Delegation and polarization of platforms in political competition

Economic Theory

Volumn 22, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 289-309

  Faulí Oller, Ramon ^a   Ok, Efe A ^b   Ortuño Ortín, Ignacio ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF ALICANTE   (Spain)

^b NEW YORK UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

Delegation; Polarization; Political competition

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041975035     PISSN: 09382259     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1007/s00199-002-0305-8     Document Type: Article

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