Once burned, twice cautious: Explaining the Weinberger-Powell doctrine

Armed Forces and Society

Volumn 24, Issue 3, 1998, Pages 357-374

  Campbell, Kenneth J ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF DELAWARE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0032220512     PISSN: 0095327X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0095327X9802400302     Document Type: Article

References (97)

1. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy, 5th ed. (New York: St. Martin's, 1996), 392.
2. See Charles Lane, "The Legend of Colin Powell," The New Republic, 17 April 1995, 20-32. For evidence of the influence of this doctrine in the 1980s, see William J. Taylor, Jr., and David H. Petraeus, "The Legacy of Vietnam for the U.S. Military," in Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam, ed. George K. Osborn, et al. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 249-268; also David Petraeus, "Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force," Armed Forces & Society 15, 4 (Summer 1989): 489-505.
3. See Charles Lane, "The Legend of Colin Powell," The New Republic, 17 April 1995, 20-32. For evidence of the influence of this doctrine in the 1980s, see William J. Taylor, Jr., and David H. Petraeus, "The Legacy of Vietnam for the U.S. Military," in Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam, ed. George K. Osborn, et al. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 249-268; also David Petraeus, "Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force," Armed Forces & Society 15, 4 (Summer 1989): 489-505.
4. See Charles Lane, "The Legend of Colin Powell," The New Republic, 17 April 1995, 20-32. For evidence of the influence of this doctrine in the 1980s, see William J. Taylor, Jr., and David H. Petraeus, "The Legacy of Vietnam for the U.S. Military," in Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam, ed. George K. Osborn, et al. (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1987), 249-268; also David Petraeus, "Military Influence and the Post-Vietnam Use of Force," Armed Forces & Society 15, 4 (Summer 1989): 489-505.
5. Michael Mandelbaum, "The Reluctance to Intervene," Foreign Policy 95 (Summer 1994): 3-18.
6. Edward N. Luttwak, "Where Are the Great Powers?" Foreign Affairs 73, 4 (July/August 1994): 23-28.
7. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (New York: Vintage Books, 1957), 68-70.
8. Although Richard K. Betts in his study of civil-military relations during the Cold War offered evidence that the military was no more "hawkish" than civilian policy-makers, the same evidence also seems to demonstrate that both were equally enthusiastic about the use of force before American policy in Vietnam went sour. See Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1977), Table C, 217-219. This is also corroborated by declassified documents of White House crisis meetings in the early days of both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. See, for instance, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, v. VII, Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 158-159, 240-241; and George McTurner Kahin, Intervention (New York: Knopf, 1986), 134-135.
9. Although Richard K. Betts in his study of civil-military relations during the Cold War offered evidence that the military was no more "hawkish" than civilian policy-makers, the same evidence also seems to demonstrate that both were equally enthusiastic about the use of force before American policy in Vietnam went sour. See Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1977), Table C, 217-219. This is also corroborated by declassified documents of White House crisis meetings in the early days of both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. See, for instance, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, v. VII, Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 158-159, 240-241; and George McTurner Kahin, Intervention (New York: Knopf, 1986), 134-135.
10. Although Richard K. Betts in his study of civil-military relations during the Cold War offered evidence that the military was no more "hawkish" than civilian policy-makers, the same evidence also seems to demonstrate that both were equally enthusiastic about the use of force before American policy in Vietnam went sour. See Betts, Soldiers, Statesmen, and Cold War Crises (Cambridge, MA.: Harvard University Press, 1977), Table C, 217-219. This is also corroborated by declassified documents of White House crisis meetings in the early days of both the Korean and Vietnam conflicts. See, for instance, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, v. VII, Korea (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1976), 158-159, 240-241; and George McTurner Kahin, Intervention (New York: Knopf, 1986), 134-135.
11. The severe stresses that the military experienced as a result of failure in Vietnam were not all that different from those of other organizations experiencing catastrophic failure. See Robert I. Sutton, "Managing Organizational Death," in Readings in Organizational Decline, ed. Kim S. Cameron, Robert I. Sutton, and David A. Whetten (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1988), 381-396.
12. Graham T. Allison, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston, MA: Little, Brown, 1971), 67-68, 82-85.
13. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis In Command (New York: Hill and Wang, 1978), 49, 184 (Table 4).
14. William Hauser, America's Army In Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 113-115; Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 183.
15. William Hauser, America's Army In Crisis (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 113-115; Alfred W. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin in Southeast Asia (New York: Harper and Row, 1972), 183.
16. Gabriel and Savage, Crisis In Command, 49, 184 (Table 4).
17. McCoy, The Politics of Heroin, 183.
18. David Cortright, Soldiers In Revolt (Garden City, NJ: Anchor Press, 1975), 32.
19. Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1984), 570.
20. General Bruce Palmer, Jr., The 25-Year War: America's Military Role in Vietnam (Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 1984), 83.
21. Cincinnatus, Self-Destruction (New York: Norton, 1981), 68; Edward L. King, Death of the Army (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), 85-96; Wallace Terry, Bloods (New York: Random House, 1984).
22. Cincinnatus, Self-Destruction (New York: Norton, 1981), 68; Edward L. King, Death of the Army (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), 85-96; Wallace Terry, Bloods (New York: Random House, 1984).
23. Cincinnatus, Self-Destruction (New York: Norton, 1981), 68; Edward L. King, Death of the Army (New York: Saturday Review Press, 1972), 85-96; Wallace Terry, Bloods (New York: Random House, 1984).
24. Cincinnatus, Self-Destruction, 68.
25. Hauser, America's Army in Crisis, 75.
26. Hauser, 323; Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt, 35; Cincinnatus, Self-Destruction, 174.
27. Hauser, 323; Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt, 35; Cincinnatus, Self-Destruction, 174.
28. Hauser, 323; Cortright, Soldiers in Revolt, 35; Cincinnatus, Self-Destruction, 174.
29. Palmer, The 25-Year War, 155.
30. William R. Corson, Consequences of Failure (New York: Norton, 1974), 87.
31. Palmer, The 25-Year War, 155.
32. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, "Military Discipline: Ebbing Morale of Men at War," 19 February 1972, 391-393.
33. Gabriel and Savage, Crisis in Command, 183 (Table 3), 202n.
34. Gabriel and Savage, 45.
35. Richard Boyle, Flower of the Dragon (San Francisco: Ramparts Press, 1972), 222-236.
36. Cortright, Soldiers In Revolt, 39.
37. Col. Robert D. Heinl, "Collapse of the Armed Forces," Armed Forces & Society (7 June 1971), reprinted in Vietnam and America, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman, et al. (New York: Grove Press, 1995), 326, 327.
38. Col. Robert D. Heinl, "Collapse of the Armed Forces," Armed Forces & Society (7 June 1971), reprinted in Vietnam and America, ed. Marvin E. Gettleman, et al. (New York: Grove Press, 1995), 326, 327.
39. Cortright, Soldiers In Revolt, 33.
40. Loren Baritz, Backfire (New York: William Morrow, 1985), 314.
41. Cortright, Soldiers In Revolt, 28.
42. Cortright, 5.
43. Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, 391-392.
44. Cortright, Soldiers In Revolt, 9.
45. Gabriel and Savage, Crisis In Command, 194.
46. Stuart Loory, Defeated (New York: Random House, 1973), 23.
47. Cortright, Soldiers In Revolt, 6-7.
48. Shelby L. Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), 294. General Colin Powell bemoaned the loss during this difficult time of his old ROTC program at City College of New York. See Powell's, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 162.
49. Shelby L. Stanton, Rise and Fall of an American Army (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1985), 294. General Colin Powell bemoaned the loss during this difficult time of his old ROTC program at City College of New York. See Powell's, My American Journey (New York: Random House, 1995), 162.
50. Lawrence Korb, The Fall and Rise of the Pentagon (Westport, CT: Greenwood Press, 1979), 51, 52.
51. John P. Lovell, "Vietnam and the U.S. Army: Learning to Cope with Failure," in Osborn, Democracy, Strategy, and Vietnam, 126.
52. Lovell, 124.
53. Heinl, "Collapse of the Armed Forces," 327.
54. Korb, Fall and Rise of the Pentagon, 11.
55. See, for example, James F. Dunnigan and Raymond M. Macedonia, Getting It Right: American Military Reforms After Vietnam to the Persian Gulf and Beyond (New York: William Morrow, 1993).
56. James Kitfield wrote that "Vietnam had cut that (civil-military) link for an entire generation, as it has severed so many of the traditional ties that bound the military to society at large." See his Prodigal Soldiers (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995) 17.
57. Lovell, "Vietnam and the U.S. Army," 129-136.
58. Colonel Harry G. Summers, Jr., On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (New York: Dell, 1984).
59. Ibid., 18, 26-27, 33-44, 62-65.
60. Ibid., 270.
61. Ibid., 20-29, 264-265.
62. Lovell, "Vietnam and the U.S. Army," 136.
63. Summers, On Strategy II: A Critical Analysis of the Gulf War (New York: Dell, 1992), 133.
64. Secretary of State George Shultz, "Terrorism and the Modern World," (Address before the Park Avenue Synagogue in New York City on 25 October 1984), Department of State Bulletin 84, 2093 (December 1984): 14-17.
65. George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph: My Years As Secretary of State (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 649.
66. Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, "The Uses of Military Power," Defense (January 1985): 2-11.
67. Petraeus, "Military Influence."
68. See, for instance, Drew Middleton, "U.S. Generals Are Leery of Latin Intervention," New York Times, 21 June 1983, A9.
69. Charles W. Kegley, Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, American Foreign Policy: Pattern and Process, 3rd ed. (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1987), 587.
70. See Kitfield, Prodigal Soldiers, 13-25.
71. Stephen Budiansky, "Lines in the Sand," U.S. News and World Report, 1 October 1990, 30.
72. Ibid.
73. Bob Woodward, The Commanders (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991), 324.
74. See Kenneth J. Campbell, "The U.S. Military's 'Vietnam Syndrome' and the Persian Gulf War." Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the NorthEastern Political Science Association, Philadelphia, November 14-16, 1991.
75. Woodward, The Commanders, 356.
76. This was confirmed in personal interviews with faculty of the Department of National Security and Strategy, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, PA. (14 August 1991), and in an interview with former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., currently U.S. ambassador to the United Kingdom, U.S. Embassy, London (7 November 1994).
77. Of 82 conflicts that erupted in the world between 1989 and 1992, 79 were internal. See Charles William Maynes, "The New Pessimism," Foreign Policy 100 (Fall 1995): 41.
78. See Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 332; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review (Winter 1995): 23-34; Charles A. Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine on the Use of Force," Armed Forces & Society 22, 4 (Summer 1996): 511-535.
79. See Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 332; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review (Winter 1995): 23-34; Charles A. Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine on the Use of Force," Armed Forces & Society 22, 4 (Summer 1996): 511-535.
80. See Christopher M. Gacek, The Logic of Force (New York: Columbia University Press, 1994), 332; Frank G. Hoffman, "'Decisive Force': A New American Way of War?" Strategic Review (Winter 1995): 23-34; Charles A. Stevenson, "The Evolving Clinton Doctrine on the Use of Force," Armed Forces & Society 22, 4 (Summer 1996): 511-535.
81. Rep. Les Aspin, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, "The Use and Usefulness of Military Forces In the Post-Cold War, Post-Soviet World" (Address to the Jewish Institute for National Security Affairs, Washington, D.C., 21 September 1993).
82. Eric Schmitt, "Somalia's First Lesson For Military Is Caution," New York Times, 5 March 1995, 10; Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and the People," Foreign Affairs 73, 6 (November/December 1994): 52.
83. Eric Schmitt, "Somalia's First Lesson For Military Is Caution," New York Times, 5 March 1995, 10; Andrew Kohut and Robert C. Toth, "Arms and the People," Foreign Affairs 73, 6 (November/December 1994): 52.
84. The Clinton Administration's Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations (Washington, D.C.: The White House, May 1994).
85. See for example, Jim Hoagland, "The Pentagon's Reluctance in Bosnia," Washington Post, 17 March 1993, A23. Also see Peter J. Talbot, "U.S. Policy in Bosnia: A Symptom of the Military's Vietnam Syndrome," (Honors thesis, University of Delaware, Spring 1996).
86. See for example, Jim Hoagland, "The Pentagon's Reluctance in Bosnia," Washington Post, 17 March 1993, A23. Also see Peter J. Talbot, "U.S. Policy in Bosnia: A Symptom of the Military's Vietnam Syndrome," (Honors thesis, University of Delaware, Spring 1996).
87. John Darnton, "Allies Warn Bosnian Serbs of 'Substantial' Air Strikes If UN Enclave Is Attacked," New York Times, 22 July 1995, 1, 4.
88. Adam Roberts, "From San Francisco to Sarajevo: The UN and the Use of Force," Survival 37, 4 (Winter 1995-96): 23.
89. Summers argues that "The generals have already curbed the president's powers, quietly and indirectly, but more efficiently than have all the congressional critics of Executive War." See Summers, On Strategy II, 74.
90. See, for example, Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest (Spring 1994): 3-17; John Lehman, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest (Summer 1994): 23-25.
91. See, for example, Richard H. Kohn, "Out of Control: The Crisis in Civil-Military Relations," National Interest (Spring 1994): 3-17; John Lehman, "An Exchange on Civil-Military Relations," National Interest (Summer 1994): 23-25.
92. Summers, On Strategy, 81.
93. Although this topic is far too large and complex for me to cover properly in this article, let me just say that the centrality of morality in the politics of war and peace is well discussed in E. H. Carr, The Twenty Years' Crisis. 1919-1939 (New York: Harper and Row, 1939/1964).
94. Because the morality of both the cause and the means employed in Vietnam were eventually called into question, especially after revelations of the My Lai massacre, much of the American public began to conclude by 1970 that the war was not only ineffective (which became evident after Tet 1968) but immoral as well. Although this contributed significantly to the erosion of public support for the war, the military carefully skirted the moral dimension in their critique of Vietnam.
95. Despite the preference among some current military leaders for a "doctrine of limited tears" towards distant humanitarian disasters, much of the American public continues to view American leadership responsibilities as including humanitarian intervention to halt genocide and feed the starving, even at the possible cost of American casualties. See Steven Kull, "What the Public Knows that Washington Doesn't," Foreign Policy 101 (Winter 1995-96): 102-115.
96. See, for example, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," Foreign Affairs 74, 4 (July/August 1995): 2-8; and Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs 75, 1 (January/February 1996): 16-32.
97. See, for example, Arthur Schlesinger, Jr., "Back to the Womb? Isolationism's Renewed Threat," Foreign Affairs 74, 4 (July/August 1995): 2-8; and Michael Mandelbaum, "Foreign Policy as Social Work," Foreign Affairs 75, 1 (January/February 1996): 16-32.