Economic science: An experimental approach for teaching and research

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 69, Issue 4, 2003, Pages 755-771

  Holt, Charles A ^a  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0038335974     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1061650     Document Type: Conference Paper

References (47)

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2. Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt. 1998b. A theoretical analysis of altruism and decision error in public goods games. Journal of Public Economics 70:297-323.
3. Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt. 2001. Minimum-effort coordination games: Stochastic potential and logit equilibrium. Games and Economic Behavior 34:177-99.
4. Anderson, Simon P., Jacob K. Goeree, and Charles A. Holt. 2002. The logit equilibrium: A unified perspective on intuitive behavioral anomalies in games with rank-based payoffs. Southern Economic Journal 68:21-47.
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