The economic turn in comparative politics

Comparative Political Studies

Volumn 33, Issue 6, 2000, Pages 822-844

  Levi, Margaret ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038998801     PISSN: 00104140     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/001041400003300606     Document Type: Article

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