Internationally mobile firms and tax policy

Journal of International Economics

Volumn 45, Issue 1, 1998, Pages 97-113

  Osmundsen, P ^a   Hagen, K P ^a   Schjelderup, G ^a  

^a NORWEGIAN SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS   (Norway)

Author keywords

[No Author keywords available]

Indexed keywords

INTERNATIONAL TRADE; INVESTMENT; MOBILE FIRMS; TAXATION POLICY; THEORY;

EID: 0031751769     PISSN: 00221996     EISSN: None     Source Type: Journal    
DOI: 10.1016/S0022-1996(97)00028-7     Document Type: Article

References (11)

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