Bargaining outcomes as the result of coordinated expectations: An experimental study of sequential bargaining

Journal of Conflict Resolution

Volumn 47, Issue 2, 2003, Pages 119-139

  Carpenter, Jeffrey P ^a  

^a MIDDLEBURY COLLEGE   (United States)

Author keywords

Bounded rationality; Convention; Experiment; Fairness; Finite Markov chain; Learning; Sequential bargaining

Indexed keywords

EID: 0037275415     PISSN: 00220027     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1177/0022002702251023     Document Type: Article

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