On the public choice critique of welfare economics

Public Choice

Volumn 114, Issue 3-4, 2003, Pages 253-273

  Besley, Timothy ^a   Coate, Stephen ^b  

^a LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (United Kingdom)

^b Department of Obstetrics Gynecology   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037282301     PISSN: 00485829     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1023/A:1022649814774     Document Type: Review

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