Manzetti, Luigi ^a  

^a SOUTHERN METHODIST UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

CORRUPTION; ECONOMIC REFORM; IMF; MARKET TRANSITION;

EID: 0141907189     PISSN: 00438871     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1353/wp.2003.0017     Document Type: Article

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