Taiwanese democracy under threat: Impact and limit of Chinese military coercion

Pacific Affairs

Volumn 70, Issue 1, 1997, Pages 7-32

  Yu, Taifa ^a  

^a NONE

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

DEMOCRACY; DEVELOPING COUNTRY; MILITARY ACTION; NATIONAL POLITICS; POLITICAL THREAT;

CHINA; TAIWAN;

EID: 85044491365     PISSN: 0030851X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/2761226     Document Type: Article

References (80)

1. Alexander L. George and William E. Simons have identified the factors conducive to a successful exercise of coercive diplomacy in their co-edited book, The Limits of Coercive Diplomacy (Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), pp. 279-91.
2. Deng Xiaoping has stated that economic integration of China and Taiwan is the most effective means to curb separatist sentiments on Taiwan. British Broadcasting Corporation (henceforth abbreviated as BBC), 8 April 1994, p. 1. Chinese Premier Li Peng justified China's refusal to renounce the use of force on the ground that Taiwan might declare independence with the support of "foreign forces." See "Senior Chinese Official Wang Zhaoguo Says Taiwan Leaders Responsible for Tension," BBC, 7 March 1996, p. 1. An article in Liberation Army Daily explained China's refusal to abandon the use of force as intended to deter foreign intervention and Taiwan's declaration of independence. See Xinhua News Agency, 30 January 1996, p. 1.
3. Deng Xiaoping has stated that economic integration of China and Taiwan is the most effective means to curb separatist sentiments on Taiwan. British Broadcasting Corporation (henceforth abbreviated as BBC), 8 April 1994, p. 1. Chinese Premier Li Peng justified China's refusal to renounce the use of force on the ground that Taiwan might declare independence with the support of "foreign forces." See "Senior Chinese Official Wang Zhaoguo Says Taiwan Leaders Responsible for Tension," BBC, 7 March 1996, p. 1. An article in Liberation Army Daily explained China's refusal to abandon the use of force as intended to deter foreign intervention and Taiwan's declaration of independence. See Xinhua News Agency, 30 January 1996, p. 1.
4. Deng Xiaoping has stated that economic integration of China and Taiwan is the most effective means to curb separatist sentiments on Taiwan. British Broadcasting Corporation (henceforth abbreviated as BBC), 8 April 1994, p. 1. Chinese Premier Li Peng justified China's refusal to renounce the use of force on the ground that Taiwan might declare independence with the support of "foreign forces." See "Senior Chinese Official Wang Zhaoguo Says Taiwan Leaders Responsible for Tension," BBC, 7 March 1996, p. 1. An article in Liberation Army Daily explained China's refusal to abandon the use of force as intended to deter foreign intervention and Taiwan's declaration of independence. See Xinhua News Agency, 30 January 1996, p. 1.
5. Deng Xiaoping has stated that economic integration of China and Taiwan is the most effective means to curb separatist sentiments on Taiwan. British Broadcasting Corporation (henceforth abbreviated as BBC), 8 April 1994, p. 1. Chinese Premier Li Peng justified China's refusal to renounce the use of force on the ground that Taiwan might declare independence with the support of "foreign forces." See "Senior Chinese Official Wang Zhaoguo Says Taiwan Leaders Responsible for Tension," BBC, 7 March 1996, p. 1. An article in Liberation Army Daily explained China's refusal to abandon the use of force as intended to deter foreign intervention and Taiwan's declaration of independence. See Xinhua News Agency, 30 January 1996, p. 1.
6. "Trade Exchanges Across Taiwan Strait Urged," Xinhua News Agency, 2 February 1996, p. 1.
7. "Taiwanese Support for Unification Has Dropped Substantially," World Journal, (henceforth abbreviated as WJ), 20 June 1995, p. A1. The other public opinion poll was conducted by the 21st Century Foundation and reported in WJ, 17 December 1994, p. A6.
8. "Taiwanese Support for Unification Has Dropped Substantially," World Journal, (henceforth abbreviated as WJ), 20 June 1995, p. A1. The other public opinion poll was conducted by the 21st Century Foundation and reported in WJ, 17 December 1994, p. A6.
9. "China Will Use Force If Support for Taiwan's Independence Reaches 50 Percent," WJ, 23 December 1994, p. A1.
10. "Chinese Vice Premier Warns against Taiwan Independence," China Central Television, 29 September 1991, quoted by BBC, 2 October 1992, p. 1.
11. "Chinese Vice Premier Warns against Taiwan Independence," China Central Television, 29 September 1991, quoted by BBC, 2 October 1992, p. 1.
12. '"One China, One Taiwan' Trends in Taiwan Warrant Attention," Liaowang, 21 December 1993, pp. 21-23.
13. China warned President Lee Teng-hui that if he continued to pursue "Tai Du" or "Du Tai," "a new crisis will break out at any time." "Taiwan Urged to Adjust 'Political Orientation,'" BBC, 31 March 1996, p. 1.
14. "The CCP's Reaction to Drastic Changes in Taiwan's Political Situation," Hsin Pao, 5 February 1993, p. 8.
15. "Taiwan Defense Ministry Report on Possible Forms of Mainland China Aggression," BBC, 9 March 1994, p. 1.
16. Central Daily News (henceforth abbreviated as CDN), 29 March 1996, p. 1.
17. "Perpetuating the Separation of Taiwan from China Guarantees Japan's Political and Economic Interest," WJ, 28 December 1994, p. A10. See also "A Sino-Japanese Tussle: Tensions over Taiwan Are Ruffling Relations," Asiaweek, 9 November 1994, p. 33.
18. "Perpetuating the Separation of Taiwan from China Guarantees Japan's Political and Economic Interest," WJ, 28 December 1994, p. A10. See also "A Sino-Japanese Tussle: Tensions over Taiwan Are Ruffling Relations," Asiaweek, 9 November 1994, p. 33.
19. "Renmin Ribao Column Deries US Talk of Resurrecting Containment Policy," BBC, 13 July 1995, p. 1. See also "The United States Turns Its Guns West toward East Asia," FBIS, 22 December 1995, p. 15.
20. "Renmin Ribao Column Deries US Talk of Resurrecting Containment Policy," BBC, 13 July 1995, p. 1. See also "The United States Turns Its Guns West toward East Asia," FBIS, 22 December 1995, p. 15.
21. "Guangming Ribao Article Sees Self-interest behind U.S. Talk of 'China Threat,'" BBC, 14 July 1995, p. 1. See also "Ta Kung Pao Says US-Vietnamese Diplomatic Ties Part of Strategy to Contain China," Ta Kung Pao, 12 July 1995, p. A2. See also "That's Enough Nose-tweaking; Interests of Both Beijing and Washington Demand Some Calm Problem Solving," Los Angeles Times, 21 July 1995, p. 8.
22. "Guangming Ribao Article Sees Self-interest behind U.S. Talk of 'China Threat,'" BBC, 14 July 1995, p. 1. See also "Ta Kung Pao Says US-Vietnamese Diplomatic Ties Part of Strategy to Contain China," Ta Kung Pao, 12 July 1995, p. A2. See also "That's Enough Nose-tweaking; Interests of Both Beijing and Washington Demand Some Calm Problem Solving," Los Angeles Times, 21 July 1995, p. 8.
23. "Guangming Ribao Article Sees Self-interest behind U.S. Talk of 'China Threat,'" BBC, 14 July 1995, p. 1. See also "Ta Kung Pao Says US-Vietnamese Diplomatic Ties Part of Strategy to Contain China," Ta Kung Pao, 12 July 1995, p. A2. See also "That's Enough Nose-tweaking; Interests of Both Beijing and Washington Demand Some Calm Problem Solving," Los Angeles Times, 21 July 1995, p. 8.
24. "USA's Foreign Policy Is Harmful to China's Sovereignty," Wen Wei Pao, 7 February 1995, p. A2. See also "An Erroneous Decision That Undermines Sino-U.S. Relations," BBC, 9 September 1992, p. 1.
25. "USA's Foreign Policy Is Harmful to China's Sovereignty," Wen Wei Pao, 7 February 1995, p. A2. See also "An Erroneous Decision That Undermines Sino-U.S. Relations," BBC, 9 September 1992, p. 1.
26. "Li Peng Speaks on Taiwan Issues," Xinhua News Agency, 30 January 1996, p. 1.
27. "Army Sways Policy," South China Morning Post (henceforth abbreviated as SCMP), 16 November 1995, p. 1. See Also "Jiang Bowing to the Army Bullies," SCMP, 29 November 1995, p. 19.
28. "Army Sways Policy," South China Morning Post (henceforth abbreviated as SCMP), 16 November 1995, p. 1. See Also "Jiang Bowing to the Army Bullies," SCMP, 29 November 1995, p. 19.
29. "Denouncing Lee Teng-hui As Having Strategic Plan for Taiwan Independence," BBC, 22 October 1994, p. 1.
30. "All of China's Seven Military Regions Reportedly Renamed," WJ, 3 January 1996, p. A2.
31. "KMT Spokesman Says Mainland's Actions Aimed at President's Election," Lien Ho Pao, 20 July 1995, p. 3. See also World Journal, 15 August 1995, p. A7 and 30 August 1995, p. A10.
32. "KMT Spokesman Says Mainland's Actions Aimed at President's Election," Lien Ho Pao, 20 July 1995, p. 3. See also World Journal, 15 August 1995, p. A7 and 30 August 1995, p. A10.
33. Renmin Ribao's editorial articles criticizing Lee were reported in WJ, 25 July 1995; 27 July, 1995; 5 August 1995; and 9 August 1995.
34. "China Has Mapped Out a Three-stage Strategy," WJ, 30 November 1995, p. A1. See also "Chinese Military Suggests Moderate Use of Force to Compel Taiwan to Give Up Presidential Election Next Year," Lien Ho Pao, 5 November 1995, p. 1.
35. "China Has Mapped Out a Three-stage Strategy," WJ, 30 November 1995, p. A1. See also "Chinese Military Suggests Moderate Use of Force to Compel Taiwan to Give Up Presidential Election Next Year," Lien Ho Pao, 5 November 1995, p. 1.
36. "China-US Ties Warm a Bit As China-Taiwan Relations Chill," New York Times, 18 November 1995, p. A3. A pro-China news agency, Hong Kong Chinese News Agency, printed a series of articles warning against voting for pro-independence candidates. WJ, 31 August 1995, p. A10. Rumored Chinese missile attack plan was reported in an article, "As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens," New York Times, 24 January 1996, p. A3.
37. "China-US Ties Warm a Bit As China-Taiwan Relations Chill," New York Times, 18 November 1995, p. A3. A pro-China news agency, Hong Kong Chinese News Agency, printed a series of articles warning against voting for pro-independence candidates. WJ, 31 August 1995, p. A10. Rumored Chinese missile attack plan was reported in an article, "As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens," New York Times, 24 January 1996, p. A3.
38. "China-US Ties Warm a Bit As China-Taiwan Relations Chill," New York Times, 18 November 1995, p. A3. A pro-China news agency, Hong Kong Chinese News Agency, printed a series of articles warning against voting for pro-independence candidates. WJ, 31 August 1995, p. A10. Rumored Chinese missile attack plan was reported in an article, "As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens," New York Times, 24 January 1996, p. A3.
39. "China-US Ties Warm a Bit As China-Taiwan Relations Chill," New York Times, 18 November 1995, p. A3. A pro-China news agency, Hong Kong Chinese News Agency, printed a series of articles warning against voting for pro-independence candidates. WJ, 31 August 1995, p. A10. Rumored Chinese missile attack plan was reported in an article, "As China Threatens Taiwan, It Makes Sure U.S. Listens," New York Times, 24 January 1996, p. A3.
40. Public opinion polls are obtained from CDN, 2 February 1996, p. 1; WJ, 12 March 1996, p. A7; WJ, 30 January 1996, p. A1; and WJ, 8 December 1995, p. A1.
41. Public opinion polls are obtained from CDN, 2 February 1996, p. 1; WJ, 12 March 1996, p. A7; WJ, 30 January 1996, p. A1; and WJ, 8 December 1995, p. A1.
42. Public opinion polls are obtained from CDN, 2 February 1996, p. 1; WJ, 12 March 1996, p. A7; WJ, 30 January 1996, p. A1; and WJ, 8 December 1995, p. A1.
43. Public opinion polls are obtained from CDN, 2 February 1996, p. 1; WJ, 12 March 1996, p. A7; WJ, 30 January 1996, p. A1; and WJ, 8 December 1995, p. A1.
44. See WJ, 9 March 1996, p. A2. The more recent poll was reported in Ming Pao, 21 June 1996, p. 1.
45. See WJ, 9 March 1996, p. A2. The more recent poll was reported in Ming Pao, 21 June 1996, p. 1.
46. A public opinion poll, conducted by the Democratic Progressive party, shows that 78.4 percent of the Taiwanese supported Lee's visit to the U.S. and believed it would promote Taiwan's interest, as compared with 5.7 percent who were opposed. Close to 60 percent of the respondents favored the pursuit of an independent foreign policy in spite of China's reactions, as compared with 15 percent who cared about how China would respond to such provocative move. The poll was reported in WJ, 19 June 1995, p. A1.
47. Statistics are taken from a Gallup poll (Taiwan), and the poll was reported in WJ, 6 November 1995, p. A6.
48. The Executive Yuan conducted a public opinion survey, which found 85 percent of respondents thought the development of foreign relations was necessary and 59.7 percent believed progress in developing foreign relations could also help improve relations between China and Taiwan. The same poll showed that 35 percent assigned top priority to developing foreign relations and only 7.5 percent to developing exchanges with China while 43.9 percent thought both were equally important. See WJ, 1 July 1995, p. A2.
49. "Public Opinion by the Council of Mainland China Affairs Counterattacks China's Verbal Attacks and Military Coercion," WJ, 17 September 1995, p. A6. A survey conducted by the Democratic Progressive party shows 67 percent of respondents rejected the Chinese treatment of Taiwan as part of the People's Republic of China. See WJ, 17 August 1995, p. A6.
50. "Public Opinion by the Council of Mainland China Affairs Counterattacks China's Verbal Attacks and Military Coercion," WJ, 17 September 1995, p. A6. A survey conducted by the Democratic Progressive party shows 67 percent of respondents rejected the Chinese treatment of Taiwan as part of the People's Republic of China. See WJ, 17 August 1995, p. A6.
51. CDN, 2 October, 1995. The DPP began to tone down the need to declare independence during the campaign, even though "Fundamentalists" in the party still rejected such a change. See WJ, 17 September 1995, p. A2.
52. CDN, 2 October, 1995. The DPP began to tone down the need to declare independence during the campaign, even though "Fundamentalists" in the party still rejected such a change. See WJ, 17 September 1995, p. A2.
53. "Beijing Scholars Comment on Significance of Taiwan's Election," BBC, 15 December 1995, pp. 1-2.
54. "The DPP Redefines the 'Era of Grand Reconciliation' As Social Reform Movement," WJ, 19 December 1995, p. A6.
55. Hsu lamented that China's missile test led many voters to question his policy of "bold westward advance" and hurt his chance of winning the DPP's endorsement of his presidential candidacy. See WJ, 18 September 1995, p. A2.
56. See WJ, 6 March 1996, p. A2.
57. Of the voters, 48 percent thought Peng's victory would aggravate tension with China, as opposed to a mere 6 percent who thought the relaxation of tension was possible. Public opinion was divided over the impact of Lee's victory over future relations with China: 27 percent believed tension with China would intensify if Lee won, as compared with 21 percent who held the opposite view. Only 8 percent thought Chen would aggravate tension with China and 35 percent thought the relations might improve. See WJ, 31 January 1996, p. A2.
58. WJ, 4 March 1996, p. A6.
59. WJ, 26 August 1995, p. A6.
60. President Lee has reiterated that Taiwan would only be "swallowed" by China unless its national sovereignty was recognized. CDN, 1 November 1995, p. 1.
61. "Senior Generals Mount Pressure on Jiang," Cheng Ming (August 1995), pp. 8-9. "Voices Demand Jiang's Resignation at the National People's Congress," Cheng Ming (August 1995), pp. 10-11. "Apprehensive That Military Attack on Taiwan Would Plunge Hong Kong into Crisis, Jiang Warned the PLA against Rach Actions," WJ, 7 February 1996, p. A1. "Jiang Bowing to the Army Bullies," p. 19. See also "President Jiang Initially Rejected Transfer of Troops for Exercises," Ming Pao, 26 February 1996, p. A2.
62. "Senior Generals Mount Pressure on Jiang," Cheng Ming (August 1995), pp. 8-9. "Voices Demand Jiang's Resignation at the National People's Congress," Cheng Ming (August 1995), pp. 10-11. "Apprehensive That Military Attack on Taiwan Would Plunge Hong Kong into Crisis, Jiang Warned the PLA against Rach Actions," WJ, 7 February 1996, p. A1. "Jiang Bowing to the Army Bullies," p. 19. See also "President Jiang Initially Rejected Transfer of Troops for Exercises," Ming Pao, 26 February 1996, p. A2.
63. "Senior Generals Mount Pressure on Jiang," Cheng Ming (August 1995), pp. 8-9. "Voices Demand Jiang's Resignation at the National People's Congress," Cheng Ming (August 1995), pp. 10-11. "Apprehensive That Military Attack on Taiwan Would Plunge Hong Kong into Crisis, Jiang Warned the PLA against Rach Actions," WJ, 7 February 1996, p. A1. "Jiang Bowing to the Army Bullies," p. 19. See also "President Jiang Initially Rejected Transfer of Troops for Exercises," Ming Pao, 26 February 1996, p. A2.
64. "Senior Generals Mount Pressure on Jiang," Cheng Ming (August 1995), pp. 8-9. "Voices Demand Jiang's Resignation at the National People's Congress," Cheng Ming (August 1995), pp. 10-11. "Apprehensive That Military Attack on Taiwan Would Plunge Hong Kong into Crisis, Jiang Warned the PLA against Rach Actions," WJ, 7 February 1996, p. A1. "Jiang Bowing to the Army Bullies," p. 19. See also "President Jiang Initially Rejected Transfer of Troops for Exercises," Ming Pao, 26 February 1996, p. A2.
65. "Senior Generals Mount Pressure on Jiang," Cheng Ming (August 1995), pp. 8-9. "Voices Demand Jiang's Resignation at the National People's Congress," Cheng Ming (August 1995), pp. 10-11. "Apprehensive That Military Attack on Taiwan Would Plunge Hong Kong into Crisis, Jiang Warned the PLA against Rach Actions," WJ, 7 February 1996, p. A1. "Jiang Bowing to the Army Bullies," p. 19. See also "President Jiang Initially Rejected Transfer of Troops for Exercises," Ming Pao, 26 February 1996, p. A2.
66. "Hard-liners Urge a Deadline for Negotiations with Taiwan," WJ, 24 January 1996, p. A1.
67. WJ, 7 February 1996, p. A1. Earlier, Wang Daohan, president of the semiofficial Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait, also reiterated to Taiwanese investors and businessmen that "we believe that it takes time to solve the Taiwan issue and to realize unification." See SCMP, 29 November 1995, p. 19. See "Beijing Warns Taipei Investors," SCMP, 30 October 1995, p. 8.
68. WJ, 7 February 1996, p. A1. Earlier, Wang Daohan, president of the semiofficial Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait, also reiterated to Taiwanese investors and businessmen that "we believe that it takes time to solve the Taiwan issue and to realize unification." See SCMP, 29 November 1995, p. 19. See "Beijing Warns Taipei Investors," SCMP, 30 October 1995, p. 8.
69. WJ, 7 February 1996, p. A1. Earlier, Wang Daohan, president of the semiofficial Association for Relations across the Taiwan Strait, also reiterated to Taiwanese investors and businessmen that "we believe that it takes time to solve the Taiwan issue and to realize unification." See SCMP, 29 November 1995, p. 19. See "Beijing Warns Taipei Investors," SCMP, 30 October 1995, p. 8.
70. Patrick E. Tyler, "China Signaling U.S. That It Will Not Invade Taiwan," New York Times, 13 March 1996, p. A3.
71. Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Qian Qichen urged the Taiwanese "not to panic" over the missile tests but warned that they would face "real disaster" only if Taiwan insisted on declaring independence. Sheng Kuo-fang, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called the missile tests "routine exercises" and gave assurances that the "Taiwanese people" were not the target. See WJ, 8 March 1996, p. A1. Wang Zhaoguo, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, stated that military exercises were "not directed against the Taiwan compatriots, but against forces that want to bring about 'the independence of Taiwan' and foreign forces that want to interfere with China's reunification," BBC, 7 March 1996, p. 1.
72. Chinese Foreign Affairs Minister Qian Qichen urged the Taiwanese "not to panic" over the missile tests but warned that they would face "real disaster" only if Taiwan insisted on declaring independence. Sheng Kuo-fang, the spokesman for the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, called the missile tests "routine exercises" and gave assurances that the "Taiwanese people" were not the target. See WJ, 8 March 1996, p. A1. Wang Zhaoguo, director of the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council, stated that military exercises were "not directed against the Taiwan compatriots, but against forces that want to bring about 'the independence of Taiwan' and foreign forces that want to interfere with China's reunification," BBC, 7 March 1996, p. 1.
73. "Wang Zhao-guo Reiterates Absolute Protection for Taiwanese Businessmen's Interests And Rights," WJ, 2 August 1995, p. A10.
74. "High Ranking Officials of Government and Parties Express Strong Concerns after the Announcement of the Missile Tests," WJ, 20 July 1995, p. A1.
75. One poll shows that 41 percent of voters credited Lee with his ability to "stabilize" society and alleviate their rising concerns, as compared with 23 percent who thought he could restore harmony in Taiwan's relations with China. See WJ, 24 August 1996, p. A1.
76. The ROC government officials have reiterated that Taiwan will not be pressure into negotiation. See CDN, 29 March 1996, p. 1.
77. Steven Mufson, "Chinese Ships, Planes Maneuver Near Taiwan," Washington Post, 13 Jarch 1996, p. A18.
78. Theresa Hitchens and Naoaki Usui, "China Sees Japan's TMD As Threat to Nuclear Might," Defense News, 22-28 April 1996, p. 12.
79. Gregor Ferguson, "Australia Plans Proactive Stance in Asian-Pacific Defense," Defense News, 19 May 1996, p. 18.
80. WJ, 17 January 1996, p. A14.