A tale of two cultures: Building the Superconducting Super Collider, 1988-1993

Historical Studies in the Physical and Biological Sciences

Volumn 32, Issue 1, 2001, Pages 125-144

  Riordan, Michael ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA SANTA CRUZ   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

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EID: 0039246835     PISSN: 08909997     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1525/hsps.2001.32.1.125     Document Type: Article

References (107)

1. Peter Galison, Bruce Hevly, and Rebecca Lower, "Controlling the monster: Stanford and the growth of physics research, 1935-1962," in Peter Galison and Bruce Hevly, Big science: The growth of large-scale research (Stanford, 1992), 46-77.
2. Robert Smith, The space telescope: A study of NASA, science, technology and politics (New York, 1989), esp. chapt. 6, 187-220.
3. Robert P. Crease, Making physics: A biography of Brookhaven National Laboratory, 1946-1972 (Chicago, 1999), 69-92.
4. Wolfgang Panofsky, private communication. According to Panofsky, McCone flew out to the Oakland Navy base for a face-to-face meeting with him and Stanford trustee David Packard to resolve this contentious issue. See also Galison et al. (ref. 1), 70.
5. Thomas P. Hughes, American genesis: A century of innovation and technological enthusiasm (New York, 1989), 381-421; David Hounshell, "DuPont and the management of large-scale research and development," in Galison and Hevly (ref. 1), 236-263, esp. 245-254.
6. Thomas P. Hughes, American genesis: A century of innovation and technological enthusiasm (New York, 1989), 381-421; David Hounshell, "DuPont and the management of large-scale research and development," in Galison and Hevly (ref. 1), 236-263, esp. 245-254.
7. Catherine Westfall and Lillian Hoddeson, "Thinking small in big science: The founding of Fermilab, 1960-72, Technology and culture, 37 (1996), 457-492.
8. Conflicts between scientists and engineers occurred in reaching the decision to build the intersecting storage rings at CERN, where the desires of accelerator physicists and engineers to construct a new kind of atom smasher took precedence over the scientific goals of the experimental high-energy physicists; see Dominique Pestre. "The second generation of accelerators for CERN, 1956-1965: The decision-making process," in Armin Hermann et al., eds., History of CERN. Vol. 2 (Amsterdam, 1990), 679-780. See also Galison, "Time projection chambers: An image falling through space," in Galison, Image and logic (Chicago, 1997) 553-688, esp. 614-627, and R.W. Smith (ref. 2), 197-220.
9. Conflicts between scientists and engineers occurred in reaching the decision to build the intersecting storage rings at CERN, where the desires of accelerator physicists and engineers to construct a new kind of atom smasher took precedence over the scientific goals of the experimental high-energy physicists; see Dominique Pestre. "The second generation of accelerators for CERN, 1956-1965: The decision-making process," in Armin Hermann et al., eds., History of CERN. Vol. 2 (Amsterdam, 1990), 679-780. See also Galison, "Time projection chambers: An image falling through space," in Galison, Image and logic (Chicago, 1997) 553-688, esp. 614-627, and R.W. Smith (ref. 2), 197-220.
10. Conflicts between scientists and engineers occurred in reaching the decision to build the intersecting storage rings at CERN, where the desires of accelerator physicists and engineers to construct a new kind of atom smasher took precedence over the scientific goals of the experimental high-energy physicists; see Dominique Pestre. "The second generation of accelerators for CERN, 1956-1965: The decision-making process," in Armin Hermann et al., eds., History of CERN. Vol. 2 (Amsterdam, 1990), 679-780. See also Galison, "Time projection chambers: An image falling through space," in Galison, Image and logic (Chicago, 1997) 553-688, esp. 614-627, and R.W. Smith (ref. 2), 197-220.
11. Michael Riordan, "The demise of the Superconducting Super Collider," in Physics in perspective, 2 (Winter 2000), 411-425. Daniel J Kevles, The physicists: The history of a scientific community in modern America (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1995), preface, and "Big science and big politics in the United States: Reflections on the death of the SSC and the life of the Human Genome Project," HSPS, 27:2 (1997), 269-297.
12. Michael Riordan, "The demise of the Superconducting Super Collider," in Physics in perspective, 2 (Winter 2000), 411-425. Daniel J Kevles, The physicists: The history of a scientific community in modern America (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1995), preface, and "Big science and big politics in the United States: Reflections on the death of the SSC and the life of the Human Genome Project," HSPS, 27:2 (1997), 269-297.
13. Michael Riordan, "The demise of the Superconducting Super Collider," in Physics in perspective, 2 (Winter 2000), 411-425. Daniel J Kevles, The physicists: The history of a scientific community in modern America (2nd edn., Cambridge, 1995), preface, and "Big science and big politics in the United States: Reflections on the death of the SSC and the life of the Human Genome Project," HSPS, 27:2 (1997), 269-297.
14. Lillian Hoddeson and Adrienne W. Kolb, "The Superconducting Super Collider's frontier outpost, 1983-88," Minerva, 38 (2000), 271-310.
15. SSC Central Design Group, "Conceptual design report of the Superconducting Super Collider," Lawrence Berkeley Laboratory report no. SSC-SR-2020 (Berkeley, CA, Mar 1986);
16. Hoddeson and Kolb (ref. 9).
17. Glenn Sandiford, "Reason and rationality in the SSC site selection, 1987-88" in Michael Riordan et al., Tunnel visions: The rise and fall cf the Superconducting Super Collider (in preparation). Cf. Catherine Westfall, "The site contest for Fermilab," Physics today, 42 (1989), 44-52.
18. Glenn Sandiford, "Reason and rationality in the SSC site selection, 1987-88" in Michael Riordan et al., Tunnel visions: The rise and fall cf the Superconducting Super Collider (in preparation). Cf. Catherine Westfall, "The site contest for Fermilab," Physics today, 42 (1989), 44-52.
19. Hoddeson and Kolb (ref. 9).
20. Crease (ref. 3), 22-39.
21. Steven C. Weiss, "Management in the realm of 'real money': DOE and the SSC, 1988-92," in Michael Riordan et al. (ref. 11); Wolfgang Panofsky, private communication.
22. U.S. Department of Energy, "Request for proposals for a management and operating contractor for establishment and initial operation of the Superconducting Super Collider (SSC) Laboratory," Department of Energy RFP no. DE-RP02-88ER40486 (Washington, 1988).
23. Edward Knapp, interview by Lillian Hoddeson, 14 Jul 1997.
24. Hoddeson and Kolb (ref. 9); N. Douglas Pewitt, interview by Michael Riordan, 3 May 1998. Pewitt had received a Ph.D. in high energy physics from Florida State University and before that had served in the Navy. During the 1970s, he had worked as a budget analyst in the U.S. Office of Management and Budget, and from 1981 to 1983 he served as a deputy to the Presidential Science Adviser George Keyworth. When Knapp called upon him to draft URA's proposal, he was working at the Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC), a large scientific consulting firm headquartered in the suburban Washington, D.C., area. While Pewitt may have had extensive experience in Washington bureaucracies, however, he lacked significant experience in the management of large projects.
25. Universities Research Association, Inc., "Technical proposal for the selection of a management and operating contractor for the establishment, management and initial operation of the SSC Laboratory" (Washington, D.C., 4 Nov1988; copy available in Fermilab archives, Batavia, IL), I.3.0-1-I.3.0-9; quote on I.3 0-2. The proposal noted that Sverdrup had managed construction of the U.S. Navy's $1.4 billion Trident submarine facilities at Kings Bay, Georgia, and the $250 million Space Shuttle launch complex #6 at the Vandenberg Air Force Base in California; EG&G had served as the management and operations contractor at DOE's Nevada Test Site and Idaho Engineering Laboratory.
26. Jeffrey Mervis, "Supercollider suffering birth pangs," The scientist (2 Oct 1989), 2.
27. Roy Schwitters, interviews by Michael Riordan, 22 Mar 1997 and 31 Mar 1998.
28. Some, such as CDG Associate Directors Christopher Quigg and Stanley Wojcicki, served in temporary roles as consultants to the project but never assumed permanent positions in the SSC Laboratory.
29. Thomas Bush, interview by Michael Riordan, 2 Apr 1998, and Thomas Kirk, private communication, 17 June 1999. After he retired from the Navy in 1987, Bush began working for SAIC on nuclear attack drills and Russian weapons systems; he was employed there when contacted by Schwitters in early 1989.
30. David Ritson, "Demise of the Texas Supercollider," Nature, 366 (1993), 607-610, quote on 608.
31. These other recruitment problems included the fact that the Dallas/Fort Worth area had no first-tier academic institutions, the lack of good schools for children in the areas south of Dallas, and the DOE's reluctance to approve substantial raises for physicists who were willing to join the new laboratory.
32. Ritson (ref. 23), 608.
33. N.D. Pewitt memo to Schwitters, "Sverdrup Corporation performance re: conventional facilities requirements definition," 11 Oct 1989, SSC files of N.D. Pewitt, Fermilab archives, Batavia, IL.
34. Schwitters, interview by Riordan, 22 Mar 1997.
35. Robert J. Smith, "Supercollider could face cutbacks," Washington post (19 Nov 1989), 1; Irwin Goodwin, "Trying times: Cost of remodeling the SSC causes Texans to circle their wagons," Physics today, 43 (1990), 45-47; Ritson (ref. 23), 608-609.
36. Robert J. Smith, "Supercollider could face cutbacks," Washington post (19 Nov 1989), 1; Irwin Goodwin, "Trying times: Cost of remodeling the SSC causes Texans to circle their wagons," Physics today, 43 (1990), 45-47; Ritson (ref. 23), 608-609.
37. Robert J. Smith, "Supercollider could face cutbacks," Washington post (19 Nov 1989), 1; Irwin Goodwin, "Trying times: Cost of remodeling the SSC causes Texans to circle their wagons," Physics today, 43 (1990), 45-47; Ritson (ref. 23), 608-609.
38. David P. Hamilton, "The SSC gets its (official) price tag: $8.3 billion," Science, 251 (1991), 741.
39. Philip Kuntz, "Super collider paves the way for members' pork projects," Congressional quarterly, 48 (1990), 1949-51; Alissa J. Rubin "Super Collider surges ahead despite concerns over cost," Congressional quarterly, 49 (1991), 856-857.
40. Philip Kuntz, "Super collider paves the way for members' pork projects," Congressional quarterly, 48 (1990), 1949-51; Alissa J. Rubin "Super Collider surges ahead despite concerns over cost," Congressional quarterly, 49 (1991), 856-857.
41. Irwin Goodwin, "Making news by calling it quits, Bucy leaves a message for the SSC," Physics today, 43 (1990), 52-53.
42. Trained as a mechanical engineer, Watkins rose through the Navy as a protégé of Admiral Hymann Rickover, commanding a nuclear-powered attack submarine and a cruiser. In early 1989, President Bush asked him to lead DOE mainly to address the environmental and safety hazards at the DOE complex of nuclear weapons labs and bomb production facilities. See Gregg Easterbrook, "Radio free Watkins and the crisis at Energy," Washington post magazine (18 Feb 1990), 16-40. Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York, 1998), 15-195.
43. Trained as a mechanical engineer, Watkins rose through the Navy as a protégé of Admiral Hymann Rickover, commanding a nuclear-powered attack submarine and a cruiser. In early 1989, President Bush asked him to lead DOE mainly to address the environmental and safety hazards at the DOE complex of nuclear weapons labs and bomb production facilities. See Gregg Easterbrook, "Radio free Watkins and the crisis at Energy," Washington post magazine (18 Feb 1990), 16-40. Thomas P. Hughes, Rescuing Prometheus (New York, 1998), 15-195.
44. James N. Watkins, interview by Michael Riordan and Steven Weiss, 2 Feb 1990.
45. U.S. Department of Energy press release, "Watkins names Cipriano project manager of the Superconducting Super Collider," 19 Apr 1990. Cipriano had just stepped down as executive director of the U.S. Naval Sea Systems Command. He originally assumed the title of "project manager" (later changed to "project director"), the same title of the key position URA was then trying to fill.
46. Ref. 33.
47. Joseph Cipriano, interview by Michael Riordan, 28 Jan 2000. Redacted copies of most of the Cipriano memos to Watkins were discovered in the SSC files of David Goldston, the legislative director for New York Congressman Sherwood Boehlert, one of SSC's staunchest opponents.
48. Schwitters, interview by Riordan, 31 Mar 1998; Roy Schwitters memo to distribution, "Project management changes," 12 Mar 1990, SSC files of N.D. Pewitt, Fermilab archives; memo from Raphael Kasper to Schwitters, "Recommendation of the project manager search committee," 19 Jul 1990, SSC files of Wolfgang Panofsky, SLAC archives. Stanford, CA.
49. Siskin received a B.S. degree in electrical engineering from the University of Pennsylvania and had worked as a nuclear engineer. He served in the Naval Reactors Division of the U.S. Atomic Energy Commission from 1963 to 1977, reporting to Admiral Rickover, at Stone and Webster, Inc., where he rose to the position of executive vice president before stepping down in 1990.
50. Crease (ref. 3), 32-37; Hughes (ref. 5), 391-411.
51. Crease (ref. 3), 32-37; Hughes (ref. 5), 391-411.
52. Edward Siskin, interview by Michael Riordan, 2 June 2000; John Toll, interview by Riordan and Weiss, 11 Feb 1996; Ritson (ref. 23), 609.
53. Edward Siskin, interview by Michael Riordan, 2 June 2000; John Toll, interview by Riordan and Weiss, 11 Feb 1996; Ritson (ref. 23), 609.
54. An unpublished DOE report dated October 1990 optimistically noted: "Management has been substantially strengthened, with Edward Siskin recently appointed as General Manager, bringing large project management expertise together with the strong technical expertise available at the SSC Laboratory." U.S. Department of Energy, "SSC status report" (Washington, D.C., 1990), SSC files of Michael Riordan.
55. Joseph Cipriano, memo to James N. Watkins, 28 Sep 1990, SSC files of D. Goldston. Cipriano refers to John Ives and George Robertson, two engineers experienced in military construction projects, who had begun to assume leading roles in the SSC Laboratory hierarchy.
56. Wolfgang Panofsky, confidential memo to SSC Board of Overseers files, "Changes in the top management structure of the SSC," 8 Oct 1990 (italics added), SSC files of Wolfgang Panofsky, SLAC archives.
57. Siskin (ref. 40).
58. Joseph Cipriano, memo to James N. Watkins, 12 Jan 1991.
59. Bush (ref. 22);
60. Harvey Lynch, private communication, 22 Oct 1996.
61. For other examples of such conflicts, see Galison (ref. 7), 614-618.
62. G.F. Dugan and J.R. Sanford, eds., "Superconducting Super Collider: A retrospective summary, 1989-93," SSC Laboratory report no. SSCL-SR-1235 (Dallas, Apr 1994), graph on 302. Copy available in Fermilab archives.
63. SSC Laboratory internal memorandum, "Summary of the meeting and recommendations of the Superconducting Super Collider pragram advisory committee" (Snowmass, CO, 1990), Riordan SSC files.
64. Robert P. Crease, "Choosing detectors for the SSC," Science, 250 (1990), 1648-1650.
65. R.F. Schwitters, "Decision memorandum - on aspects of the initial scientific program for the SSC," 4 Jan 1991, Riordan SSC files.
66. R.F. Schwitters, "Report to the PAC," 3 May 1991, Riordan SSC files. In this document, he noted that the anticipated cost of the L* detector might exceed $764 million.
67. Robert Pool, "SSC gets new detector," Nature, 351 (1991), 681.
68. Nicholas Samios, "High energy physics at Brookhaven National Laboratory," in Rene Donaldson et al., Proceedings, 1982 Summer study on elementary particle physics and future facilities, 28 June -16 Jul 1982, Snowmass, CO (Batavia, IL, 1983), 140-45, esp. table on p. 140.
69. Ref. 20.
70. Ritson (ref. 23), 609.
71. Siskin (ref. 40); Cipriano, memo to Watkins, 8 Mar 1991.
72. Siskin (ref. 40); Cipriano, memo to Watkins, 8 Mar 1991.
73. DOE and URA had agreed to this oversight role although there were substantial ambiguities in the contract with respect to construction management; W. Panofsky, private communications.
74. Thomas W. Lippman, "House votes to kill expensive Superconducting Super Collider in Texas," Washington post (18 June 1992), A10; David P. Hamilton, "Lightning strikes the SSC," Science, 256 (1992), 1752-1753; Holly Idelson, "House denies atom smasher its 1993 expense account," Congressional quarterly, 50 (1992), 1782-1785.
75. Thomas W. Lippman, "House votes to kill expensive Superconducting Super Collider in Texas," Washington post (18 June 1992), A10; David P. Hamilton, "Lightning strikes the SSC," Science, 256 (1992), 1752-1753; Holly Idelson, "House denies atom smasher its 1993 expense account," Congressional quarterly, 50 (1992), 1782-1785.
76. Thomas W. Lippman, "House votes to kill expensive Superconducting Super Collider in Texas," Washington post (18 June 1992), A10; David P. Hamilton, "Lightning strikes the SSC," Science, 256 (1992), 1752-1753; Holly Idelson, "House denies atom smasher its 1993 expense account," Congressional quarterly, 50 (1992), 1782-1785.
77. Clifford Krauss, "Senate endorses further spending on supercollider," New York times (4 Aug 1992), 1; David P. Hamilton, "Senate issues a stay of execution," Science, 257 (1992), 737.
78. Clifford Krauss, "Senate endorses further spending on supercollider," New York times (4 Aug 1992), 1; David P. Hamilton, "Senate issues a stay of execution," Science, 257 (1992), 737.
79. Ritson (ref. 23), 609.
80. John Rees, private communication, 6 Feb 2001.
81. Ritson (ref. 23), 609.
82. Thomas Kirk, private communication, 17 June 1999.
83. Malcolm W. Browne, "Building a behemoth against great odds," New York times (23 Mar 1993), C1; Karl Brown, private communication, 9 Jul 1997. This comment further illustrates the cultural divide between the high-energy physicists and military-industrial engineers.
84. Malcolm W. Browne, "Building a behemoth against great odds," New York times (23 Mar 1993), C1; Karl Brown, private communication, 9 Jul 1997. This comment further illustrates the cultural divide between the high-energy physicists and military-industrial engineers.
85. George Hager, "Is the deficit now too big for Congress to tame?" Congressional quarterly, 51 (1992), 1140-1147.
86. Ritson gives an excellent example of President Bush's jawboning activities in (ref. 23), 609-610.
87. Colin Macilwain, "SSC falls victim to Congressional austerity," Nature, 364 (1993), 6; "House votes big to kill SSC," Science, 261 (1993), 27.
88. Colin Macilwain, "SSC falls victim to Congressional austerity," Nature, 364 (1993), 6; "House votes big to kill SSC," Science, 261 (1993), 27.
89. Colin Macilwain, "Barrage of mud fails to stick on sinking super collider," Nature, 364 (1993), 92; Christopher Anderson, "University consortium faulted on management, accounting," Science, 261 (1993), 157; Mike Mills, "Oversight questions nag effort to save super collider again," Congressional quarterly, 51 (1993), 2031-2034.
90. Colin Macilwain, "Barrage of mud fails to stick on sinking super collider," Nature, 364 (1993), 92; Christopher Anderson, "University consortium faulted on management, accounting," Science, 261 (1993), 157; Mike Mills, "Oversight questions nag effort to save super collider again," Congressional quarterly, 51 (1993), 2031-2034.
91. Colin Macilwain, "Barrage of mud fails to stick on sinking super collider," Nature, 364 (1993), 92; Christopher Anderson, "University consortium faulted on management, accounting," Science, 261 (1993), 157; Mike Mills, "Oversight questions nag effort to save super collider again," Congressional quarterly, 51 (1993), 2031-2034.
92. Anderson (ref. 69), 157.
93. Mike Mills, "Collider 'problems' lead O'Leary to replace its main contractor," Congressional quarterly, 51 (1993), 2156.
94. Ritson (ref. 23), 610.
95. Mike Mills, "Super Collider, advanced reactor withstand assaults in Senate," Congressional quarterly, 51 (1993), 2628-2630.
96. Michael Wines, "House kills the supercollider, and now it might stay dead," New York times (20 Oct 1993), A1; Mike Mills, "Super collider backers cave after pivotal House vote," Congressional quarterly, 51 (1993), 2866-2870.
97. Michael Wines, "House kills the supercollider, and now it might stay dead," New York times (20 Oct 1993), A1; Mike Mills, "Super collider backers cave after pivotal House vote," Congressional quarterly, 51 (1993), 2866-2870.
98. Memo, "SSC management concerns," copied from SSC files of Kim McDonald, obtained in FOIA request to DOE, n.d.
99. Ritson (ref. 23), 610.
100. Hughes (ref. 5), 392-98; Hounshell (ref. 5), 245-254.
101. Hughes (ref. 5), 392-98; Hounshell (ref. 5), 245-254.
102. Hughes (ref. 32).
103. An explicit statement of this philosophy, written after the SSC collapse, can be found in a letter by Wolfgang Panofsky, Physics today (Mar 1994), 13-85. "Major scientific laboratories operated by universities for the government after World War II were not simply contractors but partners with government, with both parties sharing a common interest in scientific achievement....But now this postwar partnership is eroding. It is sharply criticized in Congress as providing insufficient accountability."
104. For example, although the Continuous Electron Beam Accelerator Facility (now known as the Thomas Jefferson National Laboratory) nearly doubled its total construction cost from $263 to $513 million, it encountered far less Congressional scrutiny than the SSC. See U.S. General Accounting Office, "Department of Energy: Opportunity to improve management of major systems acquisitions," report no. GAO/RCED-97-17 (Washington, 1966), esp. appendix II, 52.
105. The political organization of CERN keeps control of its major scientific projects firmly in the hands of the CERN Council, effectively insulating them from possible intrusions by member countries once a project has begun.
106. John Krige, "Felix Bloch and and the creation of a 'scientific spirit' at CERN" (in this issue) on the importance attached to having an eminent physicist serving as the Director General, and John Krige, "The nomination of the first Director General and its aftermath," Armin Hermann et al., History of CERN. Vol. 1 (Amsterdam, 1987), 261-273.
107. John Krige, "Felix Bloch and and the creation of a 'scientific spirit' at CERN" (in this issue) on the importance attached to having an eminent physicist serving as the Director General, and John Krige, "The nomination of the first Director General and its aftermath," Armin Hermann et al., History of CERN. Vol. 1 (Amsterdam, 1987), 261-273.