American grand strategy in the age of terror

Survival

Volumn 43, Issue 4, 2001, Pages 19-34

  Ikenberry, G John ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0040329837     PISSN: 00396338     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1093/survival/43.4.19     Document Type: Article

References (50)

1. See Steven Mufson, 'Foreign Policy's 'Pivotal Moment', The Washington Post, 27 September 2001; Joel Garreau, 'Hinges of Opportunity', The Washington Post, 14 October 2001.
2. See Steven Mufson, 'Foreign Policy's 'Pivotal Moment', The Washington Post, 27 September 2001; Joel Garreau, 'Hinges of Opportunity', The Washington Post, 14 October 2001.
3. See for example, Steven Erlanger, 'In Europe, Some Say the Attacks Stemmed from American Failings', The New York Times, 22 September 2001; and Elaine Sciolino, 'Who Hates the US? Who Loves It?', The New York Times, 23 September 2001. For imperial views of American power, see Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2000); and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
4. See for example, Steven Erlanger, 'In Europe, Some Say the Attacks Stemmed from American Failings', The New York Times, 22 September 2001; and Elaine Sciolino, 'Who Hates the US? Who Loves It?', The New York Times, 23 September 2001. For imperial views of American power, see Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2000); and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
5. See for example, Steven Erlanger, 'In Europe, Some Say the Attacks Stemmed from American Failings', The New York Times, 22 September 2001; and Elaine Sciolino, 'Who Hates the US? Who Loves It?', The New York Times, 23 September 2001. For imperial views of American power, see Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2000); and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
6. See for example, Steven Erlanger, 'In Europe, Some Say the Attacks Stemmed from American Failings', The New York Times, 22 September 2001; and Elaine Sciolino, 'Who Hates the US? Who Loves It?', The New York Times, 23 September 2001. For imperial views of American power, see Chalmers Johnson, Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire (New York: Henry Holt and Co., 2000); and Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, Empire (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2000).
7. For descriptions of this democratic core, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order', Review of International Studies, Vol. 25 (Spring 1999); Bruce Cumings, 'Trilateralism and the New World Order', World Policy Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Spring 1991), pp. 195-222; James M. Goldgeier and Michael MacFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', International Organization, Vol. 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-91; and Richard L. Kugler, 'Controlling Chaos: New Axial Strategic Principles', in Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (eds), The Global Century: Globalization and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2000), Vol. 1, pp. 75-107.
8. For descriptions of this democratic core, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order', Review of International Studies, Vol. 25 (Spring 1999); Bruce Cumings, 'Trilateralism and the New World Order', World Policy Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Spring 1991), pp. 195-222; James M. Goldgeier and Michael MacFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', International Organization, Vol. 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-91; and Richard L. Kugler, 'Controlling Chaos: New Axial Strategic Principles', in Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (eds), The Global Century: Globalization and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2000), Vol. 1, pp. 75-107.
9. For descriptions of this democratic core, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order', Review of International Studies, Vol. 25 (Spring 1999); Bruce Cumings, 'Trilateralism and the New World Order', World Policy Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Spring 1991), pp. 195-222; James M. Goldgeier and Michael MacFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', International Organization, Vol. 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-91; and Richard L. Kugler, 'Controlling Chaos: New Axial Strategic Principles', in Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (eds), The Global Century: Globalization and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2000), Vol. 1, pp. 75-107.
10. For descriptions of this democratic core, see Daniel Deudney and G. John Ikenberry, 'The Nature and Sources of Liberal International Order', Review of International Studies, Vol. 25 (Spring 1999); Bruce Cumings, 'Trilateralism and the New World Order', World Policy Journal, Vol. 8, No. 3 (Spring 1991), pp. 195-222; James M. Goldgeier and Michael MacFaul, 'A Tale of Two Worlds: Core and Periphery in the Post-Cold War Era', International Organization, Vol. 46 (Spring 1992), pp. 467-91; and Richard L. Kugler, 'Controlling Chaos: New Axial Strategic Principles', in Kugler and Ellen L. Frost (eds), The Global Century: Globalization and National Security (Washington, D.C.: National Defence University Press, 2000), Vol. 1, pp. 75-107.
11. See Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities', International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993); Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57; Mearsheimer, 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War', The Atlantic, 266 (August 1990), pp. 35-50; Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Christopher Layne, 'What's Built Up Must Come Down', The Washington Post, 14 November 1999. For a new statement of this view, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
12. See Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities', International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993); Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57; Mearsheimer, 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War', The Atlantic, 266 (August 1990), pp. 35-50; Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Christopher Layne, 'What's Built Up Must Come Down', The Washington Post, 14 November 1999. For a new statement of this view, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
13. See Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities', International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993); Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57; Mearsheimer, 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War', The Atlantic, 266 (August 1990), pp. 35-50; Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Christopher Layne, 'What's Built Up Must Come Down', The Washington Post, 14 November 1999. For a new statement of this view, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
14. See Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities', International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993); Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57; Mearsheimer, 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War', The Atlantic, 266 (August 1990), pp. 35-50; Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Christopher Layne, 'What's Built Up Must Come Down', The Washington Post, 14 November 1999. For a new statement of this view, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
15. See Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities', International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993); Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57; Mearsheimer, 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War', The Atlantic, 266 (August 1990), pp. 35-50; Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Christopher Layne, 'What's Built Up Must Come Down', The Washington Post, 14 November 1999. For a new statement of this view, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
16. See Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities', International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993); Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57; Mearsheimer, 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War', The Atlantic, 266 (August 1990), pp. 35-50; Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Christopher Layne, 'What's Built Up Must Come Down', The Washington Post, 14 November 1999. For a new statement of this view, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
17. See Kenneth Waltz, 'The Emerging Structure of International Polities', International Security, Vol. 18, No. 2 (Fall 1993); Waltz, 'Structural Realism after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1 (Summer 2000); John J. Mearsheimer, 'Back to the Future: Instability of Europe after the Cold War', International Security, Vol. 15 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-57; Mearsheimer, 'Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War', The Atlantic, 266 (August 1990), pp. 35-50; Christopher Layne, 'The Unipolar Illusion: Why New Great Powers Will Arise', International Security, Vol. 17, No. 4 (Spring 1993), pp. 5-51; and Christopher Layne, 'What's Built Up Must Come Down', The Washington Post, 14 November 1999. For a new statement of this view, see John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001).
18. Charles A. Kupchan, 'After Pax Americana: Benign Power, Regional Integration, and the Sources of Stable Multipolarity', International Security, Vol. 23, No. 3 (Fall 1998), pp. 40-79.
19. See Charles Kupchan, 'Fractured US Resolve', The Washington Post, Outlook Section, 13 June 1999, B1, B4.
20. For one version of coming regional economic conflict, see Lester Thurow, Head to Head: The Coming Economic Battle among Japan, Europe, and America (New York: William Morrow and Company, 1992).
21. Chalmers Johnson, 'History Restarted: Japanese-American Relations at the End of the Century,' in Johnson, Japan: Who Governs? The Rise of the Developmental State (New York: Norton, 1995).
22. Robert Jervis, 'America and the Twentieth Century: Continuity and Change,' in Michael J. Hogan (ed.), The Ambiguous Legacy: US Foreign Relations in the 'American Century' (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999), p. 100.
23. John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of Postwar American National Security Policy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982), p. 4.
24. See Mary N. Hampton, 'NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany, and the Wilsonian Impulse', Security Studies, Vol. 4 No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 610-56; and Hampton, The Wilsonian Impulse: US Foreign Policy, the Alliance, and German Unification (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996).
25. See Mary N. Hampton, 'NATO at the Creation: US Foreign Policy, West Germany, and the Wilsonian Impulse', Security Studies, Vol. 4 No. 3 (Spring 1995), pp. 610-56; and Hampton, The Wilsonian Impulse: US Foreign Policy, the Alliance, and German Unification (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1996).
26. On the complex, ambivalent, and evolving American thinking on its post-war security commitment to Europe, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Melvin Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).
27. On the complex, ambivalent, and evolving American thinking on its post-war security commitment to Europe, see Marc Trachtenberg, A Constructed Peace: The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999); and Melvin Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, The Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1992).
28. This argument is developed in G. John Ikenberry, After Victory: Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major War (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001).
29. For discussion of security dilemmas, see John Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 2 (1949/50); and Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 30 (1978), pp. 167-214.
30. For discussion of security dilemmas, see John Herz, 'Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 2 (1949/50); and Robert Jervis, 'Cooperation under the Security Dilemma', World Politics, vol. 30 (1978), pp. 167-214.
31. World Bank figures cited in Gerard Baker, 'Liberty's Triumph,' The Financial Times, 23 December 1999.
32. On global power disparities and America's preeminent position, see William Wohlforth, 'The Stability of a Unipolar World', International Security, Vol. 24, No. 1 (Summer 1999), pp. 5-41.
33. See Bruce Russett and John O'Neal, Triangulating Peace: Democracy, Interdependence, and International Organizations (New York: Norton, 2001).
34. John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1997), p. 50.
35. A large and growing literature has emerged on American grand strategy. For surveys, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, 'Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy', International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-97); and G. John Ikenberry (ed.), American Unipolarity and the Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).
36. A large and growing literature has emerged on American grand strategy. For surveys, see Barry R. Posen and Andrew L. Ross, 'Competing Visions for US Grand Strategy', International Security, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Winter 1996-97); and G. John Ikenberry (ed.), American Unipolarity and the Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, forthcoming).
37. James A. Baker, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989-92 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), pp. 605-6.
38. See White House, A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement (Washington, DC: White House, July 1994).
39. The US State Department's Director of Policy Planning, Richard Haass, has coined the term 'à la carte' multilateralism to describe the administration's approach, but important differences in thinking exist across the administration. See Thom Shanker, 'White House Says the US is Not a Loner, Just Choosy', The New York Times, 31 July 2001.
40. Stephen Fidler, 'Between Two Camps', Financial Times, 14 February 2001.
41. See Gerard Baker, 'Bush Heralds Era of US Self-Interest', International Herald Tribune, 24 April 2001.
42. See Thomas E. Ricks, 'US Urged to Embrace an 'Imperial' Role', International Herald Tribune, 22 August 2001.
43. Stephen Fidler, 'Conservatives Determined to Carry Torch for US Missile Defence', Financial Times, 11 July 2001.
44. Secretary of State Powell, National Public Radio Interview, 27 October 2001.
45. Fareed Zakaria, 'Back to the Real World', The Washington Post, 2 October 2001.
46. See Martin Wolf, 'The Economic Failure of Islam', Financial Times, 26 September 2001.
47. Secretary Colin Powell, public statement, 10 October 2001.
48. Robert Jervis, 'International Primacy: Is the Game worth the Candle?', International Security, Vol. 17 (1993), p. 66.
49. See Quentin Peel, 'Washington's Balancing Act', Financial Times, 1 October 2001; and Timothy Garton Ash, 'A New War Reshapes Old Alliances', The New York Times, 12 October 2001.
50. See Quentin Peel, 'Washington's Balancing Act', Financial Times, 1 October 2001; and Timothy Garton Ash, 'A New War Reshapes Old Alliances', The New York Times, 12 October 2001.