Agendas and strategic voting

Southern Economic Journal

Volumn 65, Issue 3, 1999, Pages 622-629

  Holt, Charles A ^a   Anderson, Lisa R ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA   (United States)

^b The College of William and Mary   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0033409236     PISSN: 00384038     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.2307/1060821     Document Type: Article

References (13)

1. Brams, Steven J. 1976. Paradoxes in politics: An introduction to the nonobvious in political science. New York: Free Press.
2. Buchanan, James M., and Gordon Tullock. 1962. The calculus of consent. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.
3. Eckel, Catherine, and Charles A. Holt. 1989. Strategic voting in agenda-controlled committee experiments. American Economic Review 79:763-73.
4. Fiorina, Morris P., and Charles R. Plott. 1978. Committee decisions under majority rule: An experimental study. American Political Science Review 72:575-98.
5. Fischer, Alstair J. 1996. Voting as a decision process. Unpublished paper, University of Adelaide.
6. Holt, Charles A. 1996. Classroom games: Trading in a pit market. Journal of Economic Perspectives 10(1):193-203.
7. Holt, Charles A., and Susan K. Laury. 1997. Classroom games: Voluntary provision of a public good. Journal of Economic Perspectives 11(4):209-15.
8. Holt, Charles A., and Roger Sherman. 1998. Classroom games: A market for lemons. Journal of Economic Perspectives. In press.
9. Levine, Michael E., and Charles R. Plott. 1977. Agenda influence and its implications. Virginia Law Review 63:561-604.
10. McKelvey, Richard D, and Peter C. Ordeshook. 1990. A decade of experimental research on spatial models of elections and committees. In Advances in the spatial theory of voting, edited by James N. Enelow and Melvin J. Hinich. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 99-144.
11. Mueller, Dennis C. 1989. Public choice II. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
12. Neufeld, John L., William J. Hausman, and Ronald B. Rapoport. 1994. A paradox of voting: Cyclical majorities and the case of muscle shoals. Political Research Quarterly 47:423-38.
13. Plott, Charles R., and Michael E. Levine. 1978. A model of agenda influence on committee decisions. American Economic Review 68:146-70.