Strict liability as a deterrent in toxic waste management: Empirical evidence from accident and spill data

Journal of Environmental Economics and Management

Volumn 38, Issue 1, 1999, Pages 20-48

  Alberini, Anna ^a   Austin, David H ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF COLORADO   (United States)

^b RESOURCES FOR THE FUTURE   (United States)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

ENVIRONMENTAL ECONOMICS; HAZARDOUS WASTE; LIABILITY; WASTE MANAGEMENT;

EID: 0032850085     PISSN: 00950696     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1006/jeem.1999.1074     Document Type: Article

References (25)

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