Incentives for anticompetitive behavior by public enterprises

Review of Industrial Organization

Volumn 22, Issue 3, 2003, Pages 183-206

  Sappington, David E M ^a   Sidak, J Gregory ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF FLORIDA   (United States)

^b Amer Entpr Inst Pub Plcy Res   (United States)

Author keywords

Anticompetitive behavior; Public enterprises

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); INDUSTRIAL PERFORMANCE; PUBLIC SECTOR; STRATEGIC APPROACH; TRADE POLICY;

EID: 0037670171     PISSN: 0889938X     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1023607223501     Document Type: Article

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