Two-level games between rival regimes: Domestic politics and the remaking of cross-Strait relations

Issues and Studies

Volumn 36, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 1-26

  Lin, Jih Wen ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

Cross Strait relations; Democratic peace; Linkage politics; Robert D. Putnam; Two level games

Indexed keywords

EID: 0039257853     PISSN: 10132511     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: None     Document Type: Article

References (48)

1. Taipei Times (Taipei), March 16, 2000.
2. Chong-pin Lin, "The Military Balance in the Taiwan Strait," The China Quarterly, no. 146 (June 1996): 577-95.
3. Taifa Yu, "Taiwanese Democracy under Threat: Impact and Limit of Chinese Military Coercion," Pacific Affairs 70, no. 1 (1997): 7-36.
4. Suisheng Zhao, "Chinese Nationalism and Beijing's Taiwan Policy: A China Threat?" Issues & Studies 36, no. 1 (January/February 2000): 76-99.
5. Andrew Scobell, "Taiwan as Macedonia? Strait Tensions as a Syndrome," Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 21, no. 2 (1998): 181-216.
6. When interviewed by the Deutsche Welle Radio on July 9, 1999, President Lee remarked that since 1991, when the ROC Constitution was amended, cross-Strait relations have been defined as "state-to-state," or at least "a special state-to-state relationship." This statement was regarded by Beijing as a dangerous step toward Taiwan independence and immediately elevated the tension across the Taiwan Strait.
7. On February 21, 2000, the Taiwan Affairs Office and the Information Office of the PRC State Council released a White Paper entitled "The One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue," which states that the PRC could use force if Taiwan delays indefinitely reunification talks. This threat was unprecedented, and incurred immediate and stern warning from the Pentagon of "incalculable consequences." See Washington Post, February 23, 2000.
8. Hung-mao Tien, "Taiwan in 1995: Electoral Politics and Cross-Strait Relations," Asian Survey 36, no. 1 (January 1996): 33-40; David Tawei Lee, "The Prospects for Cross-Strait Dialogue in Light of Domestic Political Factors on Taiwan," Journal of Third World Studies 15, no. 1 (1998): 57-63.
9. Hung-mao Tien, "Taiwan in 1995: Electoral Politics and Cross-Strait Relations," Asian Survey 36, no. 1 (January 1996): 33-40; David Tawei Lee, "The Prospects for Cross-Strait Dialogue in Light of Domestic Political Factors on Taiwan," Journal of Third World Studies 15, no. 1 (1998): 57-63.
10. Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwanese Elections and Cross-Strait Relations: Mainland Policy in Flux," Asian Survey 39, no. 7 (July 1999): 565-87.
11. Suisheng Zhao, "Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence: Beijing's Strategy of National Reunification with Taiwan," Pacific Affairs 72, no. 4 (1999): 495-512.
12. James N. Rosenau, Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems (New York: Free Press, 1969).
13. Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomatic and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," International Organization 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-60.
14. Keisuke Iida, "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (1993): 403-26; Jongryn Mo, "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions," ibid. 38, no. 3 (1994): 402-22; Jongryn Mo, "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 914-24. For recent game-theoretic analyses on linkage politics, see a special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (vol. 41, February 1997) and the introduction written by Robert Pahre and Paul A. Papayoanou entitled "Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics" (pp. 4-11). For a more general discussion on how domestic politics constrains international bargaining, see Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
15. Keisuke Iida, "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (1993): 403-26; Jongryn Mo, "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions," ibid. 38, no. 3 (1994): 402-22; Jongryn Mo, "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 914-24. For recent game-theoretic analyses on linkage politics, see a special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (vol. 41, February 1997) and the introduction written by Robert Pahre and Paul A. Papayoanou entitled "Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics" (pp. 4-11). For a more general discussion on how domestic politics constrains international bargaining, see Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
16. Keisuke Iida, "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (1993): 403-26; Jongryn Mo, "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions," ibid. 38, no. 3 (1994): 402-22; Jongryn Mo, "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 914-24. For recent game-theoretic analyses on linkage politics, see a special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (vol. 41, February 1997) and the introduction written by Robert Pahre and Paul A. Papayoanou entitled "Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics" (pp. 4-11). For a more general discussion on how domestic politics constrains international bargaining, see Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
17. Keisuke Iida, "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (1993): 403-26; Jongryn Mo, "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions," ibid. 38, no. 3 (1994): 402-22; Jongryn Mo, "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 914-24. For recent game-theoretic analyses on linkage politics, see a special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (vol. 41, February 1997) and the introduction written by Robert Pahre and Paul A. Papayoanou entitled "Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics" (pp. 4-11). For a more general discussion on how domestic politics constrains international bargaining, see Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
18. Keisuke Iida, "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (1993): 403-26; Jongryn Mo, "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions," ibid. 38, no. 3 (1994): 402-22; Jongryn Mo, "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 914-24. For recent game-theoretic analyses on linkage politics, see a special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (vol. 41, February 1997) and the introduction written by Robert Pahre and Paul A. Papayoanou entitled "Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics" (pp. 4-11). For a more general discussion on how domestic politics constrains international bargaining, see Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
19. Keisuke Iida, "When and How Do Domestic Constraints Matter? Two-Level Games with Uncertainty," Journal of Conflict Resolution 37, no. 3 (1993): 403-26; Jongryn Mo, "The Logic of Two-Level Games with Endogenous Domestic Coalitions," ibid. 38, no. 3 (1994): 402-22; Jongryn Mo, "Domestic Institutions and International Bargaining: The Agent Veto in Two-Level Games," American Political Science Review 89, no. 4 (1995): 914-24. For recent game-theoretic analyses on linkage politics, see a special issue of the Journal of Conflict Resolution (vol. 41, February 1997) and the introduction written by Robert Pahre and Paul A. Papayoanou entitled "Using Game Theory to Link Domestic and International Politics" (pp. 4-11). For a more general discussion on how domestic politics constrains international bargaining, see Peter Evans, Harold K. Jacobson, and Robert D. Putnam, eds., Double-Edged Diplomacy: International Bargaining and Domestic Politics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993).
20. Putnam, "Diplomatic and Domestic Politics," 437-40.
21. Ibid., 430.
22. Technically speaking, figure 1 of Putnam's paper (p. 441) is problematic. With a fixed status quo, the expansion of the winset must involve the change of a nation's ideal point (maximum outcome), which is different from what the author depicted in the figure.
23. This distinction is especially important to the understanding of cross-Strait relations. In Taiwan, opinion polls consistently reveal an increasing support for the status quo, while in the mainland anxiety grows about the inability to change the status quo.
24. Possible is that the decision-maker aims not only at maximizing his power, but also at realizing his own policy ideals. This is the model that Jongryn Mo constructed (see his "The Logic of Two-Level Games). Although my model does not assume the decision-maker to have a direct interest in policy outcomes, obvious is that he will most likely choose from the winset the outcome that best matches his ideal point.
25. That a nation has a distribution of policy preferences (i.e., |X| > 0) does not suggest that the division is necessarily large. For example, this paper does not reject the claim that the internal schism in the PRC on foreign policies is not as great as imagined, but rather takes the range of policy difference as a variable.
26. Parameters of the other players will be symbolized likewise. In the following, capital and small letters indicate respectively set and point.
27. See Keith Krehbiel, Pivotal Politics: A Theory of U.S. Lawmaking (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), for a detailed introduction of the concept of pivot.
28. Because the first derivative of W to d is 1-2k < 0.
29. Putnam, "Diplomatic and Domestic Politics," 448-49.
30. A crucial distinction should still be made: regime behavior in a dictatorship is susceptible to the dictator's policy position, while a radical action in a consensus democracy is almost always unlikely. See discussion on Implication 3-2.
31. For debates over democratic peace, see Zeev Maoz, "The Controversies over Democratic Peace," International Security 22, no. 1 (1997): 162-98.
32. The range of policy adjustment is therefore affected by the openness of the regime. The more competitive the system is, the greater the pressure for the decision-maker to approach the national median.
33. Important is to note that this statement applies only to the one-dimensional case. In a two-dimensional issue space, the drifting apart of two national medians reduces the international winset but enlarges the domestic winset.
34. For an actual case, see how the disagreement in the Uruguay Round negotiations has delayed domestic agricultural reforms in the United States and the European Union in Robert Paarlberg, "Agricultural Policy Reform and the Uruguay Round: Synergistic Linkage in a Two-Level Game?" International Organization 51, no. 3 (1997): 413-44.
35. For example, Crawford attributes Germany's unilateral recognition of Croatia and Slovenia in 1991, which is a defection from international cooperation, to the regime's weakness in the post-Cold War environment. See Beverly Crawford, "Explaining Detection from International Cooperation: Germany's Unilateral Recognition of Croatia," World Politics 48, no. 4 (July 1996): 482-521.
36. In April 1993, talks were held in Singapore between Taiwan's Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and the PRC's Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS). Lower-level talks continued until they were suspended by Beijing in 1995 after President Lee visited the United States. Unofficial exchanges restarted in 1997 through informal meetings between personnel of the two sides' unofficial representative organizations. Direct SEF-ARATS contacts resumed in April 1998 and the SEF chairman visited the mainland in October 1998. A planned visit by ARATS chairman Wang Daohan to Taiwan, however, was canceled after Lee Teng-hui made the "special state-to-state" statement.
37. For the crisis in 1995 and 1996, see Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); and Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis (London: Routledge, 1997).
38. For the crisis in 1995 and 1996, see Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); and Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis (London: Routledge, 1997).
39. For the crisis in 1995 and 1996, see Ralph N. Clough, Cooperation or Conflict in the Taiwan Strait? (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1999); John W. Garver, Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); and Suisheng Zhao, ed., Across the Taiwan Strait: Mainland China, Taiwan and the 1995-1996 Crisis (London: Routledge, 1997).
40. The positions of the U.S. government on the China issue are manifested by the three U.S.-PRC joint communiqués. The 1972 communiqué stated that "the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side ot the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the United States Government does not challenge that position." The wording changed a little bit in the 1978 communiqué: "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." A slightly different statement was made in the 1982 communiqué: The U.S. government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." See 〈http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/ commpg.html〉.
41. The positions of the U.S. government on the China issue are manifested by the three U.S.-PRC joint communiqués. The 1972 communiqué stated that "the United States acknowledges that all Chinese on either side ot the Taiwan Strait maintain there is but one China and that Taiwan is a part of China, and that the United States Government does not challenge that position." The wording changed a little bit in the 1978 communiqué: "The Government of the United States of America acknowledges the Chinese position that there is but one China and Taiwan is part of China." A slightly different statement was made in the 1982 communiqué: The U.S. government attaches great importance to its relations with China, and reiterates that it has no intention of infringing on Chinese sovereignty and territorial integrity, or interfering in China's internal affairs, or pursuing a policy of "two Chinas" or "one China, one Taiwan." See 〈http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ea/uschina/ commpg.html〉.
42. As such, my data does not consider secret negotiations, yet at least measures how the players respond to the policy changes of each other. Even secretive deals cannot easily violate official guidelines, especially on issues involving national sovereignty.
43. The first power transition took place when Lee took over the presidency after Chiang Ching-kuo's death in January 1988. This event was unexpected and therefore does not fit the model. Taiwan's Legislative Yuan elections are run under the single nontransferable multi-member district system (SNTV-MMD), where campaign issues are generally parochial and personalistic. Presidential elections in 1996 and 2000 are therefore the major indicators of Taiwan's power transition.
44. Nominally, the highest organ of state power of the PRC is the National People's Congress (NPC), which convenes every five years to elect the PRC president and state councilors. NPC deputies are elected every five years, a tenure that is the same as the president's. The CCP's National Congress is held every five years. The National Congress elects the Central Committee which then selects the Politburo of the CCP Central Committee. The Politburo includes a Standing Committee and other members.
45. Other cases include the replacement of Hu Yaobang with Zhao Ziyang as the premier in 1987, the replacement of Zhao with Li Peng after the Tiananmen Square Incident of 1989, and Zhu Rongji's becoming premier in 1998.
46. Zhao, "Military Coercion and Peaceful Offence," 501.
47. Important is to note that the above analysis by no means suggests that the incumbent is always radicalized by the need of power consolidation. As 1 explained in answering Question 4, to be included in a winset a weak incumbent can move toward the international median if he is originally offensive, or move away from the international median if he is originally moderate. These moves can create unexpected and paradoxical outcomes.
48. A well-known result in the spatial model is that the core is generally empty in multidimensional issue space and that all status quo are improvable.