The U.S. presumption of quick, costless wars

Orbis

Volumn 43, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 363-381

  Erdmann, Andrew P N ^a,b,c  

^a HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

^b US Institute of Peace   (United States)

^c HARVARD UNIVERSITY   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040873106     PISSN: 00304387     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0030-4387(99)80077-5     Document Type: Article

References (120)

1. This article was written prior to the beginning of NATO bombing in Yugoslavia. See Dick Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 15; U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 14, 1993), p. 1-3; Edward N. Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1996, p. 36; David Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians," Parameters, Summer 1998, p. 74. FM 100-5 (1993) is currently under revision. Significantly, the predecessor 1986 edition of FM 100-5 did not contain any such assessment of the "American View of War." See U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 5, 1986).
2. This article was written prior to the beginning of NATO bombing in Yugoslavia. See Dick Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 15; U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 14, 1993), p. 1-3; Edward N. Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1996, p. 36; David Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians," Parameters, Summer 1998, p. 74. FM 100-5 (1993) is currently under revision. Significantly, the predecessor 1986 edition of FM 100-5 did not contain any such assessment of the "American View of War." See U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 5, 1986).
3. This article was written prior to the beginning of NATO bombing in Yugoslavia. See Dick Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 15; U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 14, 1993), p. 1-3; Edward N. Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1996, p. 36; David Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians," Parameters, Summer 1998, p. 74. FM 100-5 (1993) is currently under revision. Significantly, the predecessor 1986 edition of FM 100-5 did not contain any such assessment of the "American View of War." See U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 5, 1986).
4. This article was written prior to the beginning of NATO bombing in Yugoslavia. See Dick Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 15; U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 14, 1993), p. 1-3; Edward N. Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1996, p. 36; David Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians," Parameters, Summer 1998, p. 74. FM 100-5 (1993) is currently under revision. Significantly, the predecessor 1986 edition of FM 100-5 did not contain any such assessment of the "American View of War." See U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 5, 1986).
5. This article was written prior to the beginning of NATO bombing in Yugoslavia. See Dick Cheney, Defense Strategy for the 1990s (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), p. 15; U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, June 14, 1993), p. 1-3; Edward N. Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1996, p. 36; David Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians," Parameters, Summer 1998, p. 74. FM 100-5 (1993) is currently under revision. Significantly, the predecessor 1986 edition of FM 100-5 did not contain any such assessment of the "American View of War." See U.S. Army, Field Manual 100-5: Operations (Washington, D.C.: Headquarters, Department of the Army, May 5, 1986).
6. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Remarks to the National Press Club, Nov. 28, 1984, News Release No. 609-84, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); Caspar W. Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1986, pp. 684-90.
7. Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Remarks to the National Press Club, Nov. 28, 1984, News Release No. 609-84, Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs); Caspar W. Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Spring 1986, pp. 684-90.
8. Weinberger, "U.S. Defense Strategy," p. 688.
9. Samuel P. Huntington, "Playing to Win," National Interest, Spring 1986, p. 12.
10. Ibid., p. 14.
11. For the development and application of the doctrine of "decisive force," see Kenneth J. Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 357-74; Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 220-336; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review, Winter 1995, pp. 23-34; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-45; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, with new afterword (New York: Ballantine, 1996), pp. 128-29, 139-45, 200, 280-81, 292-93, 420-21, 543-48, 559-62; Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 159-60, 401-2. See also the official statements of military strategy issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1990s: Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
12. For the development and application of the doctrine of "decisive force," see Kenneth J. Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 357-74; Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 220-336; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review, Winter 1995, pp. 23-34; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-45; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, with new afterword (New York: Ballantine, 1996), pp. 128-29, 139-45, 200, 280-81, 292-93, 420-21, 543-48, 559-62; Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 159-60, 401-2. See also the official statements of military strategy issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1990s: Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
13. For the development and application of the doctrine of "decisive force," see Kenneth J. Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 357-74; Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 220-336; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review, Winter 1995, pp. 23-34; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-45; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, with new afterword (New York: Ballantine, 1996), pp. 128-29, 139-45, 200, 280-81, 292-93, 420-21, 543-48, 559-62; Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 159-60, 401-2. See also the official statements of military strategy issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1990s: Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
14. For the development and application of the doctrine of "decisive force," see Kenneth J. Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 357-74; Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 220-336; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review, Winter 1995, pp. 23-34; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-45; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, with new afterword (New York: Ballantine, 1996), pp. 128-29, 139-45, 200, 280-81, 292-93, 420-21, 543-48, 559-62; Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 159-60, 401-2. See also the official statements of military strategy issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1990s: Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
15. For the development and application of the doctrine of "decisive force," see Kenneth J. Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 357-74; Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 220-336; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review, Winter 1995, pp. 23-34; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-45; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, with new afterword (New York: Ballantine, 1996), pp. 128-29, 139-45, 200, 280-81, 292-93, 420-21, 543-48, 559-62; Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 159-60, 401-2. See also the official statements of military strategy issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1990s: Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
16. For the development and application of the doctrine of "decisive force," see Kenneth J. Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 357-74; Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 220-336; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review, Winter 1995, pp. 23-34; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-45; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, with new afterword (New York: Ballantine, 1996), pp. 128-29, 139-45, 200, 280-81, 292-93, 420-21, 543-48, 559-62; Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 159-60, 401-2. See also the official statements of military strategy issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1990s: Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
17. For the development and application of the doctrine of "decisive force," see Kenneth J. Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 357-74; Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 220-336; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review, Winter 1995, pp. 23-34; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-45; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, with new afterword (New York: Ballantine, 1996), pp. 128-29, 139-45, 200, 280-81, 292-93, 420-21, 543-48, 559-62; Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 159-60, 401-2. See also the official statements of military strategy issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1990s: Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
18. For the development and application of the doctrine of "decisive force," see Kenneth J. Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 357-74; Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 220-336; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review, Winter 1995, pp. 23-34; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-45; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, with new afterword (New York: Ballantine, 1996), pp. 128-29, 139-45, 200, 280-81, 292-93, 420-21, 543-48, 559-62; Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 159-60, 401-2. See also the official statements of military strategy issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1990s: Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
19. For the development and application of the doctrine of "decisive force," see Kenneth J. Campbell, "Once Burned, Twice Cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell Doctrine," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 357-74; Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force: The Dilemma of Limited War in American Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), pp. 220-336; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review, Winter 1995, pp. 23-34; Colin Powell, "U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead," Foreign Affairs, Winter 1992/93, pp. 32-45; Colin Powell with Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey, with new afterword (New York: Ballantine, 1996), pp. 128-29, 139-45, 200, 280-81, 292-93, 420-21, 543-48, 559-62; Caspar W. Weinberger, Fighting for Peace: Seven Critical Years in the Pentagon (New York: Warner Books, 1990), pp. 159-60, 401-2. See also the official statements of military strategy issued by the Joint Chiefs of Staff during the 1990s: Colin L. Powell, National Military Strategy of the United States (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1995: A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1995); John M. Shalikashvili, National Military Strategy of the United States of America 1997: Shape, Respond, Prepare Now - A Military Strategy for a New Era (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1997).
20. See the insightful analysis of Stephen Peter Rosen, "Vietnam and the American Theory of Limited War," International Security, Fall 1982, pp. 83-113.
21. Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997); Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995); Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1984); Brian Vandemark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
22. Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997); Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995); Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1984); Brian Vandemark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
23. Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997); Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995); Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1984); Brian Vandemark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
24. Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997); Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995); Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1984); Brian Vandemark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
25. Robert Buzzanco, Masters of War: Military Dissent and Politics in the Vietnam Era (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1996); H. R. McMaster, Dereliction of Duty: Lyndon Johnson, Robert McNamara, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Lies that Led to Vietnam (New York: HarperCollins, 1997); Robert S. McNamara, In Retrospect: The Tragedy and Lessons of Vietnam (New York: Times Books, 1995); Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1984); Brian Vandemark, Into the Quagmire: Lyndon Johnson and the Escalation of the Vietnam War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995).
26. The argument that follows does not focus upon the issue of casualty aversion per se. It does accord closely, however, with the assessment of Richard Betts: "It has become axiomatic that Americans will not tolerate many body bags in the course of an intervention where vital interests are not at stake. There is no clear evidence for this conventional wisdom, however, and ample evidence to the contrary." Richard K. Betts, "What Will It Take to Deter the United States?" Parameters, Winter 1995-96, p. 76. For a useful investigation of the relationship between casualties and domestic support for U.S. military operations since the Second World War, see Eric Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U. S. Military Operations (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996).
27. The argument that follows does not focus upon the issue of casualty aversion per se. It does accord closely, however, with the assessment of Richard Betts: "It has become axiomatic that Americans will not tolerate many body bags in the course of an intervention where vital interests are not at stake. There is no clear evidence for this conventional wisdom, however, and ample evidence to the contrary." Richard K. Betts, "What Will It Take to Deter the United States?" Parameters, Winter 1995-96, p. 76. For a useful investigation of the relationship between casualties and domestic support for U.S. military operations since the Second World War, see Eric Larson, Casualties and Consensus: The Historical Role of Casualties in Domestic Support for U. S. Military Operations (Santa Monica: RAND, 1996).
28. In arguing against the "renewed threat" of isolationism, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., expresses concern over evidence of decreasing public willingness to support military operations abroad which risk American casualties. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1995, pp. 2-8. Harvey Sapolsky also emphasizes this purported aversion to casualties, but he employs this aversion to argue for a fundamental retrenchment of American military commitments. This advocacy of neo-isolationism is implied in Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro, "Casualties, Technology, and America's Future Wars," Parameters, Summer 1996, pp. 123-26. More recently, Sapolsky explicitly advocated a policy of "restraint," which entails U.S. military disengagement from Europe and Asia as well as a 50 percent reduction in the defense budget Eugene Gholtz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Spring 1997, pp. 5-48.
29. In arguing against the "renewed threat" of isolationism, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., expresses concern over evidence of decreasing public willingness to support military operations abroad which risk American casualties. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1995, pp. 2-8. Harvey Sapolsky also emphasizes this purported aversion to casualties, but he employs this aversion to argue for a fundamental retrenchment of American military commitments. This advocacy of neo-isolationism is implied in Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro, "Casualties, Technology, and America's Future Wars," Parameters, Summer 1996, pp. 123-26. More recently, Sapolsky explicitly advocated a policy of "restraint," which entails U.S. military disengagement from Europe and Asia as well as a 50 percent reduction in the defense budget Eugene Gholtz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Spring 1997, pp. 5-48.
30. In arguing against the "renewed threat" of isolationism, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., expresses concern over evidence of decreasing public willingness to support military operations abroad which risk American casualties. Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1995, pp. 2-8. Harvey Sapolsky also emphasizes this purported aversion to casualties, but he employs this aversion to argue for a fundamental retrenchment of American military commitments. This advocacy of neo-isolationism is implied in Harvey M. Sapolsky and Jeremy Shapiro, "Casualties, Technology, and America's Future Wars," Parameters, Summer 1996, pp. 123-26. More recently, Sapolsky explicitly advocated a policy of "restraint," which entails U.S. military disengagement from Europe and Asia as well as a 50 percent reduction in the defense budget Eugene Gholtz, Daryl G. Press, and Harvey M. Sapolsky, "Come Home, America: The Strategy of Restraint in the Face of Temptation," International Security, Spring 1997, pp. 5-48.
31. Consider, for instance, two popular contributions to the debate over the potential implications of the RMA. In a critical appraisal of over-reliance upon the RMA, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., argues that American adoption of the RMA conception of warfare will create vulnerabilities, which a ruthless adversary will then exploit with ingenious asymmetric strategies. Such an enemy might focus upon undermining the weak American public will, for example, by transmitting on global television the mutilation of female prisoners of war. Edward Luttwak agrees that the American public no longer has the stomach to endure significant casualties. He advocates, however, increased reliance upon RMA-type weapons systems since these are the only weapons whose use the public might then support. Although they stand on different sides of the RMA debate, therefore, both Dunlap and Luttwak invoke the assumptions that undergird the quick, costless war presumption. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007," Weekly Standard, Jan. 29, 1996, pp. 22-28; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," pp. 40-44.
32. Consider, for instance, two popular contributions to the debate over the potential implications of the RMA. In a critical appraisal of over-reliance upon the RMA, Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., argues that American adoption of the RMA conception of warfare will create vulnerabilities, which a ruthless adversary will then exploit with ingenious asymmetric strategies. Such an enemy might focus upon undermining the weak American public will, for example, by transmitting on global television the mutilation of female prisoners of war. Edward Luttwak agrees that the American public no longer has the stomach to endure significant casualties. He advocates, however, increased reliance upon RMA-type weapons systems since these are the only weapons whose use the public might then support. Although they stand on different sides of the RMA debate, therefore, both Dunlap and Luttwak invoke the assumptions that undergird the quick, costless war presumption. Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007," Weekly Standard, Jan. 29, 1996, pp. 22-28; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," pp. 40-44.
33. For analyses that suggest that future conflict will be less slate-centric, more likely in "complex" terrain favoring the defense, more primitive and barbaric, and, thus, a special challenge for Americans and their values, see Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007"; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-century Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy"; Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-16; Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 15-26; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; Ralph Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59; Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50; Martin L. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). For an assessment that suggests American public will should not be underestimated in the face of such challenges, see Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians."
34. For analyses that suggest that future conflict will be less slate-centric, more likely in "complex" terrain favoring the defense, more primitive and barbaric, and, thus, a special challenge for Americans and their values, see Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007"; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-century Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy"; Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-16; Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 15-26; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; Ralph Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59; Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50; Martin L. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). For an assessment that suggests American public will should not be underestimated in the face of such challenges, see Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians."
35. For analyses that suggest that future conflict will be less slate-centric, more likely in "complex" terrain favoring the defense, more primitive and barbaric, and, thus, a special challenge for Americans and their values, see Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007"; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-century Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy"; Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-16; Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 15-26; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; Ralph Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59; Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50; Martin L. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). For an assessment that suggests American public will should not be underestimated in the face of such challenges, see Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians."
36. For analyses that suggest that future conflict will be less slate-centric, more likely in "complex" terrain favoring the defense, more primitive and barbaric, and, thus, a special challenge for Americans and their values, see Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007"; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-century Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy"; Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-16; Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 15-26; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; Ralph Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59; Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50; Martin L. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). For an assessment that suggests American public will should not be underestimated in the face of such challenges, see Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians."
37. For analyses that suggest that future conflict will be less slate-centric, more likely in "complex" terrain favoring the defense, more primitive and barbaric, and, thus, a special challenge for Americans and their values, see Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007"; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-century Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy"; Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-16; Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 15-26; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; Ralph Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59; Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50; Martin L. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). For an assessment that suggests American public will should not be underestimated in the face of such challenges, see Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians."
38. For analyses that suggest that future conflict will be less slate-centric, more likely in "complex" terrain favoring the defense, more primitive and barbaric, and, thus, a special challenge for Americans and their values, see Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007"; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-century Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy"; Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-16; Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 15-26; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; Ralph Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59; Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50; Martin L. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). For an assessment that suggests American public will should not be underestimated in the face of such challenges, see Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians."
39. For analyses that suggest that future conflict will be less slate-centric, more likely in "complex" terrain favoring the defense, more primitive and barbaric, and, thus, a special challenge for Americans and their values, see Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007"; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-century Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy"; Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-16; Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 15-26; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; Ralph Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59; Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50; Martin L. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). For an assessment that suggests American public will should not be underestimated in the face of such challenges, see Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians."
40. For analyses that suggest that future conflict will be less slate-centric, more likely in "complex" terrain favoring the defense, more primitive and barbaric, and, thus, a special challenge for Americans and their values, see Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007"; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-century Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy"; Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-16; Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 15-26; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; Ralph Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59; Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50; Martin L. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). For an assessment that suggests American public will should not be underestimated in the face of such challenges, see Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians."
41. For analyses that suggest that future conflict will be less slate-centric, more likely in "complex" terrain favoring the defense, more primitive and barbaric, and, thus, a special challenge for Americans and their values, see Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007"; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-century Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy"; Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-16; Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 15-26; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; Ralph Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59; Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50; Martin L. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). For an assessment that suggests American public will should not be underestimated in the face of such challenges, see Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians."
42. For analyses that suggest that future conflict will be less slate-centric, more likely in "complex" terrain favoring the defense, more primitive and barbaric, and, thus, a special challenge for Americans and their values, see Dunlap, "How We Lost the High-Tech War of 2007"; Charles J. Dunlap, Jr., "21st-century Warfare: Four Dangerous Myths," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 27-37; Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy"; Steven Metz and James Kievit, The Revolution in Military Affairs and Conflict Short of War (Carlisle Barracks, Pa.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1994), pp. 12-16; Steven Metz, "Which Army After Next? The Strategic Implications of Alternative Futures," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 15-26; Ralph Peters, "The Culture of Future Conflict," Parameters, Winter 1995-96, pp. 18-27; Ralph Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," Parameters, Autumn 1997, pp. 50-59; Ralph Peters, "Our Soldiers, Their Cities," Parameters, Spring 1996, pp. 43-50; Martin L. Van Creveld, The Transformation of War (New York: Free Press, 1991). For an assessment that suggests American public will should not be underestimated in the face of such challenges, see Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians."
43. Alvin H. Bernstein and Martin Libicki, "High-Tech: The Future Face of War? A Debate," Commentary, Jan. 1998, p. 31. See also Jeffrey Shaffer and Benjamin Ederington, The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), pp. 10-12.
44. Alvin H. Bernstein and Martin Libicki, "High-Tech: The Future Face of War? A Debate," Commentary, Jan. 1998, p. 31. See also Jeffrey Shaffer and Benjamin Ederington, The Military Technical Revolution: A Structural Framework (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), pp. 10-12.
45. Luttwak, "A Post-Heroic Military Policy," pp. 40-44.
46. Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1994, pp. 23-28; Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995, pp. 115-16.
47. Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers? At Home with the Kids," Foreign Affairs, July/Aug. 1994, pp. 23-28; Edward N. Luttwak, "Toward Post-Heroic Warfare," Foreign Affairs, May/June 1995, pp. 115-16.
48. William C. Moore, "The Military Must Revive Its Warrior Spirit," Wall Street Journal, Oct. 27, 1998.
49. See also John A. Gentry, "Military Force in an Age of National Cowardice," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1998, pp. 182-84.
50. Joseph J. Collins, "The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner's View," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1998, p. 213. On the various definitions of "military culture" in the current discussions of American military policy, see Don M. Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," Orbis, Winter 1999, pp. 11-26. On the importance of "military culture" historically and in the current context, see in the same issue the contributions of Williamson Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter?" pp. 27-42; and John Hillen, "Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?" pp. 43-57.
51. Joseph J. Collins, "The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner's View," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1998, p. 213. On the various definitions of "military culture" in the current discussions of American military policy, see Don M. Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," Orbis, Winter 1999, pp. 11-26. On the importance of "military culture" historically and in the current context, see in the same issue the contributions of Williamson Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter?" pp. 27-42; and John Hillen, "Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?" pp. 43-57.
52. Joseph J. Collins, "The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner's View," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1998, p. 213. On the various definitions of "military culture" in the current discussions of American military policy, see Don M. Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," Orbis, Winter 1999, pp. 11-26. On the importance of "military culture" historically and in the current context, see in the same issue the contributions of Williamson Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter?" pp. 27-42; and John Hillen, "Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?" pp. 43-57.
53. Joseph J. Collins, "The Complex Context of American Military Culture: A Practitioner's View," Washington Quarterly, Autumn 1998, p. 213. On the various definitions of "military culture" in the current discussions of American military policy, see Don M. Snider, "An Uninformed Debate on Military Culture," Orbis, Winter 1999, pp. 11-26. On the importance of "military culture" historically and in the current context, see in the same issue the contributions of Williamson Murray, "Does Military Culture Matter?" pp. 27-42; and John Hillen, "Must U.S. Military Culture Reform?" pp. 43-57.
54. John Keegan, "The Warrior's Code of No Surrender," U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 23, 1995, p. 47. See also his discussion of cultures centered upon warfare in John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), pp. 24-46.
55. John Keegan, "The Warrior's Code of No Surrender," U.S. News & World Report, Jan. 23, 1995, p. 47. See also his discussion of cultures centered upon warfare in John Keegan, A History of Warfare (New York: Knopf, 1993), pp. 24-46.
56. For an assessment of the latest scholarship of motivation during the Civil War, see Mark Grimsley, "In Not So Dubious Battle: The Motivations of American Civil War Soldiers," Journal of Military History, Jan. 1998, pp. 175-88.
57. Robert David Johnson, The Peace Progressives and American Foreign Relations (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995), passim, esp. pp. 10-33.
58. Kathleen M. Dalton, "Theodore Roosevelt's Great War, 1917-1918," Charles Warren Center Colloquium, Harvard University, Apr. 2, 1997. See also Edward J. Renehan Jr., The Lion's Pride: Theodore Roosevelt and his Family in Peace and War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
59. Kathleen M. Dalton, "Theodore Roosevelt's Great War, 1917-1918," Charles Warren Center Colloquium, Harvard University, Apr. 2, 1997. See also Edward J. Renehan Jr., The Lion's Pride: Theodore Roosevelt and his Family in Peace and War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998).
60. John Whiteclay Chambers II, "'All Quiet on the Western Front' (1930): The Antiwar Film and the Image of the First World War," Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 1994, pp. 377-411; Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941, reprint edition (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990).
61. John Whiteclay Chambers II, "'All Quiet on the Western Front' (1930): The Antiwar Film and the Image of the First World War," Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 1994, pp. 377-411; Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941, reprint edition (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990).
62. John Whiteclay Chambers II, "'All Quiet on the Western Front' (1930): The Antiwar Film and the Image of the First World War," Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 1994, pp. 377-411; Warren I. Cohen, The American Revisionists: The Lessons of Intervention in World War I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1967); Manfred Jonas, Isolationism in America, 1935-1941, reprint edition (Chicago: Imprint Publications, 1990).
63. Nobutaka Ike, ed., Japan's Decision for War Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 133-63, 190, 199-239, 247-49, 281-83; Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987), pp. 140-186; Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 30-53, 160, 182-89, 194-204.
64. Nobutaka Ike, ed., Japan's Decision for War Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 133-63, 190, 199-239, 247-49, 281-83; Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987), pp. 140-186; Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 30-53, 160, 182-89, 194-204.
65. Nobutaka Ike, ed., Japan's Decision for War Records of the 1941 Policy Conferences (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1967), pp. 133-63, 190, 199-239, 247-49, 281-83; Akira Iriye, The Origins of the Second World War in Asia and the Pacific (London: Longman, 1987), pp. 140-186; Gerhard L. Weinberg, Germany, Hitler, and World War II: Essays in Modern German and World History (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 30-53, 160, 182-89, 194-204.
66. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
67. Robert Dallek, Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Foreign Policy, 1932-1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979); Waldo Heinrichs, Threshold of War: Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Entry into World War II (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988).
68. Robert A. Divine, Second Chance: The Triumph of Internationalism in American During World War II (New York: Atheneum, 1967).
69. Eliot Cohen, "The Strategy of Innocence? The United States, 1920-1945," in The Making of Strategy: Rulers, States, and War, ed. Williamson Murray, MacGregor Knox, and Alvin Bernstein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1994), pp. 464-65.
70. Ernest R. May, "Cold War and Defense," in The Cold War and Defense, ed. Keith Neilson and Ronald G. Haycock (New York: Praeger, 1990), pp. 7-73.
71. It should be recalled that a primary motive behind Dwight D. Eisenhower's decision to seek the Republican presidential nomination in 1952 was his fear that Robert Taft might lead the nation toward isolationism if elected, Stephen E. Ambrose, Eisenhower, vol. 1, Soldier, General of the Army, President-Elect, 1890-1952 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983), pp. 510-541.
72. See John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford Univeisity Press, 1982).
73. "This book is dedicated to those greatest and most heroic of all human endeavors, WAR and WARFARE; may they never cease to give us the pleasure, excitement and adrenal stimulation that we need, or provide us with the heroes, the presidents and leaders, the monuments and museums which we erect to them in the name of PEACE." James Jones, The Thin Red Line (New York: Delta Paperback, 1962). For a recent essay surveying the evolution of the World War II film genre, see Roger J. Spiller, "In the Dark," American Heritage, Feb./Mar. 1999, pp. 41-51.
74. "This book is dedicated to those greatest and most heroic of all human endeavors, WAR and WARFARE; may they never cease to give us the pleasure, excitement and adrenal stimulation that we need, or provide us with the heroes, the presidents and leaders, the monuments and museums which we erect to them in the name of PEACE." James Jones, The Thin Red Line (New York: Delta Paperback, 1962). For a recent essay surveying the evolution of the World War II film genre, see Roger J. Spiller, "In the Dark," American Heritage, Feb./Mar. 1999, pp. 41-51.
75. For the current debates regarding the impact of the Cold War on the American state and culture, see Tom Englehardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusionment of a Generation (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Aaron L. Freidberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State," International Security, Spring 1992, pp. 109-42; Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
76. For the current debates regarding the impact of the Cold War on the American state and culture, see Tom Englehardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusionment of a Generation (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Aaron L. Freidberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State," International Security, Spring 1992, pp. 109-42; Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
77. For the current debates regarding the impact of the Cold War on the American state and culture, see Tom Englehardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusionment of a Generation (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Aaron L. Freidberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State," International Security, Spring 1992, pp. 109-42; Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
78. For the current debates regarding the impact of the Cold War on the American state and culture, see Tom Englehardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusionment of a Generation (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Aaron L. Freidberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State," International Security, Spring 1992, pp. 109-42; Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
79. For the current debates regarding the impact of the Cold War on the American state and culture, see Tom Englehardt, The End of Victory Culture: Cold War America and the Disillusionment of a Generation (New York: Basic Books, 1995); Aaron L. Freidberg, "Why Didn't the United States Become a Garrison State," International Security, Spring 1992, pp. 109-42; Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S. Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998); Michael S. Sherry, In the Shadow of War: The United States since the 1930s (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1995); Stephen J. Whitfield, The Culture of the Cold War (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1991).
80. More precisely, public opinion as measured by polls correlates better with the logarithm of the number of casualties suffered than with either the number of casualties or the duration of the conflict. John E. Mueller, War,
81. More precisely, public opinion as measured by polls correlates better with the logarithm of the number of casualties suffered than with either the number of casualties or the duration of the conflict. John E. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973), pp. 42-65, 167, and passim. See also the refinement of Mueller's study offered in Scott Sigmund Gartner and Gary M. Segura, "War, Casualties, and Public Opinion," Journal of Conflict Resolution, June 1998, pp. 278-300.
82. Betts, "What Will It Take to Deter the United States?" p. 76.
83. For example, a recent survey of American opinion leaders, the 1996 Foreign Policy Leadership Survey, revealed that 63 percent of the respondents favored the use of U.S. troops to resist a North Korean invasion of South Korea. Table 3 in Ole R. Holsti, "Continuity and Change in the Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Opinion Leaders," paper at 1997 annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Aug. 28-31, 1997.
84. In May 1971, for instance, 55 percent of Americans opposed the withdrawal of all U.S. troops from Vietnam by the end of 1971 if it meant a communist takeover of South Vietnam, while 75 percent opposed such a withdrawal if it threatened the lives or safety of the U.S. prisoners of war held by the North Vietnamese. Mueller, War, Presidents and Public Opinion, pp. 97-98.
85. Testimony in December 1990 before the House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, displayed a representative range of casualty estimates by well-informed military observers. Col. Trevor N. Depuy reported that, based upon his computer combat simulation of different ground offensive scenarios, he estimated total American casualties ranging from 6,000 to 18,000, with fatalities alone ranging from 1,000 to 3,000. He estimated that an air campaign would result in 1,800 American casualties, 300 of them killed in action. Gen. Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., U.S.AF, and Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, U.S.AF, considered Depuy's estimates reasonable. Dr. James A. Blackwell, Jr., of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated that according to his projections allied casualties could reach 30,000. Col. Harry S. Summers supported this more pessimistic estimate. However, Les Aspin, summarizing his personal assessment of the testimony, concluded "the prospects for a rapid victory with light to moderate American casualties, perhaps three to five thousand including five hundred to a thousand or so fatalities, are high." Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanctions, Diplomacy and War, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, Second Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 336, 419, 462-63, 488, 916-17. See also Powell, My American Journey, p. 485.
86. Testimony in December 1990 before the House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, displayed a representative range of casualty estimates by well-informed military observers. Col. Trevor N. Depuy reported that, based upon his computer combat simulation of different ground offensive scenarios, he estimated total American casualties ranging from 6,000 to 18,000, with fatalities alone ranging from 1,000 to 3,000. He estimated that an air campaign would result in 1,800 American casualties, 300 of them killed in action. Gen. Charles L. Donnelly, Jr., U.S.AF, and Gen. Russell E. Dougherty, U.S.AF, considered Depuy's estimates reasonable. Dr. James A. Blackwell, Jr., of the Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated that according to his projections allied casualties could reach 30,000. Col. Harry S. Summers supported this more pessimistic estimate. However, Les Aspin, summarizing his personal assessment of the testimony, concluded "the prospects for a rapid victory with light to moderate American casualties, perhaps three to five thousand including five hundred to a thousand or so fatalities, are high." Crisis in the Persian Gulf: Sanctions, Diplomacy and War, Hearings Before the Committee on Armed Services, House of Representatives, 101st Congress, Second Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), pp. 336, 419, 462-63, 488, 916-17. See also Powell, My American Journey, p. 485.
87. Edward N. Luttwak testimony, Nov. 28, 1990, The Persian Gulf Crisis: Joint Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, International Security and Science, Europe and the Middle East, and on International Operations of the Committee on Foreign Affairs and the Joint Economic Committee 101st Congress, Second Session (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991), p. 328.
88. Tables 223, 224, 226, and 228 in John E. Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), pp. 305-7.
89. The Jan. 13, 1991, ABC/Washington Post poll, for instance, found 76 percent of Americans approved the congressional resolution authorizing President Bush to go to war. The same poll also revealed that 55 percent of Americans expected the war would result in a "high number of American deaths." Tables 65 and 227 in Mueller, Policy and Opinion in the Gulf War, pp. 222, 307.
90. The author would like to thank Stephen Peter Rosen for suggesting this point.
91. See the skeptical evaluation of such proposals in Daniel Byman, Kenneth Pollack, and Gideon Rose, "The Rollback Fantasy," Foreign Affairs, Jan./Feb. 1999, pp. 24-41.
92. On the development of American policy leading to the Lebanon tragedy, see George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years As Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), pp. 196-234; Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, pp. 115-17, 135-74.
93. On the development of American policy leading to the Lebanon tragedy, see George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years As Secretary of State (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1993), pp. 196-234; Weinberger, Fighting for Peace, pp. 115-17, 135-74.
94. For the debunking of the myth of the "CNN effect" in the Somalian case, see Larson, Casualties and Consensus, pp. 45-46, 71.
95. Tucker, "Fighting Barbarians," p. 76.
96. Richard Sobel, "U.S. and European Attitudes toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia: Mourir pour la Bosnie?" in The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, ed. Richard H. Ullman (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 145-81; Richard Sobel, "Portraying American Public Opinion toward the Bosnia Crisis," Harvard Journal of Press/Politics, Spring 1998, pp. 16-33; Richard Sobel, "United States Intervention in Bosnia," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1998, pp. 250-78. Contrary to the opinion of many, European public opinion throughout the Bosnia crisis was not reflexively opposed to military intervention. In fact public opinion in France, Italy, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Germany supported more vigorous military action than their respective political leaders offered. See Sobel, "U.S. and European Attitudes toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia." On the generation of congressional and public support for the deployment of American forces to Bosnia as part of the post-Dayton Implementation Force, see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 316-18.
97. Richard Sobel, "U.S. and European Attitudes toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia: Mourir pour la Bosnie?" in The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, ed. Richard H. Ullman (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 145-81; Richard Sobel, "Portraying American Public Opinion toward the Bosnia Crisis," Harvard Journal of Press/Politics, Spring 1998, pp. 16-33; Richard Sobel, "United States Intervention in Bosnia," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1998, pp. 250-78. Contrary to the opinion of many, European public opinion throughout the Bosnia crisis was not reflexively opposed to military intervention. In fact public opinion in France, Italy, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Germany supported more vigorous military action than their respective political leaders offered. See Sobel, "U.S. and European Attitudes toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia." On the generation of congressional and public support for the deployment of American forces to Bosnia as part of the post-Dayton Implementation Force, see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 316-18.
98. Richard Sobel, "U.S. and European Attitudes toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia: Mourir pour la Bosnie?" in The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, ed. Richard H. Ullman (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 145-81; Richard Sobel, "Portraying American Public Opinion toward the Bosnia Crisis," Harvard Journal of Press/Politics, Spring 1998, pp. 16-33; Richard Sobel, "United States Intervention in Bosnia," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1998, pp. 250-78. Contrary to the opinion of many, European public opinion throughout the Bosnia crisis was not reflexively opposed to military intervention. In fact public opinion in France, Italy, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Germany supported more vigorous military action than their respective political leaders offered. See Sobel, "U.S. and European Attitudes toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia." On the generation of congressional and public support for the deployment of American forces to Bosnia as part of the post-Dayton Implementation Force, see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 316-18.
99. Richard Sobel, "U.S. and European Attitudes toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia: Mourir pour la Bosnie?" in The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, ed. Richard H. Ullman (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 145-81; Richard Sobel, "Portraying American Public Opinion toward the Bosnia Crisis," Harvard Journal of Press/Politics, Spring 1998, pp. 16-33; Richard Sobel, "United States Intervention in Bosnia," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1998, pp. 250-78. Contrary to the opinion of many, European public opinion throughout the Bosnia crisis was not reflexively opposed to military intervention. In fact public opinion in France, Italy, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Germany supported more vigorous military action than their respective political leaders offered. See Sobel, "U.S. and European Attitudes toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia." On the generation of congressional and public support for the deployment of American forces to Bosnia as part of the post-Dayton Implementation Force, see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 316-18.
100. Richard Sobel, "U.S. and European Attitudes toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia: Mourir pour la Bosnie?" in The World and Yugoslavia's Wars, ed. Richard H. Ullman (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 145-81; Richard Sobel, "Portraying American Public Opinion toward the Bosnia Crisis," Harvard Journal of Press/Politics, Spring 1998, pp. 16-33; Richard Sobel, "United States Intervention in Bosnia," Public Opinion Quarterly, Summer 1998, pp. 250-78. Contrary to the opinion of many, European public opinion throughout the Bosnia crisis was not reflexively opposed to military intervention. In fact public opinion in France, Italy, Great Britain, and, to a lesser extent, Germany supported more vigorous military action than their respective political leaders offered. See Sobel, "U.S. and European Attitudes toward Intervention in the Former Yugoslavia." On the generation of congressional and public support for the deployment of American forces to Bosnia as part of the post-Dayton Implementation Force, see Richard Holbrooke, To End a War (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 316-18.
101. For the current debate surrounding the state of civil-military relations, see A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," National Interest, Summer 1997, pp. 16-25; Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," New Republic, Dec. 8, 1997, pp. 22-24; Eliot Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations," Orbis, Spring 1997, pp. 177-86; Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 5-42; Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213; Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Affairs," National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23-31; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33; Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 67-78; "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 375-462.
102. For the current debate surrounding the state of civil-military relations, see A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," National Interest, Summer 1997, pp. 16-25; Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," New Republic, Dec. 8, 1997, pp. 22-24; Eliot Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations," Orbis, Spring 1997, pp. 177-86; Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 5-42; Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213; Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Affairs," National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23-31; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33; Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 67-78; "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 375-462.
103. For the current debate surrounding the state of civil-military relations, see A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," National Interest, Summer 1997, pp. 16-25; Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," New Republic, Dec. 8, 1997, pp. 22-24; Eliot Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations," Orbis, Spring 1997, pp. 177-86; Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 5-42; Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213; Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Affairs," National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23-31; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33; Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 67-78; "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 375-462.
104. For the current debate surrounding the state of civil-military relations, see A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," National Interest, Summer 1997, pp. 16-25; Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," New Republic, Dec. 8, 1997, pp. 22-24; Eliot Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations," Orbis, Spring 1997, pp. 177-86; Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 5-42; Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213; Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Affairs," National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23-31; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33; Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 67-78; "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 375-462.
105. For the current debate surrounding the state of civil-military relations, see A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," National Interest, Summer 1997, pp. 16-25; Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," New Republic, Dec. 8, 1997, pp. 22-24; Eliot Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations," Orbis, Spring 1997, pp. 177-86; Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 5-42; Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213; Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Affairs," National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23-31; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33; Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 67-78; "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 375-462.
106. For the current debate surrounding the state of civil-military relations, see A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," National Interest, Summer 1997, pp. 16-25; Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," New Republic, Dec. 8, 1997, pp. 22-24; Eliot Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations," Orbis, Spring 1997, pp. 177-86; Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 5-42; Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213; Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Affairs," National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23-31; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33; Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 67-78; "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 375-462.
107. For the current debate surrounding the state of civil-military relations, see A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," National Interest, Summer 1997, pp. 16-25; Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," New Republic, Dec. 8, 1997, pp. 22-24; Eliot Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations," Orbis, Spring 1997, pp. 177-86; Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 5-42; Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213; Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Affairs," National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23-31; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33; Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 67-78; "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 375-462.
108. For the current debate surrounding the state of civil-military relations, see A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," National Interest, Summer 1997, pp. 16-25; Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," New Republic, Dec. 8, 1997, pp. 22-24; Eliot Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations," Orbis, Spring 1997, pp. 177-86; Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 5-42; Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213; Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Affairs," National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23-31; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33; Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 67-78; "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 375-462.
109. For the current debate surrounding the state of civil-military relations, see A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," National Interest, Summer 1997, pp. 16-25; Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," New Republic, Dec. 8, 1997, pp. 22-24; Eliot Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations," Orbis, Spring 1997, pp. 177-86; Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 5-42; Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213; Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Affairs," National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23-31; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33; Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 67-78; "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 375-462.
110. For the current debate surrounding the state of civil-military relations, see A. J. Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned: America's Military in a New Era," National Interest, Summer 1997, pp. 16-25; Andrew J. Bacevich and Richard H. Kohn, "Grand Army of the Republicans," New Republic, Dec. 8, 1997, pp. 22-24; Eliot Cohen, "Civil-Military Relations," Orbis, Spring 1997, pp. 177-86; Ole R. Holsti, "A Widening Gap Between the U.S. Military and Civilian Society? Some Evidence, 1976-96," International Security, Winter 1998/99, pp. 5-42; Douglas Johnson and Steven Metz, "Civil-Military Relations in the United States: The State of the Debate," Washington Quarterly, Winter 1995, pp. 197-213; Richard Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Affairs," National Interest, Spring 1994, pp. 3-17; "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest, Summer 1994, pp. 23-31; Edward N. Luttwak, "Washington's Biggest Scandal," Commentary, May 1994, pp. 29-33; Thomas Ricks, "The Widening Gap Between the Military and Society," Atlantic Monthly, July 1997, pp. 67-78; "A Symposium on Civil-Military Relations," Armed Forces & Society, Spring 1998, pp. 375-462.
111. Even so unorthodox a thinker as Ralph Peters succumbs to the quick, costless war presumption when contemplating burden sharing between the U.S. and its allies. For instance, he offers as one of his ten "tenets" for future U.S. military operations in urban areas: "Do the job fast. If the job can't be done fast, get somebody else to do it." Peters, "The Future of Armored Warfare," p. 59.
112. During the 1998 spring wargame of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Army After Next Project, conducted at the Army War College, the adversary planned his campaign with precisely this intent. Before American forces could deploy in theater, enemy forces seized strategic urban areas, dug in, and then called for a cease-fire and negotiations. Set in the year 2021, the enemy thus presented the American leadership with the unpalatable choice of either dislodging the enemy from "hedgehog" positions, which would strain both domestic and alliance support, or negotiating a settlement with an opponent who held many trump cards. The adversary further complicated American planning by positioning prisoners of war, foreign nationals, and civilians in, around, and on top of strategic facilities. The U.S. leadership decided to eject the enemy from its fortified positions at the cost of thousands of American casualties. Such a campaign could easily prove difficult for the military to accomplish and shocking to the public if both expect a quick, costless war in the years ahead. Author's observations at the Army After Next Project 1998 Spring Wargame, Apr. 20-29, 1998. In light of such findings, the Army After Nest's 1998 annual report to the Chief of Staff of the Army notes that "short wars and short campaigns are not guaranteed in the future." Knowledge and Speed: Battle Force and the U.S. Army of 2025 (Ft. Monroe, Va.: TRADOC, 1998), p. 3. On the Army After Next Project, see the special feature in Military Review, Mar.-Apr. 1998, pp. 2-57; Richard J. Newman, "Bombs Get Smarter; What About Generals?" U.S. News and World Report, May 18, 1998, pp. 42-43.
113. During the 1998 spring wargame of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Army After Next Project, conducted at the Army War College, the adversary planned his campaign with precisely this intent. Before American forces could deploy in theater, enemy forces seized strategic urban areas, dug in, and then called for a cease-fire and negotiations. Set in the year 2021, the enemy thus presented the American leadership with the unpalatable choice of either dislodging the enemy from "hedgehog" positions, which would strain both domestic and alliance support, or negotiating a settlement with an opponent who held many trump cards. The adversary further complicated American planning by positioning prisoners of war, foreign nationals, and civilians in, around, and on top of strategic facilities. The U.S. leadership decided to eject the enemy from its fortified positions at the cost of thousands of American casualties. Such a campaign could easily prove difficult for the military to accomplish and shocking to the public if both expect a quick, costless war in the years ahead. Author's observations at the Army After Next Project 1998 Spring Wargame, Apr. 20-29, 1998. In light of such findings, the Army After Nest's 1998 annual report to the Chief of Staff of the Army notes that "short wars and short campaigns are not guaranteed in the future." Knowledge and Speed: Battle Force and the U.S. Army of 2025 (Ft. Monroe, Va.: TRADOC, 1998), p. 3. On the Army After Next Project, see the special feature in Military Review, Mar.-Apr. 1998, pp. 2-57; Richard J. Newman, "Bombs Get Smarter; What About Generals?" U.S. News and World Report, May 18, 1998, pp. 42-43.
114. During the 1998 spring wargame of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command's Army After Next Project, conducted at the Army War College, the adversary planned his campaign with precisely this intent. Before American forces could deploy in theater, enemy forces seized strategic urban areas, dug in, and then called for a cease-fire and negotiations. Set in the year 2021, the enemy thus presented the American leadership with the unpalatable choice of either dislodging the enemy from "hedgehog" positions, which would strain both domestic and alliance support, or negotiating a settlement with an opponent who held many trump cards. The adversary further complicated American planning by positioning prisoners of war, foreign nationals, and civilians in, around, and on top of strategic facilities. The U.S. leadership decided to eject the enemy from its fortified positions at the cost of thousands of American casualties. Such a campaign could easily prove difficult for the military to accomplish and shocking to the public if both expect a quick, costless war in the years ahead. Author's observations at the Army After Next Project 1998 Spring Wargame, Apr. 20-29, 1998. In light of such findings, the Army After Nest's 1998 annual report to the Chief of Staff of the Army notes that "short wars and short campaigns are not guaranteed in the future." Knowledge and Speed: Battle Force and the U.S. Army of 2025 (Ft. Monroe, Va.: TRADOC, 1998), p. 3. On the Army After Next Project, see the special feature in Military Review, Mar.-Apr. 1998, pp. 2-57; Richard J. Newman, "Bombs Get Smarter; What About Generals?" U.S. News and World Report, May 18, 1998, pp. 42-43.
115. The phrase "strategic candor" is adapted from Bacevich, "Tradition Abandoned," pp. 20-21. In this case, the idea of "candor" hearkens back to the abortive Project Candor during the first year of Elsenhower's presidency. The initial intent behind this initiative, which was eventually reduced to Elsenhower's "Atoms for Peace" proposal before the U.N. General Assembly in December 1953, was to explain to the American public the realities of international relations in the thermonuclear age in order to prevent alarm, panic, or malaise, and, correspondingly, to generate continued support for American international leadership.
116. George Gallup, Jr., The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1997 (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, Inc., 1998), pp. 128-33.
117. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Are Americans Becoming Isolationist?" Commentary, Nov. 1998, pp. 45-48; Ole R. Holsti, "Continuity and Change in the Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Opinion Leaders"; Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Aug. 1998, pp. 395-417; Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and the People," Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 1994, pp. 47-61.
118. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Are Americans Becoming Isolationist?" Commentary, Nov. 1998, pp. 45-48; Ole R. Holsti, "Continuity and Change in the Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Opinion Leaders"; Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Aug. 1998, pp. 395-417; Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and the People," Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 1994, pp. 47-61.
119. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Are Americans Becoming Isolationist?" Commentary, Nov. 1998, pp. 45-48; Ole R. Holsti, "Continuity and Change in the Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Opinion Leaders"; Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Aug. 1998, pp. 395-417; Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and the People," Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 1994, pp. 47-61.
120. Aaron L. Friedberg, "Are Americans Becoming Isolationist?" Commentary, Nov. 1998, pp. 45-48; Ole R. Holsti, "Continuity and Change in the Domestic and Foreign Policy Beliefs of American Opinion Leaders"; Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, "Still Pretty Prudent: Post-Cold War American Public Opinion on the Use of Military Force," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Aug. 1998, pp. 395-417; Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and the People," Foreign Affairs, Nov./Dec. 1994, pp. 47-61.