Structural embeddedness and intergroup conflict

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 45, Issue 6, 2001, Pages 743-769

  Takács, Károly ^a,b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF GRONINGEN   (Netherlands)

^b Interuniv Ctr Social Sci T   (Netherlands)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0035540691     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002701045006003     Document Type: Review

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