Only for my own neighborhood? Preferences and voluntary provision of local and global public goods

Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization

Volumn 52, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 115-131

  Blackwell, Calvin ^a   McKee, Michael ^b  

^a School of Business   (United States)

^b University of Tennessee   (United States)

Author keywords

Experiment; Public goods; Voluntary contribution mechanism

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038648685     PISSN: 01672681     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0167-2681(02)00178-6     Document Type: Article

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