Spillovers and international competition for investments

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 59, Issue 1, 2003, Pages 211-238

  Olsen, Trond E ^a   Osmundsen, Petter ^b  

^a UNIVERSITY OF STAVANGER   (Norway)

^b NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

Common agency; Externalities; Mobility; Spillovers; Tax competition

Indexed keywords

COMPETITION (ECONOMICS); INVESTMENT; MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE; SPILLOVER EFFECT;

EID: 0037222640     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(02)00086-7     Document Type: Article

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