A political business cycle with boundedly rational agents

European Journal of Political Economy

Volumn 17, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 39-52

  Sieg, Gernot ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GÖTTINGEN   (Germany)

Author keywords

Artificial adaptive agents; Central bank independence; D72; D83; E32; E61; Evolutionary algorithm; Political business cycle

Indexed keywords

EID: 0041908376     PISSN: 01762680     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0176-2680(00)00027-6     Document Type: Article

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